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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The demographic structure of  European countries is changing considerably.  The old-age· 
dependency  ratio  is  increasing  in  most  countries  and  reaching  historically 
unprecedented levels.  Although the long term effects of the ageing  process on public 
budgets are rather uncertain, depending on the way the economy and society will adapt 
to the process, a significant pressure towards higher public expenditure is very likely to 
occur in the coming decades. Pension schemes and health care systems will bear much of 
the pressure  since  their  expenditure  is  highly  dependent  on the  age  structure of the 
population. 
This paper· provides  a  survey  of the  national projections  on pension  expenditure 
ca"ied out  in  the  15  Member  States  of the  European  Union.  Although  these 
projections are not homogeneous in approach, have been produced in different years and 
are based  on different  economic and  demographic  assumptions,  they  are  essential for 
understanding pension dynamics in the Union Member States. National projections are 
based on a wealth of data and institutional knowledge concerning Member ·States' public 
finances that international studies cannot achieve. In particular, they provide an estimate 
of the effects of legislative,  social and  economic changes influencing pension dynamics 
over and above demographic trends. 
Although the focus of this  survey  is  on  the latest projections produced by public 
institutions; an effort has .been made to  ~xamine all  relev~t projections carried out in : 
each country.  The survey focuses on unchanged policy projections. It must be stressed· 
that all projections are  taken  at face  value,  and  no  judgement is  made  about their 
validity. 
The future shape of European pension systems is examined over three periods:  the next 
five years, the first decade ofthe 21st century and the following decades. 
The conclusions, which are based on unchanged policy projections, are the following: 
a)  In  the  next  5 years,  expenditure pressures  stemming from public  pension_ 
systems,  although  non-negligible,  are  expected to  be rather  limited in  most 
countries.  Under favourable  economic scenarios,  over the period  1995-2000 the 
unweighted  average  of the  ratios  of pension  expenditure  to  GDP  in  the ·15 
countries considered will  increase by  about 0.1  percentage points.  The  outlook 
would be rather worse if economic activity were to slow down- markedly:  under 
unfavourable  scenarios,  the  unweighted  average  of  the  ratios  of  pension 
expenditure to GDP would increase by 0.4 percentage points. 
b)  In the first decade of  the next century, the outlook for the pension  sy~tems gets 
· worse. Even under favourable economic assumptions, the expenditure to  GDP 
ratio  is expected to  increase in most countries.  In the  period  2000-2010,  the 
unweighted average of pension expenditure to GDP ratios in the 13  countries for 
which  projections up  to the year  2010  are  available  will  increase  by  about 0.5 Ill 
percentage points. Under the least favourable economic scenarios, the increase will 
reach 1.2 percentage points. 
c)  After 2010, when the baby-boom generation retires,  the situation of  European 
pension  systems  deteriorates  more  sharply.  The  change  irt  the  pension 
expenditure trend  is  quite  radical for  the countries where the ageing  process is 
relatively  late.  Over the  period  2010-2030,  the  unweighted  average  of pension 
expenditure to GDP ratios in the 11  countries for which projections up to the year 
2030 are available will increase by about 2.0 percentage points (see Chart A below; 
the GDP-weighted increase is  steeper,  see Chart B).  Under the  least favourable 
economic scenarios, the increase will reach 2.3 percentage points_ 
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d)  Over  the  whole  period  1995-2030,  the  cumulative  increase  in  the· average 
expenditure ratio for the  11  above-mentioned countries would  re~ch 3  .0  points in 
the favourable scenarios and 4. 0 in the unfavourable ones.  Considerable increases 
in the pension burden will occur ~so in some countries that have already reformed 
their pension schemes.  By· the year 2030 in several countries  (Belgium,  Finland, 
France, Germany,  Italy and  the Netherlands) the ratio  of pension .expenditure to 
GDP might be in the range of 15  to 20 per cent.  Expenditure would be lower in 
Denmark, Spain,  Sweden (in the 10 to  15  per cent range),  and in Ireland and  the 
United Kingdom (below 10 per cent).  · 
The survey also highlights the following points: 
e)  Over the last decade, several national projections. have been revised.  The estimate 
of  the contribution rate required to finance pension expenditure has generally been 
revised upwards.  Some changes have been quite substantial. Past revisions do  not 
offer any insights into possible future revision of present estimates. However, they 
point to the usefulness of  carrying out regular reviews of projections and analysing 
past projection errors. 
f)  In  most  ~countries  present  pension  policies  are  quite  different  from  those 
implemented  in  previous  decades.  The  phase of ~tension of coverage  and 
improvement of benefits is  over,  although in a few countries past extensions 
and improvements are still affecting expenditure growth.  Since the mid.:.eighties 
several  pension  schemes  have  been  reformed  in  order  ·to  red_uce  pension 
expenditure growth. 
g)  In most countries only demographic trends are presently increasing the expenditure 
to GDP ratio. In several countries the effects. of  demographic trends will be partly 
offset by reforms aimed at restraining expenditure growth.  For this  reason, the 
projections  carried  out  by  the  IMF  and  the· OECD  in  the  eighties  (based  on 
constant transfer and eligibility ratios) have generally turned out more pessimistic 
than present national projections. 
h)  Given the large expected changes in demographic structure, in several countries 
the  preservation  of present  benefit  levels  and  eligibility  rules  requires  a· 
substantial increase in the national resources devoted to the pension systems; 
alternatively,  the stabilisation of  pension expenditure requires further severe 
cuts in pension benefit levels and substantial restrictions in pension eligibility. 
The national projections surveyed in this paper give an account of  the efforts of national 
authorities and  researchers to  develop  forecasting  models that provide more accurate, 
more frequent and longer term projections. It shows how the gradual recognition of  the 
ageing problem has led to similar methodological solutions. However, the differences in 
approach,  in the periods  of reference,  in coverage,  and  in economic and  demographic 
assumptions, severely hamper the comparability of  national estimates. 
In order to  develop  internationally comparable projections of  pension expenditure, 
· common  forecasting  methodologies  should  be·  defined  and  economic  and 
de'!lographic assumptions should be harmonised. --------------
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INTRODUCTION 
The demographic structure of  European countries is changing considerably. The old-age 
dependency  ratio  is  increasing  in  most  countries  and  reaching  historically 
unprecedented levels. 1 Although the long-term effects of the ageing process on public 
budgets are rather uncertain,  2 depending on the way the economy and  society will adapt 
to the process, a significant pressure towards higher public expenditure is· very likely to 
occur in the coming decades. Pension schemes aild health care systems will bear much of 
the pressure since  their  expenditure  is  highly  dependent  on the  age  structure of the 
1  .  3  popu atwn. 
This  paper is  part  of a . research  proj~ct  that  examines  the  prospects  for  public  ~ 
expenditure in the Member States of  the European Union. The project aims at assessing · 
the dimension,  the timing and the nature of  the strain on the budget· consolidation 
process arisingfrom demtJgraphic changes. 
More specifically,  this paper provides  a survey of national. projections  on pension 
expenditure (about 55  studies have been examined). Although these projections are not 
homogeneous  in  approach,  have  been  produced  in  different  years  and  are based  on 
different economic and  demographic assumptions,  they are essential for understanding 
pension dynamics  in the  Union Member  States.  National projections  are  based  on a 
wealth of data and institutional knowledge concerning Member States' public finances· 
that international studies cannot achieve.  In particular,  they provide an estimate of the 
effects of  legislative, social and economic changes influencing pension dynamics over and 
above demographic trends  . 
The survey  also  aims  at giving  an  account of the efforts  of national  authorities  and 
researchers to develop forecasting models that provide more accurate, more frequent and 
See European Commission (1994a, 1994b) and OECD (1988a). 
2  See, for instance, Pearson et al. (1989). 
3  See the data reported in OECD (1988a). 2 
longer term projections. It shows how the gradual recognition of  the ageing problem has 
led to similar methodological solutions. 
The survey  covers projections produced in  all.the 15 European  Union  countries . 
. Projections carried out by public institutions are available for 14 countries, the exception 
being Portugal, where forecasts by academic institutions have been considered. 
Although the focus of this  survey  is  on  the latest projections produced by public . 
institutions, an effort has been made to examine a few alternative projections for each 
country.  This  allows  some  comparisons  of  t~e  estimates  carried  out  by  different 
institutions or by the same institution in different years. Whenever possible, academic or 
private institutions' projections have been considered besides those produced by public 
institutions. In the case of the countries that have implemented recent major reforms of 
the pension system,  the outlook for the system before and after the reforms is  usually 
considered. 
The survey focuses on unchanged policy projections. This approach provides a useful 
benchmark for evaluating the need for reform. 
All  projecti~ms are taken at face value, and no judgement is made about their validity. 
The future shape of European pension systems is examined over three periods: the next 
five years, the first decade of  the 21st century and the following decades,.  Given the long-
term nature of  pension arrangements, these periods can be respectively named the short-, 
the medium- and the long-term.  · 
The paper is structured as follows. Part I provides a general overview of  the features and 
results of  pension expenditure projections carried out in the EU Member States. Section 
I.l outlines the main problems involved in forecasting pension expenditure.  Section L2 
surveys. the projections carried out by the IMF and the OECD  .. Section I.3  examines the 
main features of  the projections carried out in the European Union countries.  Section 1.4 
examines  the prospects for  the  European pension  schemes  as  presented  in  the  most 
recent projections carried out by a public institution in each Member State.  Section I. 5 
presents some tentative estimates of the overall effects ·of pension schemes  on public 
budgets.  Section  16  summarises  the  main  result  of the  study.  Part  II  outlines  the 
· characteristics and the results of  the main projections carried out in each Member State. 
The  main  problems  raised  in  national  debates  on  pension  policy  are  also  briefly 
considered.  Annex A  reports  data on social  spending  in  the EU Member.  Annex  B 
presents  Charts  outlining  the  role  of demographic  and  non-demographic  factors  m 
expected future expenditure trends in each country. 
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PART I 
A GENERAL OVERVIEW 
Ll  FORECASTING PENSION EXPENDITURE 
The ratio ofthe elderly to working-age population (i.e., the old-age dependency ratio) is 
increasing fast in most Western countries.  In the European Union,  according to  some 
recent projections, it will rise from 22.9 per cent in 1995 to 25.8-28.7 per cent in 2010 
and to 30.8-40.6 per cent in 2025 (see Box 1).4 It is an unprecedented trend that,  since 
the  early  eighties,  has  raised  worries  about  pension  expenditure  growth  and  the 
sustainability- of  P  A  YG pension systems.  The recent development of models forecasting 
pension expenditure dynamics is largely a reflection of  these worries. 
Box No.1 
DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION 
In  recent  years  national  and  international  institutions  have  carried  out  several  long-term 
projections of population. Forecasts for the European Union .Member States were produced in 
1991  by Eurostat; forecasts for all countries were released in 1994 by the World Bank (see 8os. 
et  a/.).  New  long-term  demographic  projections  for  the  European  Union  were  recently 
commissioned by the European  Commission (see Eding,  1995; see also the papers presented 
at  the  seminar  New Long-Term  Population  Scenarios. for  the  European  Economic  Area  -
Eurostat-European Commission- Luxembourg 1995). 
Among the four scenarios considered in the new projections, two are most relevant for pension 
expenditure: the 'youngest population' scenario and the 'most aged  population' scenario. The 
former assumes high fertility (with total fertility rates in the 15 courtries in the 1.8-2.1  range in 
4  The data refer to the ratio of  population 65 and over to population 15-64. Different age brackets could be 
considered for  the numerator (for instance,  population 60  and over) and  the  denominator  (for instance, 
population 20-59, or 15-64, or 20-64). The level of the dependency ratio would obviously change, but the 
tendency toward higher levels would be unaffected. 4 
the year 2020),  small increases in  life expectancy (1.4-2.2 years  in  the different countries for 
males and  1.0-1.9 years for females at birth in the period up to 2050)  ~nd high  net migration 
(an  inflow of 800,000 persons per year for the Union).  The  latter assumes  low fertility (total 
fertility rates in the 1.3-1.6 range), high increases in  life expectancy (8.1-1 0.3 years for males 
and 6.7-8.1 years for females) and low  net migration (250,000 persons per year). 
In the first scenario, total EU population increases from  ~70.4 million in  1'994 to 396.0 in  2010 
and 400.1  in  2025. Population increases are  most relevant in  France (7.8 million), the United 
Kingdom  (4.8  million),  Germany (4.2  million),  the  Netherlands  (2.9  million)  and  Spain  (2.2 
million); the  percentage increase  is  highest  in  Luxembourg  (44.6  per cent).  Italy is the  only 
country with a declining population (0.5 million). In the second scenariQ, total EU population will 
increase  up to the year 2010  (to 376.3  million) and  decrease  afterwards  (to  371.6  million in 
2025). Germany, Ireland and Italy record a peak in the population  before the year 2000.  Only 
France,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands,  Sweden  and  the  United  Kingdom  will  experience  a 
continuing increase in total population. 
A significant ageing  of European  population occurs  under both  scenarios (see the population 
pyramids below).  In  the  'youngest population'  scenario  the  ratio  of the  citizens  aged 65  and 
over to total population increases from  15.3 per cent in  1995 to  19.5 per cent in  2025; iri the 
'most aged population' scenario it reaches 25.1  per cent. This process affects all countries, with 
Germany  and  Italy  reaching  the  highest  ratios  in  both  scenarios;  Ireland  and  Luxembourg 
record  the  lowest ratios  in  the  first  scenario,  while  Denmark and  Portugal  record  the  lowest 
ratios in the second scenario.  · 
90+ 
75-79 
60-64 
"'  .  1  ;j  45-49 
I 
i 
30-34 
15-19 
EUR15: 1995 
Male  I 
I 
! 
: 
-10000  -0--1~00~00- 20000JI  Population (thousands) 
EUR15: 2025 'Most Aged Pop.' 
80-84 
70-74 
60-64 
"'  50-54 
C> 
<  40-44 
30-34 
20-24 
10-14 
0-4 1----t-
·20000  -10000  0  10000 
Population {thousands) 
20000 
til  ~-2~0000~---1~0000---0--1~0000--2~00~00__jl  ~~  Population (thousands)  . 
'----------·--,----------' 
The ratio of the elderly (population aged 65  and  over) to working-age population  (aged  15 to 
64)would increase even faster (see Chart below). The worsening of the ratio accelerates after 
the year 2010, when the generations born after the Second World War reach 65. The ratio will 
peak after the year 2025, when the generations born  in the sixties move from the working-age 
group to the elderly group.  ·  · 
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In the first scenario, the ratio of people aged 80 and overto people aged 65 and over increases 
from 24.9 per cent in  1994 to 25.6 per cent in 2010  and  thereafter deciines 24.2 per cent in 
2025; in the second scenario, it increases to 28.7 per cent in 201 O.and 31.4 per cent in 2025. In 
the first scenario, the ratio of people aged 50-64 to people aged  15~64 rncreases from 24.9 per 
cent in  1994 to 28.7 in 2010 and 31.4 in 2025;  in the second  it increases respectively to 29.4 
and 36.3per cent. Both the elderly and the workers will therefore gradually age. 
This section aims at outlining the following four points: 
a)  Pension  expenditure  cannot  be  accurately  forecast  only  on  the  ba$iS  of 
demographic  trends;  legislative,  social  and  economic  changes  greatly  influence 
pension dynamics over and above demographic trends. 
b)  Most pension systems are quite complex. Accurate projections therefore require a 
wealth of  data and institutional knowledge that only national institutions can have. 
c)  Pension  expenditure  projections  are  largely  affected  by  demographic  and 
macroeconomic assumptions;  the uncertainty concerning the long-term values of 
these  factors  suggests  that  projections  outcomes  should  be  evaluated  quite 
cautiously.  Different  assumptions  should  be  considered  in  order to  provide  the 
range of  likely outcomes. 
d)  In order to provide a measure of the need  for reform,  in the projections pension 
. policies can be assumed as unchanged. On the contrary, changes in ·social attitudes 
should be envisaged. Citizens' retirement behaviour can change over time and can 
be affected by the demographic and economic scenarios and by their effects on the 
contribution rates of pension schemes. Ideally, the behaviour of individuals should 
be endogenized in the projections. This also points to the need for some sensitivity 
analysis. 
The most common indicators of  the evolution of  pension expenditure are also presented. 6 
11.1 Demographic and non demographic factors- Although demographic change. is 
the  most  important  exogenous  factor  affecting  pension  expenditure  growth,  pension 
expenditure cannot be accurately forecast only on the basis of demographic trends. 5 
Pension expenditure dynamics are actually influenced also by changes in legislation (that 
defines eligibility rules, the amount granted to new pensioners, indexation mechanisms, 
etc.), past and present employment (that influences the length of  workers' membership in 
pension  schemes  and  the  distribution  of w.orkers  among  the  different  schemes),  and 
social  attitudes  (as  those  towards  early  retirement  and  the  demand.  for  disability 
benefi.ts).6 While legislation basically determines the supply of  pensions, the other factors 
define the demand for them stemming from .citizens. These fact<:>rs  can affect the various 
benefits provided by pension schemes in most countries in differe_nt ways. 7 
In order to highlight the problems faced in projecting pension expenditure, one can refer 
to some simple accounting identities.  Following the OECD (1988b) approach, the ratio 
of pension  expenditure  (EXPP)  to  GDP  can  be  expressed  on  the  basis  of the  four 
following ratios: 
a)  The Old-age dependency ratio= Population at pensionable age  (PO~)  divided by 
the population at working age (POPw). 
b)  The Eligibility  ratio =  Number of pension. beneficiaries (NPEN)  divided by  the 
population at pensionable age (PO~). 
c)  The Transfer ratio = Average pension per beneficiary  (pa)  divided  by GDP  per 
worker (gdpw). 
d)  The  Employment  ratio 
employment (NWOR) . 
Population  at  working  age  (POPw)  divided  by 
.  The ratio of  public expenditure on old-age pensions to GDP can therefore be written as:8 
5 
6 
7 
8 
EXPP  -(POPP)*(NPEN)*(  Pa  )*( POPw·) 
GDP  - PQPw  PO~  gdpw.  NWOR 
The methodology for forecasting social expenditure is eXamined in Coppini and.Laina (1985). 
See OECD (1988b). 
Most pension schemes provide three kinds of pensions with specific eligibility conditions: old-age benefits 
for .citizens over a certain minimum age,  disability benefits for  disabled citizens,  survivors'  benefits for 
widowers and orphans. European Commission (1993b) provides a detailed description ofthe main pension 
benefits paid in the 12 EU member states in 1994. The schemes providing old-age, disability and survivors 
in the 12 countries are respectively described in Eurostat (1992a, 1992b, 1993). OECD (19.88b) provides a 
brief  description of  the pension systems of  the other Western countries. 
The old-age dependency, eligibility and transfer ratios can. be jointly expressed as  NPEN  (Dependency 
·  NWOR  . 
ratio). The ratio of  expenditure to GDP will then result  EXPP  =(NPEN) *(_A_). 
GDP  NWOR  .  gdpw 
'"'<,..---...... -
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7 
Somewhat similar identities can bewritten for disability and survivors' pensions. 
Ratio a) represent the pure demographic component of expenditure dynamics. Ratios b) 
and  c) depend  on legislation and  economic ·factors.  Ratio  d)  is  affected  by  economic 
factors. 
Ratios b) and c) can change considerably over time because of the 'maturing' of  pension · 
schemes, i.e.  because of the process of adjustment of all pensions to present retirement 
rules. 9 On the one hand,  pension coverage extensions and benefit improvements usually · 
produce their full effects on the two ratios after many decades. On the other, quite often 
pension reforms curtailing benefits are implemented gradually and only display their full 
effects a long time later. 
The UK State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) represents an interesting case: 
over a  period  of 16  years  new benefits  were  first  introduced  and  than  substantially 
reduced twice. All measures were implemented very gradually: the scheme will reach full 
maturity in the second half of  the next century. 
Box No.2 
THE MATURING OF PENSION SCHEMES: THE CASE OF SERPS (UK) 
The State Earnings Related Pension Scheme  (SERPS) was introduced in the United Kingdom 
in  1978 (se.e  Department of Social Security,  1993) in  order to .supplement the  basic pension 
paid to all elderly citizens. The new pension  (that substituted the 'graduated pensions' awarded 
on  contributions paid between 1961  and  1975) was to be related to the contributions paid after 
April 1978. Each pensioner was to receive 1.25 per cent of the average of the best 20 years' 
earnings (each year's earnings were to be revalued to retirement age in line with movements in 
the  general  level  of earnings)  up  to  a  maximum  of  20  years.· Benefits were  to  be  raised 
gradually during a 20 years period, with full entitlements  to  be  paid to new pensioners only in 
1998.  The  system  would  have  reached  maturity  well  into  the  ne):d  century,  when  all  living 
pensioners would have been in the position of paying contributions to SERPS for 20 years. 
The scheme was substantially reformed in 1986: 
a)  While the accrual rate for contributions paid between the financial years 1978-1979 and 
1987-1988 was maintained at 1.25 per cent, the accrual  rate  on  later contributions was 
gradually reduced to 1 per cent between the  year 2000-2001  and  the year 2009-201 0; 
the replacement rate  (i.e.,  the  pension to wage  ratio)  was therefore reduced from 25 to 
20 per cent. 
b)  Starting  from  1999-2000 the  assessment  period  for  benefit  calculation  was  gradually 
extended to the whole period from age 16 to .retirement. 
This reform will produce its full effects over several decades. The scheme will therefore reach 
maturity in the second half of next century when  all existing pensioners will have paid all their 
contributions after the year 1987-1988 . 
In  order to examine the 'pure' maturation  effects of the 1986 reform  on  pension  expenditure, 
the  following simplifying assumptions can be made:  · 
9  See OECD (1988b). 8 
a)  Each generation comprises the same number of individuals. 
b)  Each individual works for 40 years and gets an old-age pension for 20 years;. 
c)  Earnings and pensions levels are stable through time (this assumption actually voids the 
effects of the  lengthening  of the  assessment  period  for benefit calculation  decided  jn 
1986). 
The Chart below outlines the replacement ratio for the new pensions paid in each year and for 
the average pension paid by SERPS in each year. The trend of the latter is an indicator for the 
trend of the ratio of SERPS expenditure on GOP. The new pensions, after having reached their 
25  per cent  peak at the  end  of the present decade, will gradually decline to the 20 per cent 
level up to the year 2029, when the 1.25 per cent accrual rate will no longer apply. On the basis 
of the three assumptions listed  above,  the  average  SERPS  pension  will  keep  increasing  (in 
terms of the average wage) up to the year 2015;  it will then gradually decline towards the 20 
per cent level, reaching  it in  2048 (by this year all pensioners will  have retired  after the  year 
2029). This means that the 1986 reform will take about half of a century (from 1999) to produce 
its full effects on the transfer ratio and on the ratio of pension expenditure to GOP. 
Stylized maturing of UK State Earnings Related Pension Scheme 
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New changes in  pension  rules were introduced in  1994: female pensionable age will increase 
from 60 to 65 (the increase will be  phased  in  between  2010 and  2020);  the  calculation of the 
earnings  factors  used to  derive  SERPS  entitlements  is  to  be  amended  from  April  2000 
onwards; contributors will no longer accrue any SERPS entitlement in respect of contracted-out 
earnings from 1997. These changes, particularly the new calculation. of the earnings factor, will 
further delay the maturation of SERPS. 
Changes in  the  relative number of workers enrolled  in  the  different  schemes  are  also 
likely to influence ratios b)  and  c).  In many countries, for instance,  in  the last decades 
public employment has grown faster than total employment and,  since public employees 
frequently· have  better  retirement  rules,  the  shift  in  employment· increases  pension 
expenditure. 
·According to OECD (1988b  ),  between 1960 and  1985  in the OECD  countries the old-
. age dependency,  eligibility,  transfer  and  employment ratios respectively  contributed to 
- •· -....... 
·--
. .  . 
·. 
9 
25.6,  38.0, 33.2,  and  3.2 per cent oftotal change in the pension expenditure· to GDP 
ratio.  Among the 15  EU countries, only in Denmark and the United Kingdom was the 
old-age  dependency.  ratio  the  most  relevant  factor  in  contributing  to  expenditure 
growth. 10  These data reflect the. widespread process of expansion of pension coverage 
and improvement of  benefits that took place in many European countries from the fifties 
h  .  11  to t  e seventies. 
Any  precise  assessment  of future  pension .expenditure  must  therefore  take  the likely 
changes in the eligibility and transfer ratios into account. While in the past these changes 
increased expenditure in most countries, in the future they are likely to work both ways 
(this subject will be dealt with in  Section I.4.5).  In some countries the effects of.past 
extensions  and  improvements  of pension  schemes  are  still  expanding  expenditure;  in 
others, the reforms recently introduced are reducing  eligibility  and· transfer ratios.  The 
latter ratio might also be negatively influenced by the present widespread unemployment, 
which limits the contribution record of  future pensioners. 
11.2 The  complexity of  pension systems  - The  problems  encountered  in projecting 
pension expenditure  are compounded by the complexity of most pension  systems.  In 
many  countries ·workers are  covered  by  several  pension schemes  with different  rules 
(e.g., for private sector employees, for civil servants, for the self-employed). 12  In some 
countries there are both insurance and assistance schemes: the former providing benefits 
to workers with a certain contributory record, the latter paying benefits to poor elderly 
citizens  or to  disabled  citizens.  Some  groups  of workers  may  be  eligible  for  two 
pensions, a basic and a supplementazy one, paid. by different schemes. 
Ideally,  pension  expenditure  should  be  projected  separately  for  each  scheme.  The 
dynamics  of ·expenditure of each scheme would  reflect, .among  other factors,  the  age 
structure of its workers and pensioners and its maturity with regard to past changes in 
legislation. 
Accurate projections can also be obtained by estimating the pension that will be paid to 
each present pensioner and to each present worker.13  Several elements ought to be taken. 
into  account  for  each  individual:  the  benefits  provided  by  her  or his  scheme(s),  life 
expectancy and several possible events, such as that of  re~eiving disability benefits before 
retirement age and that ofleaving relatives eligible for survivor benefits. 14 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
This point is stressed in Holzman (1989). 
See lLO (1989). 
The  several  pension schemes  existing in the  12  Member  States  of the  European  Union  in  1994  are 
described in Eurostat (1992a, 1992b, 1993 ). 
It should be obviously considered that some citizens may have already acquired the title to a pension, in 
spite of  the fact that they are not presently working, and that in some countries all citizens may be entitled 
to a pension under certain age or income conditions. 
This approach, requiring detailed. information, can be applied by referring to large samples of workers and 
pensioners (see Box 4 in Section I.3).  · 10 
It is  therefore obvious that the production of accurate projections  requires  extensive 
datasets and precise institutional knowledge. Only national institutions are in the position 
· to satisfy such requirements. The decision to evaluate the prospects of  European pension 
schemes through a survey of  national projections is largely .due to this consideration. 
L1.3  The uncertainty about demographic  and macroeconomic scenarios  - Pension 
projections are necessarily based on demographic and macroeconomic assumptions. As 
to demography,  assumptions are to be made  about fertility  rates,  life  expectancy  and 
migration  flows.  As  to  the  macroec~nomic scenario,  GDP,  wage  and  employment 
growth  are  most  relevant;  assumptions  about  employment  structure  and  mcome 
. distribution are also important. 
The long-term demographic  outlook  is  quite  uncertain.15  Fertility  rates  can fluctuate 
considerably and rather unpredictably even in  the short-term.  In the early nineties,  for 
·.·instance, the number ofbirths in the European Union was lower than that predicted by 
J;:urostat in 1991  in the low-fertility scenario.16 Mortality rates, although the margins of 
error are relatively smaller, are also difficult to predict.17 Even greater uncertainties stem 
from the projection of  net migration flows, which depend on several economic and social 
factors, on political decisions and on the enforcement of  policies. 18 
The  uncertainty  of long-term  projections  is  stressed  in  Danish.  Ministry  of Finance 
(1995).  By  assuming  a  higher  birth-rate  and  higher  net  immigration,  in  its  1994 
projection Denmark's  Statistical Department  estimated  for  2025  a  population of five 
·million people, as against the four million estimated in the 1984 projection. · 
Box No.3 
DEMOGRAPHIC SCENARIOS UNDERLYING PENSION EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS: A 
COMPARISON WITH NEW EC SCENARIOS 
Pension expenditure forecasts are  usually based  on  demographic projecti'ons,  which  are often 
carried  out  by national statistical  offices.  The Charts  included  in  the  Box compare  some  of 
these  national projections with  those  recently  developed  for the  European  Commission  (see 
Box 1  ). More specifically the ratio of the elderly to working age population (old-age dependency 
ratio) referred t9 in the pension projections is compared with the ratios of the two extreme EC 
scenarios (the 'Most-Aged Population' and the 'Youngest Population'). 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Long  (1995)  and Rogers  (1995) evaluate the methodological  problems underlying  long-term population 
projections. Rogers points to the difficulty of  assessing the quality of  projections, as "they inevitably depend 
not only on the models used but also on the particular historical periods selected for examination" (p.l87). 
Long analyses the accuracy of  official population projections used for government planning. 
The topic is extensively examined in De Jong (1995) and Crujsen arid Erling (1995). According to the latter 
paper (p. 4), "fertility showed once again its capricious and unpredictable nature". 
See Van Hoorn and De Beer (1995) and Crujsen and Eding (1995). 
The topic is examined in Visser (1995). 
_. 11 
For  all  six  countries  taken  into  consideration  (see  Charts  below),  the  national  old-age 
dependency ratio line lies between the lines of the two EC scenarios. In Portugal it is closer to 
the  Most-aged scenario;  in  Denmark,  Ireland (in  the long-run)  and  the  United  Kingdom  it is 
closer to the Youngest Population scenario. In France and Spain it  lies exactly in between the 
two. 
National Demographic Scenarios arid New EC Scenarios 
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National pension projections are evidently based on  intermediate and,  presumably, most likely 
scenarios.  The  gap between  national  pension  projection  lines and  the  two  extreme  EC  lines 
provides a measure of the uncertainty of long-term demographic prospects and  of the possible 
effects on  pen~ion expenditure of extreme fertility and mortality rate trends. 
The long-term economic outlook is  also  uncertain.  As  will be  shown in  Section II,  in 
several  countries the  projections  carried  out by  different  institutions  or by  the  same 
institution in different periods are frequently based on different assumptions. Even if the 
changes in the rate of groWth of parameters are often relatively limited  in  scope,  their 
long-term effects are considerable.  . 12 
The  uncertainty  concerning  the  long-term  values  of  demographic  and  economic 
parameters  suggests that projections  should  be  evaluated  quite  cautiously.  Different 
assumptions should be systematically considered in order to provide the range of likely 
outcomes.  In the following  Sections,  in:  reporting the results  of national  projections, 
great attention will be paid to the effects of alternative assumptions and  to  sensitivity 
analysis tests (see also Box 7). 
L 1. 4 Assumptions on pension policies and the behaviour of  individuals - As already 
mentioned in Section I. 1.1, pension expenditure dynamics is. influenced also by changes 
in pension policies and in social attitudes.  · 
Changes  in  pension  rules  can  modify  eligibility  and  transfer  ratios.  Most  studies,  . 
however,  project expenditure over long periods applying  exogenous  demographic and 
~conomic scenarios  over unchanged  policies.  This  approach,  although  unrealistic,  as 
policies are likely to be adjusted frequently,  provides a useful benchmark for evaluating 
the need for reform. 
On the  other  hand,  changes  in  social  attitudes  should  be  taken  into  consideration. 
Assumptions on the behaviour of individuals in the labour market and in the retirement 
decisions  (e.g.,  choice  of retirement  age,  demand  for  disability  pensions)  should .  be 
explicitely specified.  Labour supply and retirement decisions can change over time and 
are not independent of the economic and demographic scenarios and  of their effects on 
contribution  rates.  For instance,  an  increase  in  contribution  rates  which  reduces  net 
wages and the gap between net wages and  net pensions may  provide an incentive for 
early retirement. 
Danish Ministry  of Finance  (1995)  observes that  actual  retirement  age  is  affected  by 
unemployment,  the business  cycle,  and  the general levels  of wealth  and  health of the 
· population. Lower unemployment and a better state of  health will increase the retirement 
age. Greater prosperity is likely to lower retirement age.  · 
Ideally,  the behaviour of individuals should be  endogenized in  the  projections.  This  is 
particularly  relevant  for  pension  systems  that  allow ·flexible  retirement.  Some  reeent 
pension  reforms  will  greatly  increase  the  freedom  of choice  of individuals  as  to 
retirement age: workers will.choose their retirement age within a c~rtain age-bracket and 
receive an actuarially discounted pension. 19  Although the long -term effects of different 
decisions are not very relevant since pensions are actuarially discounted, in the short'- to 
medium-term they may substantially influence the dynamics of  pension expenditure. 
Wide-ranging effects of demographic and  economic factors,  complexity of the factors 
affecting pension expenditure dynamics,  changes in individual behaviour and in pension 
policies all  contribute to the necessity  of periodic revisions  of expenditure projections 
(see Box 6). 
19  This is one of  the main features of  the reforms introduced in Sweden in 1994 and in Italy in 1995. See Part 
n. 
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. LJ.5 Indicators of  pension systems sustainability - Pay-as-you-go  (PAYG)  pensions 
can be  paid  by  different  institutions  (social  security  institutes, the state)  and  can  be 
financed in a variety of  ways (social security institutes usually rely on contributions and 
transfers from the public budget; the state can rely on earmarked taxes, general revenues, 
borrowing). In order to compare the economic situation of  national pension systems, it is 
necessary to use a measure of the burden of pension expenditure that is not affected by 
the way expenditure, directly or indirectly, is funded.  Comparisons based on the deficits 
or surpluses resulting from pension expenditure and earmarked contributions would not -
be relevant. 
Two indicators are most frequently referred to in works concerning the future of  pension 
schemes: 
a)  The ratio of  pension expenditure to GDP. 
b)  The rate of  contribution required to finance pensions. 
The first ratio implicitly measures the burden that public pensions impose on the whole 
society.  The  contribution  rate  measures  the  burden  on  the  workers  and  employers 
enrolled in the pension schemes. If, as is frequently assumed in long-term-projections, the 
ratio oflabour income to GDP is constant; the .two indicators are equivalent. 
As  to  the  second  indicator,  in  order  to  avoid  any  influence  of the  composition  of 
·financing (e.g., to avoid the contribution rate to be  affected by  changes in government  . 
transfers to pension schemes), one can refer to the 'equilibrium contribution rate' (ECR).  ·  · 
This  is  the  rate  required  to  finance  all  current  pension  expenditure  from  a  uniform 
contribution levied on current labour income. It can be defined as: 
ECR=(  EXPP  ) 
w*POPw 
where w is the taxable average income. If pension expenditure is partly covered by other 
fund  sources (budgetary transfers,  income from  assets,  etc.),  ECR is  obviously higher 
than the actual rate levied on workers and employers. ... _  ~ 
·-
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1.2  MAJOR INTERNATIONAL PROJECTIONS 
In the last decade, when it became apparent that Western countries were experiencing 
major changes in their demographic  structure,  both the IMF and the OECD tried to 
estimate  the  effects  of these  changes  on public  expenditure.  While  OECD  (1988b) 
evaluated the pure impact of demographic changes,20 the IMF (with a paper by Heller, 
Hemming  and  Kohnert,  1986) ·also  considered  some factors  influencing  eligibility  and 
transfer ratios. OECD covered 21  countries; IMF considered only the major seven  . 
L2.1 Main assumptions - OECD's baseline population projections were  base~ on the 
following hypothesis: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
A gradual convergence of  fertility rates to replacement level (i.e., to a total fertility 
rate of2.1) by 2050.21 
An increase in life expectancy of2 years for each sex between 1983 and 2030. 
Zero net migration or low levels of  net migration. 
llv1F's baseline scenario is somewhat similar. The main assumptions are the following: 
a)  A gradual increase in the 1980 total fertility ratio that by 2010 reaches replacement 
level in five out of  the seven countries. 
b)  An increase in life expectancy at birth of 3.4 years for males and 2.5 for females · · 
between 1980 and 2010.  · 
c)  Limited net emigration from Germany and immigration to Canada and the United 
States.· 
Two more scenarios were considered in the IMF paper. They both envisage a "Greater 
Ageing" situation with fertility broadly constant at 1980 levels and with a life expectancy 
increase  of 6.7  years  for  males  and  4.8  years  for  females.  One  scenario  shares  the 
baseline economic assumptions, while the other takes a more pessimistic view of growth 
and employment  .. 
In OECD (1988b),  the share of the elderly  (65  and  over)  in  total  population for the 
whole OECD was projected to rise from 12.2 per cent in 1980 to 15.4 per cent in 2010 
and 22.1  in 2040.  For the seven major countries it was projected to rise from 12.5 in 
1980 respectively to 16.4 and to 22.8 per cent.  The ·share of the elderly on the working 
age population was expected to grow at a faster rate. In the IMF projections the ageing 
process was slower; in the seven countries. the share of  population aged 65  and over was 
20 
.  21 
OECD's "projections assume constant benefit levels per beneficiary relative to national income per worker, 
constant  labour  force  participation rates,  as  well as a  constant  portion  of elderly  people  in receipt  of 
benefits" (p. 35). 
Two  more  projections  were  produced:  a  "high  variant"  one  with a  progressive  convergence  on  a  fmal 
fertility rate of2.5, and a "low variant" one with convergence to a fertility rate of 1.4. 15 
. projected  to  rise  from  12.5  ·per  cent  in  1980  to  15.9  in  20}0  and  19.5  m  2025 
(respectively 17.3 and 22.3 per cent in the Greater Ageing scenario). 
L2.2  Main  results  - As  to  pension  ~xpenditure,  OECD  (1988b,  p.  35),  assuming 
"constant benefit levels per beneficiary relative to t:tational income -per worker, constant 
labour force participation rates, as well as a constant portion of elderly people in receipt 
of benefits,"  estimated that between 1984 and  2040 demographic changes could nearly 
double  its  share  in  national  income  for  the  OECD  area as  a  whole  (see  Table  1). 
Demographic pressure on pension expenditure would be quite "large in  most European 
countries. As  a result, in 2040 pension expenditure was estimated to be around 30 per 
cent of national  income in Austria,  France,  Germany,  Italy  and  the  Netherlands  and 
. around 20 per cent in  Belgium,  Denmark,  Greece,  Spain and Sweden.  Only  in  Ireland 
and the United Kingdom would it remain close to 10 per cent of  national inc<;> me. 
These projections were considered as conservative, since other factors were expected to 
· .·increase pension expenditure.  It was suggested (p.  42) that "The extension of coverage 
to  new  groups will  raise  the  proportion of beneficiaries  among  the  elderly  in  many 
schemes, especially in earnings-related ones. Furthermore, the benefit level will continue 
to rise more rapidly than the average income per worker as  some of the schemes have 
been  introduced  only  recently  or  have  experienced  substantial  improvements  in  the 
benefit structure". In other words, pension systems were not considered fully mature. 
IMF projections are more complex. Starting from the growth in the number of citizens of 
pensionable age,22 Heller et al.  projected the growth in the number of pensioners on the 
·basis  of several  assumptions  on  the  eligibility  ratio  dynamics  in  each· country.  The 
dynamics  of the  average  pension  in  real  terms  were then  projected  on  the  basis  of 
hypothesis concerning the maturity of  the different systems. 
In the  baseline  projection  (Table  1  ),  between  1980  and  2025  the  share  of pension 
expenditure in GDP  rises considerably in Germany (from 13  to 20 per cent)  and  Italy 
(from 10 to 18 per cent) and to a smaller extent in France (from 10 .to  13  per cent) and 
the United Kingdom (from 6 to more than 8 per cent).  In the more pessimistic scenario 
the expenditure ratio  is  noticeably higher in France (reaching  16  per cent) and in Italy 
(reaching 20 per cent). 
Although the IMF and the OECD projections are not fully  comparable, because of the 
different  starting  years  and  the  different  pension  aggregate  considered  for  some 
countries, they both point to large expected incr·eases in public expenditure on pensions. 
Both studies suggest that the pressure on pension expenditure will increase from 2010 
onwards, when the "baby boom" generation reaches retirement age. 
The IMF and OECD studies largely contributed to raising awareness of  governments and 
public opinion to the public expenditure consequences of demographic changes.  In the 
same  period,  the growing  awareness  concerning  population  ageing· has  also  led  to  a 
22  They consider the retirement age applied in each colintry to mal~s and females. 16 
substantial increase in the resources devoted to national long-term projections of  pension 
expenditure.23 During the last decade, national.projections considering the several non-
demographic factors affecting pension exRenditure dynamics in each country have been 
made available in most Western countries.  4 
23 
24 
Some  long-term projections  were  nevertheless  carried out  in the past.  The  Beveridge "Report in 1942 
included, for instance, a 30 year estimate of  social expenditure in the UK. · 
In the United States, regular proj~ctions over a 75 year period are required by the Social Security Act. They 
have been recently considered in Steuerle - Bakija (1994). Long term projeCtions for Canada are surveyed in 
Bayoumi (1994). As to Japan, see Japanese Ministry of  Health and Welfare (1985) and Takayama (1996). '  '  ' 
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IMF (1986): PensiouExpenditure I GDP<1> %  OECD (1988): Equilibrium Contribution Rate % 
Table 1 
Austria  16.5  17.6  20.7  23.7  29.6  31.7  28.2 
Belgium  14  13.8  14.8  17  21  22.7  21.5 
Denmark  10.1  9.5  10.8  13.5  16.2  18.7  17.4 
Finland  8.5  9.7  11.4  16  18.2  17.8  17.6 
France  10  11.0/11.0  11.5/12.6  13.0/16.3  14.3  16.5  17.3  21.6  25.3  27  26.6 
GermanyC2l  13.3  17.1/17.1  18.6/18.8  20.5/21.1  13.7  16.4  19.7  21.6  28.1  31.1  26.8 
Greece  10.8  13  14.7  15.7  17.7  19.5  19.6 
Ireland  6.7  6.2  6  6.8  8.3  9.9  11.2 
Italy  10.5  12.7/13.1  14.4/15.4  18.0/20.1  14.7  17.1  19.5  22.3  26.8  31.1  28.7 
Luxembourg 
TheN  etherlands  12.1  13.4 .  15  19.6  25.7  28.5  25.5 
Portugal  8.2  10.6  10.9  12.1  14.6  16.9  17 
Spain  10  '11.7  12.3  13.6  16.6  20.4  20.7 
Sweden  12.9  12.1  12.8  15.9  17  18  17 
United Kingdom.  5.8  6.6/6.8  .  7.2/7.7.  8.4/9.3  7.7  7.5  ·7.6  8.6  10.6  11.2  10.2 
U.S.A.  6.3  5.8/6.4  5.7/6.6  6.9/8.5  8.1  8.2  8.5  11.3  14.4  14.6  14.2 
Canada  3.5  3.1/3/4  3.1/3.6  4.3/5.3  6.1  7.6  8.6  11.6  15  15.2  14.4 
Japan  4.2  9.6/10.5  12.9/14.4  13.4/15.5  6  9.4  12.3  14  13.2  15.7  15.4 
l) Left: Baseline Economic and Demographic Scenario. Right: Pessimistic Economic and "Greater Aging" Scenario. 
2)  West Germany.  · 
Sources: Heller, Hemming and Kohnert (1986) and OECD (1988). ·. 
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· 1.3  MAIN FEATURES OF NATIONAL PROJECTIONS 
The  present  survey  covers  projections  produced  in  15  European  Union  countries. 
Projections  carried  out  by  public  institutions  are  available  for  14  countries,  25  the 
exception  being  Portugal,  where  forecasts  by  academic  institutions  have  been 
considered.  26 
In all countries recent projections are available. In 1995, public institutions released long-
term projections in  8 EU Member States.27  In 4 other countries projections  had  been 
released in 1994. In the 3 remaining countries they had been released in 1992-1993. 
Projections usually cover 30 to 55  years.  At present,  available estimates reach the year 
2015  in Luxembourg,  2020 in Portugal,. 2030 in Austria,  Finland Germany and  Spain, 
2035  in  Ireland,  2040  in  Denmark  and  France,  2045  in  The  Netherlands,  2050  m 
Belgium, Greece, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
In most countries projections are not carried  out on a regular basis.  They  are usually 
produced when some major reform ofthepension system is considered. Periodic reviews 
of  the outlook of  public pension schemes are envisaged. in Germany every year and in the 
United  Kingdom  every  5 years  (Box 6  in  Section 1.4  reports  the  outcomes  of some 
revisions  of expenditure  estimates).  German  projections  are  produced  by  the ·Federal 
Government  over  a  15  year  time  range;  British  projections  are. carried  out  by  the · 
Goverpment Actuary and cover the period up to 2050. 
Some countries are moving towards the introduction of regular projections.  The  1995 
Italian pension .reform created a technical committee aimed at .producing periodic reviews 
of  pension expenditure trends. Both the 1993 Final Report of  the Irish National Pensions 
Board and  the  1995  Spanish Pacta  de  Toledo  envisaged  reviews  of  long-term public 
pension system prospects to be carried out every five years. 
Most projections provide estimates  either for  the equilibrium  contribution rate or the 
. ratio of expenditure to GDP.  As already mentioned, although the two types of data will. 
be plotted in  different  charts,  their trends  convey  similar  information  concerning  the 
evolution of  the burden of  pension expenditure. 
25 
27 
In most countries the projections were carried out by the ministries of social security; or by the institutes in 
charge of social security benefits or by councils for social security (Austria, Finland, Luxembourg, Ireland, 
Italy, Germany, The Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom). In other countries the projections were produced 
by  the ministries of fmance or of economic affairs  (Denmark, Italy,  Sweden) or  by the central planning 
offices  (Belgium,  France).  In  Greece  they  were produced  by  the IMF  in  co-operation wi!fl  the Greek 
government. 
The projections are however endorsed by the Ministry of  Finance, which has also financed them. 
Illcluding Portugal, where, as already mentioned, projections endorsed by the Ministr.y of Finance ha~e been 
released in 1995. 18 
Several  projections  take  two  or  more  demographic  and  economic  scenarios  into 
consideration. Different mortality and fertility hypotheses are considered for Belgium in 
Boulanger et al.  (1991), for the Netherlands in Scientific Council of Government Policy 
(1993) and for United Kingdom in Government Actuary's Department (1986,  1990 and 
1995). Different fertility assumptions are considered forDenmark in Jensen and Nielsen 
(1995a), for France in Government ofFrance (1991) and in General Planning Committee 
(1995), for the Netherlands in Committee on the Financing of Pension Schemes (1987), 
for Portugal in Portuguese Federation oflnsurance Companies (1994). 
Different hypotheses concerning labour participation ratios are examined for Austria in 
Council of Economic and· Social Affairs  (1991),  for  France in  Government of France 
(1991) and General Planning Con;unittee (1995), for Germany in Federal Government of 
Germany  (1994  and  1995).  Different  employment  growth  rates  are  considered  in 
Luxembourg (1995). Different assumptions concerning employment growth,  real wage 
growth and real GDP ·growth are considered for Belgium in Boulanger et al.  (1991) and 
Englert et al.  (1994), for Denmark in Jensen and Nielsen (1995b ),  for Finland in Social 
Expenditure  Committee  (1994),  for  France  in the National  Old-Age  Insurance  Fund 
projections  quoted  in  Ruellan  (1993),  for  Spain  in  Ministry  of Labour  and  Social 
Security (1995) and  Herce and  Perez-Diaz (1995),  for  Sweden in Swedish Parliament 
(1994).28 
The main economic assumptions considered in the late.st national projections are repbrted 
in Table  2.  Wherever  an  estimate is  put forward  for  GDP  growth,  it  usually  ranges 
between 1.5 and 3 per cent. Most estimates for real wage groWth range 'between 1.5  and 
2.5 per cent. Some projections are based on assumptions concerning employment growth 
rate (which is  generally rather moderate);  others are based on assumptions  concerning 
activity and unemployment ratios (which are usually constant)29.  ·  · 
The projections included in Table 2 cover a large part of  public expenditure on pensions. 
Among the schemes omitted there are those providing pensions to civil servants in some 
countries  {Austria,  France  and  Germany)  or  to  some  categories  of self-employed 
workers  (France  and  Italy).  Some  public  supplementary  pension  schemes  are  also 
oJ?itted (e.g. France), as are some non-contributory schemes (e.g. Italy). 
Some projections for countries in which pensions  are  automatically adjusted to prices 
also  provide  estimates  of the  effects  of wage  indexation  on  pension  benefits?0  It is 
28 
29 
30 
Some projections (i.e., those by the Austrian Council of Economic and SoCial Affairs, 1991) also considered 
different  scenarios  concerning  the  share  of the  pension  burden  between  employers  and  employees' 
contributions and the public budget. 
In Qovernment Actuary's Department (1990) the trend towards higher activity rates for young females and 
lower activity rates for elderly males is assumed to continue in  the United Kingdom. 
In most countries pensions are automatically adjusted to prices. Some countries (France, Italy, the United 
Kingdom) switched from wage to price indexation in recent years in order to restrain pen.sion expenditure 
growth.  Only in Austria and Germany are pensions still adjusted to wage dynamics (both these countries 
recently changed from the adjustment of pensions to the dynamics of gross wage to that of  the dynamics of 
wages net of  pension contributions). See Box 5. •'  \  '  '  ,. 
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Country  Projections reported in Charts 2 - 8  Scenario 
ReaiGDP 
Employment Growth<•> % 
Real Wage 
Growtb<1>%  Growth<•>% 
AustriaC2l  Council for the Adjustment of Pensions, 1995  Main Scenario  2.7  0.6 
;Belgimn  Bureau du Plan, 1994 
Favourable Scenario  2.35  0.75 
Unfavourable Scenario  2.26  0 
Denmark  Ministry of  Finance, 1995  '  Main Scenario  Constant unemployment level  2 
Social Expenditure Collilllittee, 1994 and Ministry of 
Favourable Scenmio  1.5 to 3.8  1.8 to 2.1 
Finland  Intennediate Scenario  1.2 to 2.7  1.4 to 1.8 
Social Affairs and Health, 1994  Unfavourable Scenario  1.1 to 1.5  0.9 to 1.5 
France  General Planning C01nmittee,  1995  Main Scenario  3.5to1.75  1.25 to -0.25  1.0 to 2.0 
GennanyC3l  Social Advisory Board, 1994  Main Scenario  0.8 to 0.1  3.7to3 
Greece(2)  IMF and ·Government of Greece, 1992  Main Scenario  0.7 to 1.4  1.0 to 2.2 
Ireland  National Pensions Board, 1993  Main Scenario  Constant unemployment ratio 
ltalyC4l  State General Accounting Office, 1995  Main Scenario  2  0  2 
Favourable Scenario  2  1.5 
Luxembourg  Ministry of Social Security, 1995  lntennediate Scenario  1.6  1.5 
Unfavourable Scenario  0  1.5 
The Netherlands  Scientific Council.of Government Policy, 1993 
Favourable Scenario  2.8  Unemployment rate: 11.5 to 4.3 
Unfavourable Scenario  1.5 to 2.3  Unemployment rate: 11.5 to 7.5 
Portugal  Centre for Financial Economics Research, 1995  Main Scenario  Constant activity ratio  1.5 
Spain  Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 1995 
Favourable Scenario  3,7- 4.0 to 2.5  2.4 - 2.9 to 0.9 
Unfavourable Scenario  3.7-4.0 to 2  2.4- 2.9 to 0.9 
Favourable Scenario  3 
Sweden  Swedish Parliament, 1994  Intennediate Scenario  .  1.5 
Unfavourable Scenario  1 
United Kingdom  Government Actuary's Department, 1994 and 1995  Main Scenario 
5% unemployment rate; 
1.5"  changes in activity rates(s) 
1)  Data reported refer to the years from 1996 onwards. 
2)  Data refer only to private sector. 
3)  Data refer to .old Bundesldnder. In the new Bundesldnder the rates of  growth are lower. 
4)  Data refer to the pension  ~chemes for private sector employees and self-employed artisans and businessmen. 
5)  Increase in female activity rates (for ages under 45). Decline in male activity rates (for ages over 60). 19 
considered  that,  whatever  the  indexation  arrangement,  governments  can  decide 
discretionary pension increases "in  order to maintain their purchasing  power relative to 
wages.  )'his issue is particularly relevant for schemes providing pensions which are not 
related to the earnings career of  workers (see Box 5). These estimates were produced for 
Denmark by Jensen and Nielsen (1995a); for France by the National Old-age Insurance 
Fund (see Ruellan 1993), for Italy by the State General Accounting Office (1994) and 
the  National  Social  Security  Institute  (1993),  for  the  United  Kingdom  by  the 
Government Actuary's Department (1990 and 1995}. 
The methodology of some projections is  briefly examined in Box 4.  Three forecasting 
models are considered: that of the Belgian Bureau du  Plan,  that of the Italian National 
Social Security Institute and that ofTilburg University in the Netherlands. 
Box No.4 
FORECASTING TECHNIQUES: THREE MODELS 
The model of the Belgian Bureau du Plan - In  1989 the Belgian Bureau du Plan developed 
the  MALTESE  forecasting  model  ("Model  for Analysis  of Long  Term  Evolution  of  Social 
Expenditure"  - see  Englert  1990  and  1992,  Festjens-Becquaert-Bogaert  1990),' which  is  a 
system  of interconnected  models,  with  a central  core  bearing  the  same  name  and  a  set  of 
macroeconomic, demographic, socio-demographic, and social modules (see Chart below). The 
model aims at projecting expenditure trends of all social security schemes up to the year 2050. 
Various scenarios are considered.  · 
DEMOGRAPHIC INP\ITS 
DEMOGRAPHIC model 
(I.N.S) 
HERMES .model  MALTESE model 
SOCIAL INPtiTS 
MALTDEMO model 
S<>:io-4:mognpbic 
Proj<:ctioo  • 
PENSION  model 
HOR1<Wl  model 
~ 
~· 20 
The demographic projections are carried out by a model developed by  the National Institute of 
Statistics. The main exogenous variables are: fertility rate, life expectancy, migrations. 
The  socio-demographic projections for activity rates,  retirement  rates  and  school  attendance 
rates,  are  carried  out  by  a  specific  model  (MAL  TDEMO)  which  provides  an  exhaustive 
breakdown  of the population between  appropriate socio-demographic categories for each  age 
and  sex group.  There  is  a feed-back  mechanism  from  unemployment  rates  to  participation 
rates. 
The  projection  of the  distribution  of pensioners  among  the  different  pension  sche~es is 
provided  by  a  special  peripheral  model  (HOR2040).  A  special  model  called  PENSION 
computes the average pension in the general scheme for wage earners. 
Long-term  projections  concerning · macroeconomic  variables  and  Government  and  Social 
Security accounts are carried out by the central  MALTESE model based  on  the medium-term 
macroeconomic projections supplied by the HERMES medium-term econometric model and  on 
the output of the before-mentioned peripheral models. The  main macroeconomic assumptions 
concern  productivity  growth,  wage  growth,  employment  changes,  unemployment  rates  and 
interest  rates.  The  main  "social"  assumptions  concern  transfers  from  central  government 
budget, contribution rates and the rate of adjustment of benefits to living standards. 
The  model  generates  the  main  factors  explaining  the  long-term  evolution  of receipts  and 
expenditure of social security schemes, namely: 
a)  The number of beneficiaries of the different typeS! of benefits. 
b)  The average benefit amount. 
c)  Contributions and transfer receipts to the social security. · 
The  first  projections were  produced  at  the  end  of 1989  (the  basic  scenario  is  presented ·in 
Englert,  1990).  New  projections  were  produced  in  1994  {see  Englert,  Fasquelle  and 
Weesmaes, 1994). Estimates for the ECR have not undergone substantial changes up to  year 
2020; in both the 1989 and the 1994 projections the ECR is between 22 and 23 per cent. As to 
the following decades, the new projections are more optimistic, with the ECR  in  the year 2040 
about 3 points below the level expected in the 1989 projections (25.1-25.4 per cent as  against 
28.5 per cent- Tables 11.2a-11.2b). 
The  model  of the  Italian  National  Social  Security  Institute  (lstituto  ·  Nazionale  per Ia 
Sicurezza Socia/e) - The model insures most Italian private sector employees and  a large part 
of the self-employed workers. Its forecasting model (see National Social Security Institute, 1989 
and  1993) developed in the late eighties, aims at  producing 20 to 25  years projections of the 
pensions paid  by the four main  pension  schemes  managed  by  the  Institute  (those  of private 
sector  employees,  farmers,  craftsmen· and  other self-employed  businessmen).  The  model 
provides estimates of expenditure trends under existing rules,  of the effects of pension reforms 
and of different employment and earnings scenarios. 
The model is based on a sample of workers and  pensioners and tries to simulate the changes 
that will occur to each individual included in the sample in  each year of the forecasting period. 
The  sample 'includes -about  2  per cent  of the  workers  currently  paying  contributions  to the 
schemes (or who have paid contributions but are not yet receiving a pension) and about 1.5 per 
cent  of the  schemes'  pensions  (574,000  contributory  files  and  222,000  pension  files  are 
considered). 
Each  worker's  situation  is  projected  into  the  future  by  considering,  each  year,  his  or her 
· probability to retire, to die, to leave employment, to move to another economic sector, to move 
to another earnings level. For each  pensioner his or her' probability of death is considered.  In 
case of death, the probability of leaving survivors and the features of s4rvivors as to sex and 
age  is  considered.  New pensions are  paid taking  the contributory record  of each  worker into 21 
account.  New workers  qre  not  introduced  in  the  sample;  this  means that the  model  canf!ot 
produce projections over very long periods. 
The  macroeconomic scenario  is  exogenous.  The  main  assumptions  concern  inflation,  real 
income and employment changes in each of the four sectors insured by the schemes. 
Projections  were  published  in  1989,  1991,  1993  and  1995  (see  Senate  of  Italy,  1995). 
Estimates concerning the ECR have undergone substantial changes.  While in  National Social 
Security  Institute  (1989)  the  ECR  of the  Private  Sector  Employees'  Pension  Scheme  was 
expected to remain rather stable (rising from 37.7 per cent in 1988 to 39.1  per cent by the year 
201 0), in the 1991  projections it was expected to increase from  42.8 in 1990 to .48.5 per cent in 
2010. In the 1993 projections it was expected to rise even more steeply,  from 42.5 per cent in 
1992 to 53.7 per cent in 2010. The 1992 reform substantially reduc~d the projected ECR. The 
1993  projections  also  included  an  estimate  of the  new situation:.  th~ ECR  was  expected  to 
decline from 43 per cent in  1995 to 40 per cent in  201 0.  These data .were substantially revised 
in  1995. The ECR was revised upward  and  expected to remain nearly stable: 49.4 per cent in 
1995, 47.8 in 2010, 48.8 in 2030 (see Table 11.9a). 
The Putch NEDYMAS model (Tilburg University) - The  NEDYMAS  model  was  built in the 
late eighties in the University of Til burg  (see Nelissen 1994 and 1995 and Dekkers eta/. 1994) 
with the purpose of evaluating the distributional effects of the. Dutch social security system and 
simulating  different  possible  policy  measures.  The  model  considers  both  the  basic  public 
pension  scheme  and  the  supplementary  pension  schemes.  It· was  initially  created  as  a 
microsimulation model  and then extended by  a macro shelL  Decisions at household  level are 
dealt with  by the  microsimulation  model,  whereas  spill-overs to  and  from  other markets  are 
handled by the macro shell. 
The microsimulation model is dynamic, meaning that it takes changes in the composition of the 
population structure over time into account, and cross-sectional, meaning that in each period it 
checks whiqh individual characteristics change and to what extent they do so. 
The initial population of the model has been formed on the basis of data from the 1947 Census 
(the  1930  cohort  is  the  first  which  can  be  followed  over time).  It  is  then  followed  period  by 
period  by  looking  at the  characteristics  of individuals  (and  therefore  of households)  and  by 
verifying which ones changed  in those periods. This results in the creation of a fictitious panel 
in  which  individual  life  histories  can  be  simulated.  The  sample  population  increases  as  a 
consequence  of births and  immigration  and  decreases  because  of deaths  and  emigration.  In 
order to simulate life histories, 320 personal  characteristics are considered.  In  each  period the 
sample is subjected to the different modules of the NEDYMAS model in the following order: 
a)  The  demographic  main  module  containing  the  following  sub-modules:  immigration, 
b) 
c) 
d) 
·emigration, mortality, marriage,  cohabitation,  divorce, flows  into and  out of institutional 
households, leaving the parental home and fertility;  · 
The labour market, consumption and  wage  income main module (part  1)  containing the 
following  sub-modules:  ·education,  labour  income,  transitions· between  the  several 
possible  economic  activities  (employed,  unemployed,  disabled, 
househusband/housewife,  conscript,  retired);  these  sub-modules  provide  estimates  of 
labour supply and labour income; 
The  social  security  main  module  containing  sub-modules  about  contributions  and 
benefits of all different social security benefits  existing in the Netherlands; 
The  labour  market,  consumption  and  wage  income  main  module  (part  2)  which 
determines medical consumption and  tax payments. 
The  NEDYMAS model now covers 79  per cent of total  benefits paid  by  Dutch social security 
schemes in  1950,  91  per cent  of those  paid  in  1960 and  over 95  per cent of those paid from 
1970 onwards. 
-...... ~ - . . 
.  ---
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In  Dekkers et a/.  (1994)  the  model  is  used  to  provide  projections  concerning  the  basic  and 
supplementary  pension  schemes:  the  contribution  rates  required  to  finance  the  schemes  is 
projected  up to the  year 2060 under the assumption of unchanged  legislation.  The· effects of 
several policy measures are also considered. In Nelissen (1994), the model is used to evaluate 
the  costs  and  the  redistributive  impacts  of  current  pension  arrangements  and  of  three 
alternative pension systems (Tables 11.11 a - 11.11 b). .  .  ...  ..,"" 
. .  .  " 
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I.4  THE PROSPECTS FOR PENSION EXPENDITURE IN EUROPE 
This Section outlines the most recent iong-term national projections produced in each 
country by a public institution. The projections included in the charts are. listed in Table 
2. The projections per country are presented in Part II  . 
Before examining the data, it is necessary to point out that: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
As already mentioned, in the case of Portugal private institutions' projections are 
used.  In  the  case  of Austria  and  Greece, ·on1y  medium  term  projections  are 
presented, since long-term ones were not updated after recent major refomis. 
The data plotted for each country are not homogeneous in term of coverage of 
total pension expenditure. Any comparison concerning the level of  the expenditure 
to  GDP  ratio  should  be  very  cautious.  The  charts  mostly  aim  at  allowing  a 
comparison of the evolution of the expenditure ratio and of  the ECR. The matter 
will be addressed in Section 1.5  where the trends concerning these ratios will be 
applied to.  an estimate of  present total public pension expenditure. 
Although all the projections reported in the Charts were produced in the period 
1992-1995,31 the present position of some pension systems, in terms ofECR or 
expenditure to GDP ratio,  may  not coincide with that estimated for  !"995  in the 
.  . .  32  . 
proJectlOns. 
The  projections  taken  into · consideration  are  based  on  the  assumption  of 
unchanged policies (some policy changes are however assumed in the projections 
concerning the Netherlands that refer to complex economic and social scenarios). 
As already mentioned, this approach may lead to so·me unrealistic outcomes, since 
policies  will  obviously  adapt  over  time  to  new  demographic  and  economic 
circumstances, but is surely helpful in identifying the dimension of required policy 
adjustment. 
Charts 1 and 2 report the most favourable scenarios that can be envisaged for pension 
expenditure on the basis of the national projections surveyed in this  Section.  The first 
chart concerns the ratio of  pension expenditure to GDP, the second the ECR. 
More specifically, wherever more economic scenarios were taken into consideration, the 
most favourable  have  been  considered  in  Charts  1 and  2. · The  effects  of·  the  least 
favourable scenarios are considered in Charts 3 and 4 . 
31 
32 
Estimates were published in 1992 for Greece, in 1993 for Ireland and the Netherlands, in 1994 for Belgium, 
Finland, Germany and Sweden, in 19_95  for Austria, Denmark, Fance, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain 
and UK. 
The most extreme case is that of Finland. In 1991  the ratio of Finnish pension expenditure to GDP was 
projected to grow from 10.1 per cent in 1990 to 11.1  per cent in 2000 and to 13.3 in 2010. The recession of 
the early nineties affected the ratio in an unforeseen way:  in 1994 the future evoluti9n of expenditure was 
projected from a starting point close to 15 per cent of  GDP. The actual expenditure was later estimated as 
14 per cent ofGDP.  · Chart 1 
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Wherever both price and wage indexation of benefits were taken into consideration, the 
former has been considered in Charts 1 and 2.  The effects of  wage indexation of  benefits 
are examined in Chart 5.  · 
All projections reported in Charts  1 and  2 include the effects of major recent pension 
reforms. The effects of  some recent reforins on the ECR or the expenditure to GDP ratio 
are considered in Section I.4.4 and Charts 6 and 7a-7b. 
L4.1 The short-term: 1995..,2000- The prospects for European pension schemes in the 
next five years are rather mixed. In the favourable scenarios considered in Charts 1 and 
2, the ratio of  pension expenditure to GDP or to labour income is expected to decline in 
4  countries:  Finland,  Italy,  Sweden and the United Kingdom.  Stability is  projected for 
Austria,  Denmark,  Ireland,  the  Netherlands  and  Spain.  An  increase  is  expected  in 
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal. 
In several  countries the  dynamics  of pension expenditure  growth will  be  substantially 
influenced by the reforms implemented in the late eighties and early nineties (see Section 
I.4.4 and Charts 6 and 7a-7b). The decline in the ratio ofp€?nsion expenditure to GDP or 
to labour in~ome  expected in Italy and Sweden can be ascribed to the reforms. In France, 
Germany and Greece the reforms will Substantially reduce the increase in the ratios that 
would have otherwise occurred. 
The  outlook  appears  rather  worse  when  the  less  favourable  economic  scenarios 
considered in some of  the projections are taken into account (Charts 3 and 4).  The ratio 
of pension expenditure to GDP or to labour income would increase also in Finland,. the 
Netherlands  and  Sweden.  There  is  also  a  sizeable  worsemng  of the  situation  of 
Luxembourg. 
The adjustment of benefits to wage rather than price dynamics would also contribute to 
the increase in the pension burden (Chart 5).  Between 1995  and the year 2000 it would 
increase the ECR by  about 2 percentage points in Italy33  and  by  about  1. 5 points  in 
France34 and the United Kingdom. 
Considering  that  the  pressures  for  budget  consolidation  are  likely.  to  prevent 
governments from offering discretionary increases to pensioners,  in man:Y  countries the 
·next five years are likely to represent a sort of 'breathing space' in which the pension 
systems will not exert large pressures on public budgets. However considerable increases 
in the pension burden, measured either as ECR or as the ratio of expenditure to GOP, are 
likely  to occur in  six  countries,  in  spite  of the  fact  that three of them  have  already 
substantially reformed their pension schemes. 
.  33 
34 
This estimate refers to projections carried out by CER (1995) before the 1995  Reform. However, in the 
period 1995-2000 the effects on the ECR of different indexation criteria should not be substantially affected 
by the 1995 Reform. 
This estimate is reported in Ruellan (1993). 
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L4.2 The medium-term: 2000-2010- The outlook for the pension systems gets worse in 
the next decade.  Even under favourable  economic assumptions and  even  assuming  no 
discretionary adjustment of pensions to wage dynamics,  the expenditure ratio  and the 
ECR are  expected  to  increase  in  most  countries.  Large  increases  in  the  ECR are 
expected  in  France  (more  than  3  points35),  Germany  (about  2  percentage  points), 
Luxembourg and Portugal (more than 1 point). Large increases in the expenditure ratio 
are  projected  for  Belgium,  Denmark  and  Finland.  Austria  is  also  likely  to  record  a 
significant  worsening  of its  situation.  36  The  ECR  is  expected  to  record  moderate 
increases in Ireland. 
The burden  represented  by  pension  expenditure  is  expected  to  remain  stable  in  the 
Netherlands, Spain and Sweden and to decline only in Italy and the United Kingdom. 
Assuming  less  favourable  economic assumptions,  the.  growth of the  ratio  of pension 
expenditure to  GDP  or to  labour income  is  substantially  greater.  The  worsening  of 
expenditure trends would be particularly relevant for Belgium, Finland and Luxembourg 
(Charts 3 and  4).  Both Italy and  Spain would record an  increase in the expenditure to 
GDP ratio.  . 
In a medium-term perspective, the link of benefits to price rather than wage dynamics . 
might be questioned.  Governments  might increase pension levels  in  order to limit  the 
decline in the ratio of pensioners' purchasing power to that of workers.  The adjustment 
of pensions to wage dynamics,  rather than price dynamics,  in the course of the' decade 
·would add 2 points to Brit~sh ECR and 1 point to Frenqh ECR (Chart 5).37 
L4.3 The long-term: after 2010 - The situation of several European pension systems 
deteriorates sharply after 2010 when the "baby-boom"  generatio11 retires (Charts  1 and 
2). Between 2010 and 2020 the ECR increases by about 5 points in France, 3 points in 
Ireland and Portugal, by J  to  1.5  points in  Germany and the Netherlands,  by  nearly  1 
point in  Sweden.  In Luxembourg the ECR increases by about 0.5  points in the period 
2010-2015. The ratio of  pension expenditure to GDP is projected to rise by2 percentage 
points in Finland,  by  about  1.5  in Belgium and by more than 0.5  point in Denmark.  A 
limited increase is also expected in Italy and Spain. 
35 
36 
37 
This estimate is based on the increase reported in General Planning Committee (1995) for the period 2000-
2015 (7 points) in the "after the reform scenario" and the increases reported in the same document for the 
periods 2000-2010 (5 points) and 2010-2015 (5 points) in the "before the reform" scenario. 
In the case of Austria, where projections incorporating the 1993  reform are available only up to the year 
1999,  one  can  refer  to  the  estimates  carried  out  in  Council  of Economic  and  Social  Affairs  (1991) 
concerning the effects of some possible reform measures.  The reforms  actually  introduced ih 1993  were 
similar to those examined in the report. 
A  substantial  increase would  occur  also  for  the  ECR  of the  Italian  pension  scheme  for  private  sector 
employees,  In order  to  provide  an indication of the  effects  of wage  indexation,  Chart  5 reports  some 
estimates produced before the 1995 reform. 26 
The change in the pension expenditure trend is quite radical in Ireland, where the ageing 
process  is  relatively  late.  The  ratio  of pensioners  to  workers  paying  contributions, 
expected to remain stable up to 2010, increases sharply in the following decades. By the 
year 203 5 its level nearly doubles.  · 
A reduction in the ECR is expected only in the United Kingdom. 
In the  third  decade  of the  next  century  the  situation  keeps  deteriorating  in  most 
countries. The ECR rises by 6 points in Ireland, 4 points in Germany and 1 point in the 
Netherlands.  The  ratio  of pension  expenditure. to  GDP  rises  by  about  1.5  points  in 
Belgium, 1 point in Denmark and 0.5 points in Finland.  · 
After the year 2030 the national trends are expected to diverge:  in Belgium, Denmark, 
Italy,  the Netherlands  and  the  UK the  incidence  of pension  expenditure  is  stable  or 
declining; in France it keeps increasing.  Over the period 2020-2040 the French ECR is 
expected to increase by 10 points. 
In the period after the year 2010, the difference in the expenditure ratio and in ·the ECR 
between the  favourable  and  unfavourable  economic  scen~ios is  projected  to remain 
constant in .Belgium,  Italy, the Netherlands and  Sweden. It is  projected to decline  in 
Finland.  It ought  to  be  considered  that  wherever  pension  entitlements  and  pension 
amounts  are related to employment  and  contributory records,  the benefits of a better 
economic performance in terms of  expenditure to GDP ratio and ofECR are likely to. be 
temporary. Higher employment and higher wage growth would eventually work. through 
the system and determine more and higher pensions.38  .  ·  . 
The wedge between price indexation and wage indexation scenarios is nearly stable in the 
projections for Italy, while it keeps increasing in those for the United Kingdom.  This is 
due to the different rules applying to the two countries. In Italy most pensions are related 
to  the  earning  career  of workers,  which  means  that  a  change from  wage  to  price 
indexation of pensions  (as  that implemented  in  1992)  reduces  the  rate of growth of 
pension expenditure temporarily (until all living pensioners have retired after the change). 
Afterwards,  expenditure  growth resumes  the  pattern  it would  have  had  without .  the 
change.  In  the United  Kingdom,  basic  pensions  are  unrelated  to  the  wage  level  of 
workers.  If they  are  adjusted  only  to  price  dynamics,  their  relative  value  declines 
asymptotically.  · 
Box No.5 
THE ROLE OF PENSION INDEXATION. 
As a rule," pensions are  long-term benefits. Therefore,  unless they are .adjusted  through time, 
even  modest price and  wage  rises  can  substantially reduce their purchasing  power,  both  in 
absolute terms and relative to that of active workers.  Hence the  need  for regular adjustment, 
38  This point is stressed for U.S. Social Security by Steuerle and Bakija (1994). See also Del  ville et al.  (1995), 
who present some simulations of  changes in the rates of  growth of  employment and real· wages. This topic is 
examined in Box 7. 
-· .... 
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either  discretionary  or  automatic.  The  assumptions  concerning  pension  adjustment  are 
obviously  very important  in  long-term  projections:  over many  years  even .minor  changes  in 
adjustment rules produce large effects on the transfer ratio (see ILO, 1977).  · 
Most PAYG schemes use one or more of  the following three solutions: 
a)  Evaluation by discretionary measures on the part of the authorities: 
b)  Automatic revaluation to maintain the purchasing power of pensions by indexing them to 
prices. 
c)  Automatic revaluation to maintain the rafio of pensions to wages by indexing the former 
to the latter  . 
Discretionary revaluation has the drawback of uncertainty. Neither pensioners nor workers can 
be sure of their future purchasing power. Thus this solution, generally used in the start'" UP stage 
of retirement systems,  has  been abandoned  in  most  countries  in  favour of price  and  wage 
indexation (Ireland and Portugal are the only EU countries that have not introduced automatic 
indexation  of public pensions).  In  PAYG  systems the  indexation  mechanism  is  an  essential 
part  of the  implicit  social  contract  between  the  generation  of active  workers  and  that  of 
pensioners  (see  Musgrave,  1981).  It  provides  individuals  with  an  insurance  against  future 
unexpected changes in inflation or income levels.  · 
Wage and  price dynamics represent,  respectively, the  higher and the lower term of reference 
for automatic adjustment mechanism.  In  principle, wage  and  price  indexation  just represent 
different  ways  of  distributing  pension  expenditure  through  pensioners'  lifetime:  the  same 
amount of total  expenditure  can  be  distributed  either by  paying  to  new  retirees  lower wage-
adjusted  pensions  or by  higher price-adjusted  pensions.  In  a situation  in  which  the  rates  of 
growth  of real  wages,  employment and  the  number of pensioners  change  considerably  over 
time, the shift from one to the other index may represent a way to adjust pension expenditure .. 
(and  the  implicit  intergenerational • contract)  to  the  new  economic  and  demographic 
circumstances. 
In recent years in many countries the indexation mechanisms have been frequently adjusted to 
slowdowns in· employment growth,  population  ageing  and  budgetary constraints  (see  Vording 
and  Goudswaard, 1995). Some countries moved from wage to  price indexation (France,  Italy, 
United  Kingdom).  Several  of those  still  retaining  wage  indexation  moved  from  gross  wage 
indexation  to  net  wage  indexation,  in  order  to  get  the  pensioners  to  share  the  burden  of 
increases in contribution rates (Austria, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands).  In  Finland, where 
employment pensions are  adjusted to  an  average of the price and the wage index, tne weight 
of the former was increased from 50 to 80  per cent; the weight of the latter was reduced from 
50  to  20  per cent.  On  several  occasions the  mechanisms  were  temporarily  suspended  or 
modified. 
The Table below reports the indexation mechanisms existing in the EU Member States and the 
indexation assumptions underlying the projections considered in this Section. 
Most  projections  are  rather  prudential.  Wage  indexation  is  assumed  in  the  projections 
concerning the countries where  it represents the  legal  arrangement,  but  also  some  countries 
where  price  indexation  is the  legal  arrangement (Finland  after the  year 2000)  or the  normal 
arrangement (Ireland). Some projections concerning countries which have recently moved from 
wage to price indexation, project expenditure on the basis of both indexes (France, Italy, United 
Kingdom). It is considered that governments can provide additional adjustments in order to limit 
the reduction in the value of pensions in terms of workers' purchasing power. 
In the countries in which pensions are related to the earning  career of workers,  a change from 
· wage  to  price  indexation  of pensions  reduces  the  rate  of growth  of  pension  expenditure 
temporarily (until all  living pensioners have  retired  after the  change).  Afterwards,  expenditure 
growth resumes the pattern it would have had  wi~hout the change. ·In countries providing basic 28 
pensions unrelated to the wage ·level" of workers (Ireland,  United Kingdom), the  lack of wage 
adjustment determines a continuous decline in their  relative value. This makes the assumption 
of price  indexation  of benefits  rather  less  sustainable  than  in  countries  linking  pensions  to 
earning careers. 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Finland 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
the Netherlands 
.·  Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Ki  m 
Net wages 
Prices (minimum increase 2% per year) 
Wages 
Prices 
Prices/Net Wages(1) 
Net wages 
Wages (basic salaries of civil servants) 
Prices 
Net Wages 
Prices 
Prices 
Prices 
Net wages 
Wages·- 1.25% 
Wages 
Prices and wages 
Prices/Net Wages(2) 
Net wages 
Wages 
Wages 
Prices and wages 
Wages- 0.5% 
Prices 
Prices and wages 
Prices and 
1  )  Basic pensions are  adjusted to  price dynamics.  Occupational  pensions are  adjusted to  the average of price and 
wage dynamics (from 1993 the wage index is computed net of employees' contributions to pension schemes). 
2000. 
L 4.4 The effects of  past reforms - Since the mid-eighties several pension schemes have 
·been reformed  in  order to reduce .pension expenditure growth.39  Major reforms  were 
introduced in Austria (1985,  1988,  1993),  Germany  (1989),  Italy .(1992  and  1995)40, 
France (1993),  Greece (1990 and  1992),  Portugal (1993), Sweden (1994), the United 
Kingdom (1986, 1994). 
a)  Benefit  indexation  rules  were  modified  in  Austria,  Finland,  France,  Germany, 
Greece, Italy and the Netherlands.  Austria and Germany shifted from gross wage 
dynamics to the dynamics ofwages net of contributions as·reference for the annual 
adjustment of pensions. In Austria pension indexation was also inversely related to 
unemployment  levels.  France  and  Italy  turned  from  wage  dynamics  to  price 
dynamics. Finland increased the weight attributed to price dynamics. 
b)  Standard retirement age was raised in  Germany,  Greece,  Italy (1992),41  Portugal 
and the United Kingdom. 
c) 
39 
40 
41 
Replacement  rates  were  reduced  in  Austria,  Finland,  France,.  Greece,  Italy, 
Portugal and the United Kingdom. This outcome was achieved in several ways.  In 
some  countries  (Austria,  Finland,  France,  Italy,  Portugal,  United  Kingdom)  the 
For a description of  recent reforms see European Commission (1993a, 1995a). 
A  second major reform was decided  by  the Italian  government  in  1995.  The draft  bill  was  brought  to 
Parliament in June 1995. See Bank ofltaly (1995) and Peracchi and Rossi (1995). 
The  1995  reform  abolished  standard  retirement age  ru:i.d  introduced  an  8 year  age  bracket over which 
individuals decide when to retire and receive a pension actuarilyTelated to life expectancy after-retirement.  .  ' 
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number of  years considered in the assessment of  the amount of  earnings used in the 
computation of. new  pensions was increased;  this  reduced  assessed  earnings.  In 
Austria,  France,  Portugal  and  the  United  Kingdom  the  percentage  of assessed 
earnings  paid  for  each  contribution  year  was  reduced.  Measures  reducing 
replacement rates were also taken in Denmark and the Netherlands.42 
The  contribution  periods  required  for  pension  eligibility  were  increased  in 
Greece.43 
e)  In Germany,  Greece and  Italy the functional  relationship  of pension to years of 
service was modified in order to provide an incentive to retire later  . 
f)  New rules concerning pension credits for years with limited or null  contributions 
were introduced in Austria and  Germany.  In particular,  pension credits for years 
spent in higher education were reduced. 
g)  Public  sector employees'  special  pension benefits  were curtailed  9r abolished  in 
Finland, Greece, Portugal and Italy. 
h)  Eligibility· criteria for disability benefits were tightened in Finland,  Greece and the 
Netherlands. 
The structure of  the pension system was largely reformed in Italy (1995) and Sweden. In 
both countries  the wage-related  system  of pension  determination was  replaced  by  a 
contributory system.  Cost containment was just one of the objectives of the reforms, 
which also aimed at making the system more able to tolerate demographic change, more 
transparent in its distributive effects, less distortive in its effects on individuals' ch()ices. · 
As  shown in  Charts  6 . and  7  a-7b,  some  pension  systems  have  already  adjusted  to a 
considerable extent to the new demograp4ic situation.  In the UK, the 1986 reform was 
expected to reduce the ECR by about 1 point in 2010 and 4 points in 2030 and 2050; the 
1994 reform will reduce it further by 0.2 points in 2010 and by nearly 3 points in 2030 
and 2050.  Under the assumption of price indexation of pensions,  the two reforms are 
expected to keep the ECR firmly below its 1995 level. 
The 1993  French reform is  expected to reduce the ECR by 4  percentage points in the 
year 2015  and by 7 points in 2040. The  1989 German reform is projected to reduce the 
ECR by 4 points in 2010 and  10 in 2030.  In both countries the reforms do  not prevent 
substantial increases in the ECR. 
42 
43 
In both countries the rules concerning additional income received by pensioners or their partners have been 
tightened.  In  Denmark  pensions  and  minimum  income  guarantees  have  been  made  taxable.  In  the 
Netherlands  entitlement to  higher rate  basic  pensions  has  been restricted.  See  European  Commission 
(1995a). 
The contribution period required for pension eligibility was increased also in Italy in I 992 (from 15 to 20 
years). It  was later reduced (to 5 years) by the 1995 Reform that abolished "minimum pensions" and related 
pensions to contributions paid over all working life. See Section IT. 9. 30 
The recent Swedish reform is expected to reduce the ECR concerning old-age benefits 
by 3.0 percentage points in 1995, 4 in2015,. 5.5  in 2025 and 6 in 2050. The reduction is 
largely due to a change in the definition of taxable income.  Under the old definition of 
taxable income, the effects of the reform on the benefit side will. reduce the ECR by  1 
percentage points in 2015, 2.5 in 2025 and3 in 2050. 
The 1992 Italian pension reform is expected to reduce pension expenditure by 3 per cent 
ofGDP in the year 2010 and by 4 per cent in the year 2025. The 1995 reform is expected 
to reduce the expenditure of  the schemes for private sector employees  an~ self-employed 
artisans and  businessmen by 0.5  points of GDP  in  2010,  1 in  2030  and  1.5  in 2050. 
Under the assumptions  of price indexation of pensions and  of adjustment  of pension 
coefficients to life expectancy changes, the expenditure ratio of  these schemes at its 203 0 
peak will not substantially exceed the 1995 level.  · 
The 1990 Greek reform shifted the increase in the expenditure ratio otherwise expected 
for the nineties by about 10 years. 44  . 
in both the French and the Italian case, expenditure cuts largely. depend on the shift from 
wage to price indexation. About two thirds of  the effects of  the 1993 French reform and 
ofthe Italian 1992 reform are due to the change in indexation.45  · 
L 4. 5 Demographic  and non-demographic factors  - As  mentioned  in  Section  I. i .1, 
·between 1960  and  1985  a large part of the expansion in pension expenditure in  most 
Western countries was caused by the increase in the eligibility  and transfer ratios.  By 
comparing  the  expected  trend  of the  old-age  dependency  ratio  with  those  of the 
expenditure ratio  or of the  ECR,  it  is  possible  to evaluate the  expected  future  joint 
effects of  the two ratios. 
Charts B1-B15 in Annex B plot the expected trend of the old-age dependency ratio and 
. that expected for pension expenditure (in terms of GDP ratio or of the ECR).46 Broadly 
speaking, an old-age dependency ratio line over the expenditure line points to a reduction 
in the eligibility and transfer ratios. This implies that restrictive reforms, counterbalancing 
the ageing  trend,  have  already  been implemented  in the  pension  system.  An  old-age 
dependency ratio line close to the expenditure line points to stable eligibility and transfer 
ratios,  and therefore to a mature pension system in which expenditure growth depends 
mostly on demographic change. An old-age dependency ratio line under the expenditure 
line points to an increase in the eligibility and transfer ratios. This Implies that the effects 
44 
45 
46 
No long term projections of  the effects of  the ·1992 reform are available. 
See respectively Ruellan (1993) and CER (1995). 
Expenditure  lines  refer  to  the  national  projections  considered  in Charts  1-7  (i.e.,  the  latest  official 
projections). Wherever major reforms have been implemented, the expenditure trend preceeding the reform 
has also  been plotted (all the relative data are reported in the Tables  of Annex B).  Expenditure  lines 
concerning Italy refer to CER (1994  ).  Old-age dependency lines usually refer to the projections considered 
in Charts 1-4; wherever these projections do not provide data concerning the dependency ratio, the old-age 
dependency lines refer to the most recent population projections reported in the Tables of  Annex B. '  .  -. 
~ .  . . 
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of demographic changes will be increased by  the improvements introduced in pension 
rules in the past or by the gradual increase in workers' contributory records. 
In most  EU  countries  the  old-age  dependency  line  is  expected  to  lie  above  the 
expenditure line, particularly in the long-term. In several countries this tendency is due to 
the reforms implemented in recent years. 
In  Germany  the  1989  reform  has  shifted  the  expenditure  line  firmly  below  the 
dependency line (Chart B6).  Before the reform,  the former line was projected slightly 
above  the  latter.  In  Italy,  the  reforms  introduced  in  1992  and  1995  shifted  the 
expenditure lines firmly below the dependency line (Chart B9); this situation represents a 
radical departure from the trend ofthe previous decades. 
As to the United Kingdom, in the. scenario in which basic pensions are adjusted to price 
dynamics, the expenditure line is far below the dependency ratio line (Chart Bl5). The 
gap  between  the  two  lines  gets  wider  and  wider. . In  the  scenario  assuming  wage. 
indexation of basic pensions, the expenditure line is above the dependency line over the 
next decades.  This is  due to the gradual implementation of the SERPS original rules. 
Later on, the effects of  the 1986 and the 1994 reforms move also this expenditure line 
substantially below the dependency line.  Before the 1986 reform, in the wage indexation 
scenario, the expenditure line was above the dependency line. 
In the next five years, the dependency line is expected to lie above the expenditure liile 
· also  in Austria and  Gree~e (Charts B 1 and B7).  In. both countries,  as .mentioned in. 
Section 1.4.4, significant reforms have been implemented in the early nineties, shifting the·· 
expenditure lines downwards. The change has been particularly radical for Greece, where 
the expenditure line was previously expected to lie much above the dependency. line.  As 
already mentioned, available projections do not allow an assessment of the situation of 
the two countries in the long-term. 
In Finland and Sweden the trends are similar.  In the former, the dependency line is very 
close to the expenditure line of the baseline scenario up to the year 2010 (Chart B4). 
Thereafter  it  moves  substantially  above  the  expenditure  lines  corresponding  to  all 
economic scenarios.  In Sweden· the dependency line lies between the expenditure lines. 
corresponding to the two alternative economic scenarios up to the year 2015.  Then it 
moves upwards, while the expenditure line turns downwards. 
In spite of the recent reforms,  the expenditure line  is  still  expected  to be above the 
dependency line in France. The 1993 reform has, however, considerably reduced the gap 
between  the  two  lines.  Before  their  introduction,  the  gap  was  expected  to  grow 
progressively (Chart B5). 
On the  whole,  the  countries  which  have  not  introduced  extensive  refornis  of their 
pensions systems are not in a much worst situation. This is probably due to the fact that 
reforms have been introduced in the countries where expenditure prospects were more 
alarming. 32 
In Belgium the dependency line is always above the most favourable expenditure line and 
is above the most unfavourable one from about 2015 (Chart B2). This tendency depends 
on the projected increase in the activity ratio, the decline in the unemployment ratio and 
the reduction of the gradual transfer ratio after the year 2020.  In the Netherlands both 
the 'young population' and  the 'old  population' dependency  rate are always  above the 
respective expenditure lines; the gap between the lines widens gradually over time.  This 
reflects  also  the gap  (0.5  per cent  per  annum)  between the  rate  of growth of basic 
pensions and  that of average wage,  which is  assumed in the projections of the Dutch · 
Scientific Council of  Government Policy. 47 
In Ireland the two lines have similar long-term trends, but the expenditure line lies below 
the dependency line in the first  quarter of the next  century (Chart B8), reflecting the 
effects of the projected decline  of the  inactive  and  eligibility  ratios  and  the projected 
stability of  the transfer ratio at the beginning of the next century.  48  The dependency and 
expenditure  lines  have  similar  trends  in  the  Danish  projection,  which  also  assumes 
constant transfer and eligibility ratios (Chart B3). 
In Spain the dependency line is  expected to  remain above the expenditure lines (Chart 
B 13). Two factors contribute to this trend: the expected decline in the transfer ratio and 
the expected substantial increase in the number of workers paying contributions to the 
pension system. 
Luxembourg  is  in  a  rather  different  situation.  The  dependency  ratio_  is  close  to  the 
expenditure  ratio  corresponding  to  the  most  favourable  economic  scenano.  It  is 
substantially below the lines corresponding to the other scenarios. 
Charts Bl-B15 show clearly that in. most  countries present pension policies  are  quite 
different  from those implemented  in  the previous  decades.  The phase  of exten~ion of 
coverage  and  improvement  of benefits  is  over,  although  in  a  few  countries  past 
extensions and  improvements are  still  affecting  expenditure growth.  In most  countries 
only demographic trends are presently exerting an upward pressJ1re on the expenditure to 
GDP  ratio or the ECR.  In  several countries the effects of demographic trends will be 
partly offset by reforms aimed at restraining expenditure growth..  · 
In spite of this change in  policy,  in  most countries pension expenditure ratios are still 
expected to move upwards.  Section 15 will try to assess their effects on public  sector 
·budgets. 
47 
48 
In the case of the Netherlands the gap betwe_en pension and wage dynamics has· a formal  ground in a new 
law  ·that came into force  in 1992.  The law, while reafflrming 'the principles of indexation to  gross wages 
and the net link  between rp.inimum wage and public pension', discarded automatic' adjustment of  pensions to 
wage dynamics.  It established t.lllit  '(full)  indexation can be discarded when the ratio of the number of 
benefit recipients to the number of the working population exceeds a specified percentage (82.6 per cent)'. 
See Vording (1995).  · 
The eligibility rate is expected to decline in spite of the 1986 extension of pension insurance to the self-
employed (who will become eligible for insurance benefits in 1998). .  --
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14.6 Revisions and sensitivity analysis - As  already pointed out,  no  attempt has been 
made to evaluate the reliability of  the projections presented in the preceding sections.  It 
has been considered that only national institutions have the institutional and  statistical 
knowledge required to forecast pension expenditure. 
An indirect  indicator  of the  reliability  of projections  is,  however,  provided  by  the 
adjustments implemented over time. Four examples of  revision of  estimates· are presented 
in Box 6.  In all  of them the ECR has  been revised upwards.  Some changes have been 
quite substantial, especially considering the lirpited period of time over which they took 
place.  Available evidence does not allow to infer that there is  a consistent tendency to 
underestimate expenditure trends. However, it points to the need to cany out periodic 
revisions of estimates.  It also  points to the need  to· evaluate alternative economic and 
demographic  scenarios,  in  order  to  have  some  estimates  of the  range  of possible 
expenditure trends. 
Box No.6 
REVISIONS OF PROJECTIONS: FOUR CASES 
Section 1.1  stressed the  uncertainty concerning the  parameters affecting pension  expenditure 
dynamics and the difficulty of P.fOjecting pension expenditure over long periods. It also stressed 
the usefulness of periodic revisions of projections. This Box examines the revisions carried out 
in four countries in recent years (see Charts below) . 
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France- Government of France (1991) and General Planning Committee (1995)  estimated the 
ECR of a fictional scheme representing  all  basic and supplementary pension schemes. In the 
first document the rates estimated for the year 2040 ranged  from 30.9 to 41.9 per cent.  In the 34 
. comparable scenario ("before the 1993 reform") of the second study .fh~ projected rate was 48 
per cent.  · 
Germany  - Federal  Government  (1994,  1995)  estimated  the  ECR  (net  of  Government 
transfers)  of the  Statutory  Pension  Scheme.  For  the  year  2008,  the  1994  study  (central 
scenario) projects a rate of 21.0 per cent; the 1995 study projects a rate of 21.8 per cent. 
Italy - General Accounting Office (1991,  1994,  1995) estimated the ECR of the Private Sector 
Employees' Pension Fund. In the 1991  study, the ECR was expected to increase from 39.5 per 
cent in 1995 to 54.5 in 2025. On a comparable basis ("before the 199.2 reform" scenario) in the 
second study it was expected to increase from 44 to 60 per cent over the same period. In the 
"after the  1992 reform" scenario, the latter study projected  a decline in  the  ECR from  41  per 
cent in  1995 to 37  per cent  in  2025.  For the  same  scenario  and  the  same  period, the  1995 
study projected a decline in the ECR from 47 to 44 per cent. 
United Kingdom- Government Actuary's Department (1986,  1990, 1995) estimated the ECR of 
the National Insurance Pensions. The  1986  report (under the assumption of price  indexation) 
projected a decline in the rate from 14.6 per cent in 1990 to 10.8 in 2050. In the following report 
the rate  was  expected to decline over the  same  period  from  19.1  per cent to  14.1  per cent 
·(from 17.7  to  13.0  per  cent  allowing  for the  effect  of the  Social  Security  Bill  1990).  On  a 
qomparable  basis  ("before  the  1994  reform"  scenario),  the  last  report  expected  the  rate  to 
decrease from 18.25 per cent in  1995 to 16.8 in 2050.  Each  new report analyses in  detail the 
differences with  the  previous projections.  The  differences  between  the  1995  and  the  1990 
projections are attributed to the expected changes in the number of pensioners and contributors 
and to a revision in the benefit rate relative to earnings. 
In all four examples presented, the ECR has been revised upwards. Some changes have been 
quite substantial, especially considering the limited period of time over which they took place. 
Several of  the national projections examined evaluate the effects of  alternative economic · 
scenarios; most of them do  not include estimates of alternative demographic scenarios. 
As reported in Box 7,  which presents some sensitivity analysis results included in two 
national studies, two points ought to be stressed: i) changes in demographic parameters 
tend to produce greater long-term effects than changes in economic parameters; ii) the 
effects of  changes in economic parameters on the ECR tend to be temporary. 
·Box No.7 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
As already poirited  out,  long-term  projections are  inevitably subject to  wide  margins of error. 
Demographic and  economic parameters and  retirement behaviour are quite difficult to predict 
over long periods.  Sensitivity analysis,  estimating the  effects of different sets of assumptions, 
provides  an  indication  of the  range  of possible  expenditure  trends.  Several  recent  pension 
expenditure projections devote a section to sensitivity analysis. This Box briefly presents two of 
them. 
Delville eta/. (1995), who  project the  pension  expenditure  of the  Belgian schemes far public 
sector employees,  consider alternative  employment and  earnings scenarios.  In  each  variant, 
only one assumption is changed with respect to the baseline scenario. A 10 per cent increase 
(reduction) in employment determines a lower (higher) ECR; the difference with respect to the 
baseline scenario widens up to the year 2025 and declines thereafter (see Chart below). By the 
year 2040 the ECR in the lower (higher) employment scenario coincides with the baseline ECR. 
Almost no  changes are expected when  assuming a higher (lower)  growth  in  real  wages  (1. 75 
per  cent  every  two  years  instead  of  1.5  per  cent),  sine~  pensions  are  adjusted  to  wage 
dynamics.  · . . 
.  "-
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Government  Actuary's  Department  ·  (1990,  1995)  examines  the  effects  of  change~  in 
demographic,  employment  and  earnings  parameters  on  UK  National  Insurance  pension 
expenditure. In the scenario with  price  indexation  of pensions,  an  increase in  life expectancy 
(improvements are assumed to  be twice those assumed in the baseline scenario) increases the 
ECR  by  0.1  points  in  2010  and  1.0 in  2050  (see  Chart  below).  A  reduction· in  fertility  (1.7 
children per woman, as against 1.9) has no effect in 2010 and increases the j::CR by 1.7 points · 
in 2050. An increase in the unemployment rate (by 2 per cent) raises the ECR by 0.6 points in 
2010 and  0.5  in  2050.  A  reduction  in  the  rate  of growth  of real  earnings  (by  0.5  per cent) 
increases the ECR by 0.8 points in 2010 and 3.4 in 2050. In the scenario with wage indexation 
of pensions,  in  which  the  baseline  ECR  is  higher,  the  effects ·of the  first  three  changes  in 
assumption  are  also  larger.  On  the  contrary,  the  reduc~ion in  the  rate  of growth  of earnings 
produces smaller effects (0.2 points in 2010 and 0.3 in 2050), since the loss in taxable earnings 
is largely offset by the reduction in pension adjustments, 
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The _effects of marginal changes in demographic and  economic parameters over a 50-60 year' 
period can be summarised as follows: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
.  . 
An  increase  (decline)  in  life  expectancy  raises  (reduces)  the  ratio  of the  number  of 
pensioners to the number of workers and increases (reduces) the ECR. The effects build 
up gradually over a long period  . 
An increase (decline) in  fertility tends to raise (reduce) the number of contributors to the 
pension system and to reduce (increase) the ECR. Effects become  relevant after about 
20 years, when the flow of entrants in the labour market is affected . 
An  increase  (decline)  in  employment in  a first  phase  reduces  (raises)  the  ratio of the 
number of pensioners. to  the  number of workers  and  reduces  the  (increases)  ECR.  If 
pension  eligibility and  the  replacement ratio  depend  on  contributory  records,  in  a later 
stage the effects gradually decline. 36 
d)  An  increase  (reduction)  in  the  rate  of growth  of real  wages  in  a first  phase  reduces 
(raises)  the  transfer  ratio  (average  pension  I  average  labour  income)  and  reduces 
(increases)  the  ECR.  If pensions  are  relateEI  to  earnings  records,  in  a later stage  the 
effects gradually decline and may eventually disappear. If pensions are flat-rate benefits, 
constant in real terms, the effects keep building up over a long time. ---------c-------------
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1.5  THE  EFFECTS  ON  PUBLIC  BUDGETS:  SOME  TENTATIVE 
ESTIMATES 
As already  pointed  out,  the  projections  presented  in  the  previous  Section  are  not 
homogeneous in their coverage of  pension expenditure. Therefore, although they provide 
some useful indications about the trends in future pension expenditure in the EU Member 
States, they do not provide an estimate of the impact of the future  evolution of public. 
pension schemes on general governments• accounts. This Section tries to fill this gap by 
applying each country•s projected expenditure trend to an estimate of its  1995  ratio of 
total public pension expenditure to GDP. 
More specifically, the expected values of  the ratio ofp(msion expenditure to GDP and of 
the ECR have been turned into an index based on a 1995 value of 1.  Then the index has 
been multiplied by the ratio of public pension expenditure to GDP estimated for  1995. 
The latter data has been computed in different ways,  according to the data available for 
each country (see Annex A2).  Some of  them are not fully satisfactory. 
As  in  the Charts  referred  in  Section  1.4.5  and  included  in  Annex  B,  wherever more 
scenarios were considered in the national projections, the most favourable and the least 
favourable  are taken into consideration in  order· to provide a range for  future pension 
expenditure  growth.  Individual  country  estimates  are  presented  in  Charts  8-·11.  The 
· unweighted ·and weighted average of  the ratios of  pension expenditure to GDP.in the 11. 
EU countries which produced projections up to the year 2030 are presented in Charts.· 
12a-12b. 
.  . 
The data can be examined over three periods: the next five years, the period 2000-2010, 
the period after the year 4030. 
a)  Between 1995 and the year 2000, the ratio of  public pension expenditure to GDP 
might grow by 0. 7 percentage points in Germany and Greece, nearly 0.4 points in 
France and  0.3  in  Portugal.  According  to the  different  economic  scenarios,  the 
ratio would grow by 0.7 to  1.5  points in Luxembourg and by 0.5 to 0.7 points  i~ 
Belgium.  In Austria,  Denmark, Ireland and  Spain the expenditure ratio would be 
nearly stable; in the ·Netherlands it would be stable in the best scenario and increase 
by 0.6 points in the worst.  In the United Kingdom it would either decline by·0.2 
points  (price  indexation  of basic  pensions)  or  increase  by  0.3  points  (wage 
indexation  of basic  pensions).  In  Finland  and  Sweden  the  best  and  the  worst 
economic scenarios respectively point to a decline in the expenditure ratio of 0.5 
points and to an increase in the ratio of 0.6 - 0.8  points.  In Italy the ratio would  . 
decline by 0.3 to 0.8 points. 
Under favourable  economic scenarios and  assuming no  discretionary increases in 
pensions (particularly assuming  no  discretionary  adjustment cif pensions to wage 
dynamics),  ovyr  the  period  1995-2000  the unweighted average  of the  ratios  of 
pension expenditure to  GDP in the  15  countries considered will.increase by about Chart 8 
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0.1  percentage points.  The outlook would  be  rather worse if economic  activity 
were  to  slow  down  markedly:  under  unfavourable  scenarios,  the  unweighted 
average  of the  ratios  of pension. expenditure  to  GDP  would  increase  by  0.4 
percentage points. In the 11  countries for which projections are available up to the 
year 2030, the average ofthe ratios would be stable under favourable assumptions 
and increase by 0.3 under unfavourable assumptions (see Chart 12a). 
b)  Expenditure growth would accelerate in the period 2000-2010. Over the decade, 
the expenditure to GDP ratio would grow by  2 percentage points in France,  1. 7. 
points in Denmark,  1.2 in Germany,  0.2 in Ireland and PortugaL In Luxembourg 
expenditure growth would range between 0.6 and 3.4 points, in Finland between 1 
and 2.4 points, in Belgium between 0.6 and 1.3 points, in Sweden between 0.4 and  · 
1 points. In Spain the ratio would be nearly stable in the best scenario and increase 
by 0.5  points in the worst.  In the United Kingdom the change in the expenditure 
ratio would range between a reduction of 0.2 percentage points and an increase of 
0.6 point; in Italy between a 0.2 points reduction and a 0.6 points increase. In the 
Netherlands it would be stable. 
c) 
d) 
Over the period  2000-2010,  the unweighted  average  of pension  expenditure to 
GDP  ratios  in  the  13  countries  for  which  projections  up  to the  year  2010  are 
available will increase by about OS percentage points.  Under the least favourable 
economic scenarios and  the scenarios assuming discretionary wage indexation of 
pension  benefits,  the  increase  would  reach  1.2  percentage points.  In· the  ll 
countries for which projections are available up to the yeat 2010, the average of 
the ratios would increase by 0.6 percentage points under favourable assumptions.· 
and by 1.0 points under unfavourable assumptions (Chart 12a). 
After  the  year  2010  expenditure  pressure  would  ·rise ·substantially  in  most 
countries.  The  estimate  for  the  period  2010-2030  is  4.3  points  for  France,  3.5 
points for Germany,  3 to 3.2 points for Belgium,  0.6 to 2.4points for Finland,  3 
points for  Ireland,  2.8  to  3.8  points for  the Netherlands.  Expenditure pressures 
would be more moderate in Denmark (1.8  points),  Spain (0.3  to  1.4  percentage 
points of GDP),  Italy (1.2 to  1.7 points) and  Sweden (0 to 0.5  points),  Portugal 
(0.7 point up  to the year 2020) and  the United Kingdom (0  points in  the  price 
indexation scenario, 1.8 in the wage indexation scenario). In Luxembourg the ratio· 
would increase by O.J to 1.4 points in the period 2010-2015. 
Over the whole period 201 0-203 0, the unweighted average of  pension expenditure 
to GDP ratios in the  11  countries for which projections up to the year 2030 are 
available will increase by about 2. 0 percentage points.  Under the least favourable 
economic scenarios and  the scenarios assuming discretionary wage indexation of 
pension benefits, the average would increase by 2.3 percentage points (Chart 12a). 
Under both favourable and unfavourable scenarios, the GDP-weighted49  increase 
in  the  ratio  is  steeper than the  unweighted,  since  some  large  countries project 
49  ·  The weights are represented by 1995 GDP in units of  Purchasing Power Standard. 39 
relatively high increases in expenditure.  In the  11  countries for which projections 
are available  up to the year  2030, the average  ratio  would  increase by  0.1-0.3 
points over the period 1995-2000, 0.6-1.0 points over the period 2000-2010,2.3-
2.7 points over the period 2010-2030(see Chart 12b). 
'-•'  .. ~ .  . 
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1.6  SOME CONCLUSIONS 
Before presenting  the  main  general  conclusions  of the  survey,  three  points  must  be 
recollected:  a)  all projections have been taken at face value;  b)  national projections 
largely  differ  in  assumptions  and  in  methodologies;  this  obviously  hampers  their 
comparability; it can nevertheless be argued that national institutions are likely to know 
best the scenarios most relevant for their own pension system; c) most projections apply 
over long periods exogenous demographic  and  economic scenarios to present pension 
rules  (which  are  actually  likely  to  be  adjusted -frequently)  and  present.  retirement 
behaviour (which can change over time and is not independent of  the scenarios).· 
The conclusions, which are based on unchanged policy projections, are the following: 
a)  In the next 5 years, expenditure pressures stemming from public pensio_n systems, 
although non-negligible,  are expected to be rather limited in most countries.  The 
ratio of pension expenditure to GDP in EU 15  is expected to increase on average 
by 0.1  points (under favourable  economic scenarios) and up to 0.4 points (under 
unfavourable scenarios). 50 
b)  In the first decade  of the  next century,  the  outlook for  the  pension. systems 
becomes worse. Even under favourable economic assumptions, the expenditure to 
GDP ratio is expected to increase in most countries.  Over the period 2000-2010,  .. 
the unweighted average of pension expenditure to GDP ratios in the 13 countries 
for  which  projections  up  to  the  year  2010  are· available  will  increase  by  0.5 
percentage points (under favourable assumptions) and up to 1. 2 percentage points 
(under·unfavourable assumptions). 
c)  After the year  2010,  when  the  baby-boom  generation  retires,  the  situation  of 
European pension systems  deteriorates more sharply.  The change in  the pension 
expenditure trend is  quite  radical  for  the countries  where  the  ageing  process is 
relatively late (particularly in Ireland). Over the period 2010-2030, the unweighted 
average  of pension  expenditure  to  GDP  ratios  in  the  11  countries  for  which 
projections up to the year 2030 are available will increase by 2.0 percentage points 
(under  favourable  assumptions)  and  up  to  2.3  points  (under  unfavourable 
assumptions).51  In several countries expenditure pressures will peak in the period 
2030-2040. 
d) 
50 
51 
Over the whole period 1995-2030,  expenditure pressures will be relatively strong 
in  several  countries  which  have  not  yet  substantially  reformed .  their  pension 
systems  (Belgium,  Denmark,  Ireland  Luxembourg,  the Netherlands),  but also  in 
As  to the  United  Kingdom,  the  favourable  scenario  envisages  price  indexation  of basic  pensions;  the 
unfavourable scenario envisages wage indexation of  basic pensions. 
Charts 12a-12b refer to the 11  countries for which estimates are available up to the year 2030. They  slightly 
differ from  the data reported for the periods  1995-2000  and  1995-2010 in conclusions a) and b),  which 
respectedely refer to 15 and 13 countries. 41 
some  countries  that  have  already  introduced  large  reform-s  (Finland,  France, 
Germany).  Expenditure  increases  are  expected  to  be  fairly  limited  (under 
favourable economic scenarios) in Italy, Portugal; Spain Sweden and (in the case 
pensions were adjusted just to pric.e dynamics) in the United Kingdom. In most of 
these  countries  pension  reforms  largely  co.ntributed  in  curtailing  expenditure 
dynamics. 
e)  By the year 2030 in several countries (Belgium,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Italy 
and  the Netherlands) the ratio  of pension expenditure to.  GDP  might  be  in the 
range  of 15  to 20  per cent.  Expenditure  would  be  lower in  Denmark,  Spain, 
Sweden (in the 10 to 15 per cent range), and in Ireland and  the United Kingdom 
(below 10 per cent). Luxembourg and Portugal, for which projections are available 
up to the period 2015-2020, are likely to belong,  respectively, to the first and the 
last group of  countries. 
f) 
.  g) 
h) 
i) 
Over the last decade, several national projections have been revised. The ECR has 
generally been revised upward.  Some changes  have been quite  substantial.  Past 
revisions  do  not give  any  indication about  future  revision of present estimates. 
However,  they  point  to  the  usefulness  of carrying  out  regular · reviews  of 
projections and analysing past projection errors. 
In .some  countries  the  wedge  between  the  most  favourable  and  the  most 
unfavourable expenditure scenarios is quite large. Both the assumptions concerning 
economic  activity  and  employment  and  those  concerning  the  adjustment  of 
pensions play an important role. Alternative demographic scenarios are rarely taken 
into  consideration;  different  mortality  and  fertility  assumptions  would  further · 
increase the range of  possible tong-term expenditure outcomes.  .  · 
In  most  countries  present  pension  policies.  are  quite  different  from  those 
implemented  in  previous  decades.  The  phase  of extension  of coverage  and 
improvement of benefits is over,  although in a few  countries ,past extensions and 
improvements are still affecting expenditure growth.  Since the mid-eighties several 
pension  schemes  have  been  reformed  in  order  to  reduce  pension  expenditure 
growth.  Major  reforms  were  introduced  in  Austria,  Finland,  Germany,  Italy, 
France, Greece, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
In most countries only demographic trends presently increase the expenditure to 
GDP ratio (the exceptions being, the long-run, France, Ireland and Luxembourg). 
In several  countries  the  effects  of demographic  trends  will  be  partly  offset  by 
reforms aimed at restraining expenditure growth, These reforms have brought the 
expenditure line firmly  below the old-age dependency ratio line.  for this reason, 
the projections carried out by  the IMP and the OECD in 'the eighties (based on 
constant transfer and eligibility ratios) have generally tui:ned  out more pessimistic 
than present national projections. 
j)  Given the large expected changes in  demographic ·structure,  the  preservation of 
present benefit levels  and  eligibility  rules  requires  a  substantial  increase  in the 
national resources devoted to the pension systems;  alternatively, the stabilisation 
of pension expenditure requires further  severe cuts in  pension benefit  levels  and 
substantial restrictions inpension eligibility in  sev~ral countries. 42 
The  national  projections  surveyed  in  this  paper give  an  account  of the  pressure that 
pension expenditure will exert on EU Member States' public finances.  They also give an 
account  of the  efforts  of national  authorities  and  researchers  to  develop  forecasting 
models  that  provide  more  accurate,  more  frequent  and  longer-term  projections  of 
pension expenditure. 
As  already  pointed  out,  the  differences  in  approach,  in  the  periods  of. reference;  in 
coverage,  and  in  economic  and  demographic  assumptions,  severely  impede  the 
comparability  of national  estimates.  In  order  to  develop  internationally  comparable 
projections  of pension  expenditure,  common  forecasting  methodologies  should  be 
defined and economic and de1llogniphic assumptions should be harmonised: .  .  ~- ... 
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PART  IT 
COUNTRY  PROJECTIONS 
ll.l  AUSTRIA 
The Austrian pension system is run on a PAY  G basis with pensions related to w~ges and 
length of contributory records.  There are two main pension schemes (the ASVG52  for 
. private sector employees and  a few  specific schemes run by the Federal government or · 
by the States for  public  sector employees) and  a number of smaller  schemes for  self-·· 
.  53 
employed  .  · 
Between  1960 and  1988 pension payments  rose from  9.5  per cent to  15  per cent of 
GDP. Expenditure growth was particularly high for old age pensions. The trebling of  the 
share of  old-age pensions to GDP in the period 1960-1985 can be attributed to a 78 per 
cent increase in the eligibility ratio, a 36 per cent increase in the transfer ratio, a 14 per 
cent increase in the dependency ratio and a 9 per cent increase in the inactive ratio. 5  In 
1988 Austria recorded one of the highest ratios of pension expenditure to GDP among 
Western countries. 
Demographic forecasts  are rather worrying:  the dependency ratio  is  already  relatiyely 
high, while the birth rate is one of  the lowest in Europe. In the private sector, the ratio of 
the number of pensions to the number of workers has increased from less than 50 per 
cent in 1972 to 56.6 per cent in 1982 and to 58 per cent in the early nineties. 55 Including 
52 
53 
54 
55 
Allgemeine Sozialversicherungsgesetz. 
The Austrian pension system is described in Board of  Austrian Social Security Institutions ( 1994  ). Detailed 
data concerning the system are presented in Board of  Austrian Social Security Institutions (1993). 
See OECD (1989a). 
See Board of  Austrian Social Security Institutions (1993). 44 
the public sector, the ratio reached 62.3 per cent in 198856. The eligibility ratio rose from 
70 per cent in 1960 to more than 100 per cent in the early nineties.  Between 1970 and 
1992 the average retirement age declined from 61.9 to 58.3  years for males and from 
60.4 to 57.3 years for females, becoming one of  the lowest among Western countries, 
Pension. expenditure is mostly financed by social security contributions. In order to cover 
the increase in expenditure the contribution rate for employees and employers rose from 
11  per cent in  1960 to 22.8  per cent in  1988.  Federal government transfers cover the . 
gaps between contributions and pensions.  Since  1993  these subsidies are limited within 
33 per cent of  total expenditures. In the late seventies federal transfers represented more 
than a  third  of total pension expenditure;  in  the following  years  their .  ratio to total 
expenditure declined to 20 per cent in 1994.57 
Some reforms were introduced in 1985 and in 1988. From 1985, · 
a)  the basis for new pensions was to be gradually changed from the average wages 
earned in  the  last  five  years  at  work to  those  earned  in  the  last  ten years;  the 
assessment period was also increased in the event of early retirement; 
b)  · the annual adjustment of  pensions to wage increases was to be scaled down by 0. 1 
per cent for each percentage point of  unemployment. 
In 1988, 
c)  the assessment period in case of  early retirement was further lengt~ened; 
d)  pension credits for years spent in higher education were reduced. 
The outlook for the Austrian pension system was extensively examined in  1991 by .the 
Council of Economic and Social A:ffairs58  in the Report "Social Security in Old-Age"59. 
The resulting projection is based on the following assumptions: the fertility rate is· stable 
at 1.56 from the year 1995, mortality rates decrease with life expectancy at birth rising 
from 72  to 75  years for  males  and. from  78.6 to 80.9 years for females  in the period 
1989-2015, the net migration flow is stable at a level of 10.000 persons each year. 
The Council projected an increase in the old age dependency ratio from 33  per cent in 
1990  to  59  per  cent  in  2030  (Table  II.1,  point  1).  Assuming  a  constant  labour 
participati9n ratio, the ratio of  pensions to workers was projected to remain stable up the 
year 2001  and then to rise to 69 per cent in 2010,  82 per cent in 2020,  102 per cent in 
·  2030.  Different projections were presented for the transfer ratio.  Assuming  a constant 
contribution  rate  levied  on workers  and  employers  and  an  increase  in  the  share  of 
expenditure financed  by  the Federal  Government,  the  transfer  ratio  was  projected  to 
56  See Council of  Economic and Social Affairs ( 1991 ). 
57  The role of  the federal government in the financing of  pension expenditure is examined in OECD (1994e  ). 
58  Beirat  fti.r Wirtschafts-'und Sozialfragen. 
59  Soziale Sicherung im Alter. 
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remain stable at 4  7 per cent. Assuming that all the burden for the increase in expenditure 
is carried by employees, the transfer ratio was projected to rise from 47 to 54 per cent. 
In either case, the ratio of pension expenditure to taxable income (the contribution rate 
that would be required to finance all pension expenditure) was projected to remain stable 
up to the beginning ofthe new century (at about 31  per cent), and then to rise gradually 
up to 35  per cent in 2010, 43  per cent in 2020, 54 per cent in 2030.  Accordingly, the 
ratio of  pension expenditure to GDP was expected to grow from 11 to 19 per cent. 
Two  alternative  scenarios  involving  higher  employment  were  also  considered  by  the 
Council of Economic and  Social Affairs.  One assumed  higher inflows  of workers, the 
other an increase in the participation ratio.  In the latter scenario,  the dependency. ratio 
would  reach  a  level  of only  78  per cent  in  2030.  Maintaining  the  share  of federal 
subsidies to GDP constant, pension expenditure would reach  14.5 per cent of GDP in 
2030  ..  The increase in the contribution rate would have been 10 points lower than in the 
case of  invariant labour participation ratio. 
The Council focused on two lines of  reform: 
a)  A change.in.the commitment of  the Federal Budget in providing transfer to pension 
schemes. 
b)  A switch from gross to net wages as a term of reference in the annual adjustment 
of  pensions.  · 
Under  the  assumptions .  of constant  labour  participation  ratio  and  constant  share  of 
federal  subsidies  to  GDP,  these  measures  would  reduce  pension  expenditures  by  2 
percentage points of  GDP and the equilibrium contributio~ rate by 5 points. 
In 1993 the pension system was reformed. 60 The following measures were taken: 
a)  The switch from gross wages to wages net of contributions as reference for the 
annual adjustment of  pensions. 
b)  The  introduction of new  coefficients  relating  each  year  of contribution  to  the 
average pensionable wage; while previous coefficients still apply to males retiring 
at 60 and females retiring at 55, higher coefficients-apply to workers retiring later. 
c)  The calculation of  pensions on the basis of  the best 15 income years rather than of 
the last 1  0-15 years. 
d)  The introduction of  partial pensions for worker·s accepting shorter working hours. 
e) 
f) 
60 
The introduction of  pension credits for child-bearing periods. 
The introduction of  new regulations for survivors' pensions. 
See Federal Ministry of  Labour and Social Affairs (1993). 46 
· In  1995  the  Council  for  the  Adjustment  of Pensions  carried ·out  some  medium-term 
projections of the Austrian pension system taking the effects of the  1993  Reform into 
account. These projections are based on the assumptions of  a yearly GDP real growth of 
2.8 per cent in 1994, 3 per cent in 1995,-and 2.7 per cent in the years 1996 to 1999. The 
dependency ratio, which declined from the year 1988 to 1993, wilf increase slightly;  by 
the year 1999 it will have recovered its  1988 level.  According to the Council, the share 
of  pension expenditure to GDP will decline from 10.5 per cent in 1993  to 10 per cent in 
1999 (Table II.1, point 2).  This trend is mainly attributed to th~ increase in the number 
of  contributors.  . 
New economic projections point to lo~er GDPgrowth rates for the next five  years. 61 
. This change is likely to worsen the financial accounts of pension schemes and to lead to 
higher ratios of  pension expenditure to GDP. 
The new medium-term fiscal programme contains a large number of  elements concerning 
.·consolidation with regard  to  pension expenditure.  The  main  features  are  (see  OECD 
l995a): 
a)  Public  sector wage  growth will  be  restricted,  affecting  the  growth  of pensions 
entitlements in the public sector. Pension contributions of public employees are to 
be raised. 
b)  Pensions for public employees will be reduced to about 80 per cent of final salary, 
by changing the pension base to the average of  the last five years' salary, gradually 
·  rising to fifteen years over the next ten years. 
c)  Measures will be taken to increase the effective retirement age, including  stricter 
controls on applications for early and invalidity pensions and cuts for pensions paid 
before standard retirement age.  The pension contributions of  the self-employed are 
to be raised. 
61  The rate of  growth of  GDP in real terms was 2. 7 per cent in 1994; 2.4 per cent is expected for 1995, 2.1  for 
1996, 2.4 for the period 1997-2000 (data indicated l;ly the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affair in 
October 1995).  · 
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1.  Council of Economic and Social Affairs ell, 1991 
Old-age Dependency Ratio<3l % 
Invariant Labour Participation Ratio 
Dependency Ratio (Number of  Pensions I Number of  Workers) % 
a) Invariant Workers Contribution Ratio 
Transfer Ratio (Average Pension I Average Taxable Income)% 
Pension Expenditure I GDP % 
Total Contribution Ratio% 
Workers Contribution Ratio% 
Government Contribution Ratio % 
Constant federal subsidies I GDP 
Transfer Ratio (Average Pension I Average Taxable Income) % 
Pension E:cpenditure I GDP.% 
Total Contribution Ratio% 
Workers Contribution Ratio % 
Government Contribution Ratio % 
g_Ipte;;mal Labour.Particio 
!
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2.  Council for the Adjustment ofPensions<4J,  1995 
Dependency Ratio (only private sectod5l% 
Pension Expenditure I GDP(5) % 
62.31  62.21 
7.5 
62.2 
47.1 
10,8. 
30.3 
22.8 
7.5 
59.3 
10.5 
I  60.81 
46.6 
10.7 
30.1 
22.8 
7.3 
60.8 
46.6 
10.7 
30.1 
22.8. 
7.3  . 
60.8 
47 
10.8 
30.4 
22.8 
7.6 
59.5 
10.1 
61.71 
46.6 
11 
30.5 
22.8 
7.7 
61.6 
46.6 
11 
30.4 
22.8 
7.6 
61.7 
47 
11.1 
30.7  . 
22.8 
7.9 
.  . .., 
64JJ  6R71 
47.6  48.6 
11.8  12.6 
32.6  .  35.2 
24.6  27.1 
8  ·8.1 
63.7  65.6 
46.9  47.1 
11.4  11.8 
31.1  32.9 
23.7  24.8 
8.1  8.1 
64.8  68.7 
47  47 
11.7  12.3 
32.3  34.3 
24.3  26.2 
8  8.1 
I 
'• 
43 
73.9 
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82.4  92.9 
47.4  47.5 
15.5  17.6 
42.7  48.6 
22.8  22.8 
19.9  25.8 
50.7  52.6 
15.1  16.9 
43  49 
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8.3  8.4 
72.7  76.2 
48.2  49.8 
13.1  14 
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8.2  8.2 
82.4  92.9 
47  47 
14.3  15.7 
40.4  44.9 
32.2  36.6 
8.2  8.3 
I)  These projections take into account all the pension sohernes for private sector employees (ASVG) and self-employed persons (GSVG, FSVG and BSVG), with the exception of  the projections concerning. the Dependency Ratio in 
section I where also the pension schemes for public sector employees are taken into consideration and the projections concernirlg the Transfer Ratio in section 1 where only the scheme for private sector employees (ASVG) is considered. 
2) Beirat  fi;r Wirtschafis- ,undSozialfragen.  . 
J) Number of people  nged60 and over I Number of  people between 15 and 59.  As reported in the graph on page 51 .. 
4)  Outachten des Beiratesfor die Renten- und  Pensionsanpassung.  Real GDP growth" 2.8% in 1994, 3.0% in 1995 and 2.70/o up to 1999. 
~' ,,.,,, ''"'" fnr the vear 2000 nctunllv refct11 to the vcnr 1999. 
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ll.2  BELGIDM 
The Belgian pension system is  based on three major P  AYG schemes:  the scheme for 
public  employees,  the  scheme  for  private  sector  employees  (the  largest)  and  the 
compulsory  pension  scheme  for  the  self-employed. 62  Since  1969  these  schemes  are 
complemented  by  a  system guaranteeing  a  minimum  old-age pension.  Income-related 
welfare benefits are supplied to all citizens who have reached the legal pensionable age.  · 
In the past 20 years,  pension expenditure has  risen steadily (4.5  per cent per year at . 
constant prices)63 as a result of  the widening of  pension cover and the steep upgrading of , 
pension benefits.64  The pure demographic effects have been rath~r limited:  0.6 per cent 
per year.65  In  1991  the share of the total pension expenditure on GDP was  10.5  per 
cent.66 
In recent years many different projections have been carried out in order to estimate the 
future  trends  of pension  expenditure.67  In  1989  the  Bureau  du  Plan  created  the 
MALTESE68 demographic-economic model to study long-term prospects of  receipts and 
expenditure of the social security system.within a global framework (see also Box 2 in 
Section I.1 ).  This  model  is  in fact a system  of interconnected  models  based  on four 
different sets ofhypothesis: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
Demographic assumptions concerning fertility, life expectancy and migrations. 
Socio-demographic  assumptions  concerning  participation  rates,  retirement  rates· 
and school attendance rates. 
Macroeconomic assumptions concerning the rates of growth of productivity and 
wages, employment trends, unemployment rates and interest rates. 
The evolution of  the Belgian pension system is examined in De Deken (1994). 
See OECD (1994f). 
OECD (1994f) estimated that the average annual growth rate of  total pension expenditure was 10.4 per cent' 
over the period 1970-75 and 5.2 per cent over the next five-year period, while the average annual growth of 
GDP was respectively 3.5 and 3 per cent. 
See OECD (1994f). 
Expenditure  for  the pensions  of the  Regime  General,  central  govenunent  and the  program  insuring  a 
minimum income to elderly citizens was 8.7 percentofGDP in 1980,9.2 per cent in 1985,8.7 in 1991 and 
8.8 in 1995 (these data have been provided by the Bureau du Plan in October 1995; 1995 GDP as estimated 
by the European Commission). 
In addition to the  studies  quoted  in the  text,  the prospects  of the  Belgian pension  system  have  been 
examined in Defeyt (1987).  The effects of population ageing on Belgian sociaJ.  security expenditure have 
been examined also in Dooghe (1991 ). 
Model for Analysis  of Long  Term  Evolution  of Social  Expenditure;  see Englert .(1990  and  1992)  and 
Fes~jens -Becquaert- Bogaert (1990). 48 
d)  Social assumptions concerning transfers from central authority to pension schemes, 
contribution rates, adjustment rates of  benefits to living standards. 
Englert {1990) used the MALTESE model to project social security expenditure up· to 
the year 2040. Projections were based on the following four sets of  assumptions:69 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
Low fertility ratio, stable migration flows, small improvement in life expectancy.70 
High decrease of participation rates for people aged ·15  to 24, (due to an increase· 
in school attendance rates), low increase in the participation rates of people aged 
50 to 65. 
Yearly growth rate of  productivity per worker of  2.25 per cent, constant sharing of 
value  added  between  production .  factors,  wage  frowth  equal  to  productivity 
growth, employment growth rates of0.75 per cent.7  . 
Constant  contribution  rates7  1 per  cent  yearly  increase  m  real  terms  m  social 
benefits and benefit ceilings.  2 
Pension expenditure share on GDP was projected to remain stable at  11  per cent until 
2000 andthen to increase up to 18 per cent by 2040 (Table II.2a, point 1).  This trend 
will depend mostly on the increase in the number of  pensioners, which will be particularly 
marked after the turn of the century.  The number of pensioners will rise mostly in the 
schemes for private sector employees.  73  .  •  · 
A  second . forecasting .  m~del  (the  d1famic.  simulat~~n  '?odel  ~ASECU) was 
developed m the early runettes by IRES  and ADRAS.  This model mvolves a smaller 
number of  exogenous variables. The main features of  the model are the following: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
Productivity is positively, but not linearly, related to economic growth rate. 
The consumption ratio  depends  on  income  distribution,  and  increases  with the 
share of  social security transfers. 
Any worsening of  the external budget and/or.public finances implies the setting of 
measures limiting the increase in real incomes. 
Seven alternative scenarios were considered but were not examined in the paper. 
The total fertility rate gradually rises from 1.55 in 1995 to 1.8 in 2040. Life expectancy at birth increases by 
about 4 years in the period considered. 
Except for  the public  sector where  medium term plans  are  taken into  account.  Public  employment  is 
projected to decline by 0. 7  5 per cent a year up to the year 2000. 
This is a compromise between the Belgian policy-makers' behaviour of the last ten years (when practically 
no adjustment was grante4) and the historical trends of  the sixties and seventies:  ·  · 
The dependency ratio was projected to rise from 52.7 per cent in 1987 to 54.7 in 2000 and to 96.6 per cent 
in2040.  . 
/nstitut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales; see Boulanger et al. (1991 ). 
Association pour le Developpement et la Recherche Appliquee en  Sciences Sociales. 
-.• .... 
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d)  Migratory flows follow the economic cycle. 
In Boulanger et al.  (1991)  four  scenarios  are  considered  combining· two  hypotheses 
concerning  GDP  growth (respectively  2  and  2.8  per  cent  per year)  and  two  sets of  .. 
demographic hypotheses: 
a)  Constant fertility rate (1.6 children per woman),  small  decrease in mortality (for 
men from 72.9 to 75.6 years, and for women from 78.6 to 82.6 years). 
b)  Increasing fertility  rate (from  1.6  to .2.4  children per woman),  high  decrease in 
mortality (for men from  72.9  to  84.5  years  and  for  women from  78.6 to 88.3 
years) . 
The share of pension expenditure on GDP is projected to increase from 9.4 per cent in 
1988 to 12.2 in 2040 in the most favourable scenario and to 15.3 in the least favourable 
(Table IL2a, point 2).  AB the average pension is projected to increase more slowly than 
the average GDP pro capita, the increase in pension expenditure is again mainly due to 
the large increase in number of  pensioners after the turn of  the century. 
Several  measures  aimed  at  reducing  pension  expenditure  have  been  taken  in  recent 
76  •  years:  .  . 
a)  In the summer of 1993  a "solidarity" deduction on early retirement pensions and 
the highest pensions was introduced. 
b)  According to the Global plan for unemployment,  competitiveness and the social .. 
security system approved in November 1993, a new method of  calculating pensions 
will  be  introduced· (the  base  period  for  calculating  pensions  will  be longer and 
pensions for men and women will be harmonised).77 
c)  The age of  early retirement was raised. 
In  1994 ·Englert  et al.  presented  new  projections  carried  out  with  the  MALTESE 
method.  The  main  difference  with  the  previous  MALTESE  projection  concerns  the 
demographic assumptions which are more favourable: total fertility rate is assumed stable 
at 1.85; between 1992 and 2050 life expectancy at birth increases by 9 years for men and 
8 years for women. The Belgian population is therefore expected to be much higher than 
in the previous projection (10.5  million in the year 204(')  as  against 8.5).  Two different 
economic scenarios were considered: 
a)  Scenario A assumes a 0.75  per cent yearly growth in private employment up to 
about 2013, and a GDP growth of2.35 per cent per year. 
b) 
76 
77 
Scenario B assumes constant private employment and an average GDP growth of 
2.26 per cent. 
See OECD (1994f). 
See OECD (1995b). 50 
In the two scenarios, existing pensions are indexed to prices and,. partially, to real wage 
growth. More specifically, existing pensions are increased in real terms by  1 per cent, as . 
against a 2.25 per cent yearly growth in real wages.78 In scenario A pension expenditure 
would increase from 10.5 per cent ofGDP in 1991 to 12.3 per cent by the year 2010 and 
to 14.7 in 2050.79  In scenario Bit would reach 13.4 per cent in 2010 and  15.6 in 2050. 
The ratio of the average pension to the average wage (31  per cent in  1991) would be 
nearly stable up to the year 2020 and then decline to 27 per cent in both scenario A and 
B by the year 2050 (Table 11.2b, point 4). 80  ·  . 
Lambrecht et al.  (1994) provide estimates of  the pure effects of demographic change on 
pension expenditure.  81  By considering the average pension paid to each age group, they 
. estimate that between 1993  and 2050, demographic factors will increase expenditure in 
real terms by  59  per cent (Table 11.2a,  point 3).  By comparing this  increase with the 
projections of the MALTESE model (64  per cent in  projection A and  73  per cent in 
projection B), they point out that expenditure pressures will be increased by some non-
.·  demographic factors  (such as  workers retiring  with more complete careers and  higher 
~evenues, women acquiring right to a second individual pension, etc.). 
In October 1995, Delville et al. of  the Pension Administration82 published a report on the 
evolution  of public  employees'  pensions  until  the  year  2040.  Nine  scenarios  are 
considered.  The base scenario  assumes unchanged legislation,  constant  employmen~,  83 
1.5  per cent real wage growth every second year,  full  pension indexation.  In the base 
scenario, the ratio of  pensioners to workers increases from 45 per cent in 1994 to 69 per 
cent  in  2010  and  100  per  cent  in  2040  (Table  II.2b,  point  5).  The  equilibrium· 
·contribution rate would increase from 32.5 per cent' in 1994 to 47.4 per cent in 2010 and· 
64.5 per cent in 2040. The increase in pension expenditure would be-most rapid between 
2003  and 2020. It would be caused by the large increase in the number of civil servants 
which  occurred  in  the  1960s  and  1970.  Several  policy  changes  are  examined  in the 
alternative scenarios.  It is pointed out that an  increase in employment does not reduce 
the long-term equilibrium contribution rate.  The same conclusion applies to an increase 
in  real wage  growth,  since  pensions  are  adjusted  to  wage  dynamics.  Delville  et  al. 
78  . 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
According to the pension indexation mechanism, existing pensions are adjusted to real wage dyn~cs  with 
a 1.25 per c·ent yearly deduction. 
These estimates refer to the paper as revised in October 1994. 
According to OECD (1994f), Belgium will be faced with steeply rising pension expenditure and, "although 
the outlook is more or less similar in other OBCD COWltries, the problem in Belgium is compoWlded by the 
initial marked imbalance of  public fmance. In this respect, the simulations of  the Bureau du  Plan show the 
crucial importance of  making rapid progress in reducing the size of  the debt so that the necessary room can 
be ril.ade to cope with the costs related to the ageing of  the population." 
Demographic projections were jointly produced by Bureau du Plan and Institut National de Statistique. 
Administration des Pensions.  Institution which has the rnaincompetences on the administration of pensions 
for the public sect~r. The study was carried out in collaboration with Siemens Nixdorf. 
With the exception represented lJY employment in defence and 'e<:lucation. In the latter sector, employment is 
assumed to be reduced according to the projected decline in the number of  students.  ·  · 
... It  -: 
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suggest  the  need  to  search  for  policy  solutions  which  combine  several. measures, 
including changes in indexation policies. BELGIUM  I 
1.  Englert (JJureau du Plan p>, 1990 
Dependency Ratio (Number of  pensioners/Number of  workers)%  52.7  53.5 
Average Pension I Average Wage%  33  32 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate %  15.2  16 
Pension Expenditure I GDP %  11  11 
2.  Boulanger, Defeyt, Lambert (IRES)<3>, 1991 
Number ofPensioners (1988=100) 
Low growth scenario (real GDP growth= 2%)  I  I 
1001  I  I  High growth scenario (real GDP growth= 3%)  100 
Average Pension (1988=100) 
Low GDP growth, constant fertility and a low decrease in mortality  100 
High GDP gro\\1h, constant fertility and a low decrease in mortality  100 
Low GDP groMh, increasing fertility and a high decrease in mortality  100 
High GDP gro\\1h, increasing fertility and a high decrease in mortality  100 
Expenditure I GDP % 
Low GDP growth, constant fertility and  ·a low decrease in mortality  9.4 
High GDP gro\\1h, constant fertility and a low decrease in mortality  9.4  . 
Low GOP growth, increasing fertility and a high decrease in mortality  9.4 
High GDP groMh, increasing fertility and a high decreasdn mortality  9.4 
3. Lambrecht, Fasquelle and Weemaes (Bureau du Plan i 4>, 1994 
Dependency Ratio(5) %  39 
Dependency Ratio (Number of  pensioners/Number of  workers)%  49 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate %  15  16 
Pension Expenditure (1993 = 100)  100 
I) The Social Security System comprises all the contributory schemes for the employed and self-employed in both the private and the public sectors. 
2) Yearly productivity growth= 2.25%, yearly employment growth= 0.75%. 
3) Jnstitut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales de l'Universite Catholique .de Louvain. 
.  4)  The data for the year 199 i actuallyrefers to the year 1993. 
5)  Number of  people aged 60 and over I Number of  people between 20 and 59. 
,, 
54.7 
32 
16.6 
11 
1161 
118 
110 
125 
105 
1251 
42 
54 
17 
109 
59.9 
32 
18.2 
12 
47 
63 
20 
122 
J  .. 
73.1 
32 
22.2 
14 
I 
1451 
158 
I  I 
57 
77 
24 
141 
,. 
Table ll.2a 
. 90.3  96.6 
31  31 
26.6  28.5 
17  18 
I 
155 
193 
I  335 
13.5 
12.2 
15.3 
14 
69  71  70 
89  92  92 
28  29  29 
158  163  159 
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11.3 DENMARK 
The Danish pension system has three pillars: 
a)  the basic statutory scheme which provides a pension to all citizens;· 
b)  the supplementary occupational pension schemes - organised either in a statutory 
way or by collective agreements - which cover 80 per cent of  wage earners and 60 
per cent of  the labour force (including the unemployed);84  .  · 
c)  individual  old-age  provisions,  such  as  life  insurance,  capital  pensions, · rate 
.  M  .  . 
pensiOns, etc.  . 
In 1995 public pension expenditure to the elderly is  estimated at 9.3  per cent of GDP, 
out of  a total social expenditure to the elderly of 13.1 per cent of GDP. 86 Basic pensions 
represent the major outlay (4.5 per cent ofGDP in 1991). 
Demographic trends are worrying. Total fertility rate has fallen dramatically (from 2.6 in 
1966  to  1.4  in·  1983  with a  partial  recovery  in the  last years to  1.8.87  Female  life 
expectancy at age 60 increased from 17.9 years in 1946-50to 21.5 years in 1992, while 
male life expectancy remained nearly constant. The old-age dependency ratio is expected 
to decline in the nineties and to rise at a moderaterate in the first part of  the next decade. 
Thereafter,  it is  expected  to  rise  considerably.  According to  the  1994  projections  of .. 
Denmark's Statistical Department,  ~he ratio88 is likely to increase from 33.6 per cent in 
1995 to 36.2 in 2005 and· 49.5 in 2030. 
Ministry of  Finance (1995) stresses the uncertainty surrounding population projections; 
changes  in  the  assumption  concerning  fertility  rates  and  immigration  flows  have 
determined large changes in recent official Danish projections: in the 1984 projections, 
total population in the year 2025 was expected to be 1 million lower than in the  1994 
projections.  The dependency ratio was projected to be 10 percentage points above the 
level  presently  expected.  The  assumptions  concerning  fertility  and  immigration  were 
revised again in the 1995 official projections: the total fertility rate was increased by 0.1 
percentage points (to 1.9), immigration was assumed to be slightly higher. 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
From the latest estimates of  Ministry of  Finance, as provided l.n September 1995. 
For a description of  the system see Ministry of  Economic Affairs (1994) and Jensen and Nielsen (1995a). 
These data were provided by the Ministry of  Finance in September 199 5. 
It should be stressed that so far no generation of Danish women has had a completed cohort fertility below 
I. 8 children. Furthermore, there are signs of  modest increase in the completed cohort fertility of  the younger 
generations.  The low total fertility rate in the early 80s was  a reflection of women's choice to postpone 
births and was therefore transitory in character.  . 
Defmed as the ratio of  the number of  people aged 60 and over to the number of  people aged 18 to 59.  .  . 53 
. Both Ministry of Finance (1995) and  Jensen and  Nielsen (1995a).  point out that in the 
short to medium term Denmark will have a rather uruque demographic 'breathing space': 
the increase in the elderly burden will not begin until the years 2005-2010. 
The ratio of the number of pensions to the number: of workers depends also  on labour 
force participation rates and on average retirement rates. On both accounts prospects are 
unfavourable. By international standards,  labour market participation rates in Denmark 
are now extremely high. Therefore, it is hard to envisage that the future ageing problem 
in Denmark could be countered by a higher employment rate. The average retirement age 
fellfrom 65 to about 63  over the decade 1980-1990.89 
. Jensen and Nielsen (1995a) fcroject the impact of demographic changes on total public 
expenditure  for  the  elderly.  0  They  consider  three  demographic  scenarios.  with  total 
fertility rates equal to 1.5,  1.8 and 2.1  respectively. 91  They also consider both wage and 
price indexation of old age benefits. In the latter case, the living standards of the elderly 
· ·relying on public transfers lag behind those of  wage earners by 1 per cent p.a. 
The proportion of GNP needed to finance total outlays to the elderly is expected to fall 
from 1988 to 2000, irrespective of  the indexation formulae in use.  Moreover, if benefits 
are indexed  to  prices,  there  will  be  no  rise  in  the  expenditure  rate  over  the  whole 
projection period,  no  matter what the fertility  assumption is.  If benefits  are linked  to 
wage dynamics, the expenditure rate is likely to rise dramatically over the last 20 years of 
the projection period:  from  11.8  in  2010  to  15.0/16.4 in  2030  (Table  II.3,  point  1). 
Jensen and Nielsen also consider the effects of a further two years advancement in the · 
retirement age.  In this scenario, the expenditure to GDP ratio is obviously higher: by 03 · 
percentage points in 201 0 and 0.4 points in 203 0 in the case of price indexation; by 0. 5 
points in 2010 and by 1.0 points in2030 in the case ofwage indexation (Tablell.3, point 
1). 
Similar  projections  are  presented  in  Jensen  and  Nielsen  (1995b).  Two  rates  of 
productivity growth are considered in this  paper. Irrespective of the. indexation scheme 
and the productivity growth rate,  the expenditure ratio  is  projected to fall  up  to  year 
2005.  This  reflects the pattern of the ageing  process in Denmark.  As  in the previous 
projections,  the trend  in  the  ratio  of expenditure  to  GDP  largely  depends  ~n the 
indexation rule.  If benefits were linked to prices, a 2 per cent productivity groWth rate 
would allow a large reduction in the expenditure ratio (Table II.3, point 2.b )  .. 
An  intermediate  indexation  arrangement,  with  transfers  growing  as  wages · and 
expenditure on social services growing one percentage point p.a. 'less than wages is also 
considered.  This scenario has  been examined with the aim  of reconciling the potential 
89 
90 
91 
See Jensen and Nielsen (1995a). 
These projections are based on population forecasts carried out by Denmark's Statistics Department in 1992.  · 
The intermediate scenario, developed by  Denmark's Statistics Department, assumes a recovery in fertility by 
1995 (from 1.7 to 1.8), stable female life expectancy, and a minor increase in male life expectancy. In the 
other two scenarios, fertility reaches the new levels by the year 2QOS and thereafter remains stable. .  -. 
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conflict  between  generational  equity  and  economic  efficiency.  This  solution  would 
moderate the increasein the expenditure ratio.  Up to the year 2010 the ratio would be 
below its 1993 level.  In the following two decades it would increase by two percentage 
points (Table II.3, point 2.c), 
To sum up, according to Jensen and Nielsen, with realistic productivity growth rates and 
indexation schemes, the underlying demographic structure tends to delineate a j-shaped 
expenditure profile: falling over the first  10-15  years (the "breathing space") and rising 
over the subsequent 20-25 years (when the "baby-boomers" reach pensionable age): 
The implication of population ageing  on Danish public finance ·have  been extensively 
examined in Ministry of Fina.nce (1995). The report, drafted by a group of experts _from 
different ministries,  is  based  on the demographic projections quoted above.  Assuming 
"unchanged  retirement  pattern,  unchanged  public  staff  demand  per  elderly,  and 
adjustment of public wages and 'transfers in line with the development of  private labour 
market wages", that "implies that the development of  the economic eldyrly burden mainly 
reflects the relation of  the size of the population groups", and also assuming unchanged 
unemployment level from  1995  onwards,. Ministry of Finance (1995,  p.  7)  estimates an 
increase in total public expenditure on elderly people from 1  ~  .1  per cent in 1995 to 15.1 
in 2010 and  18.3 in 2030. Net of the taxes levied <;m.public transfers to the elderly, the 
increase in the burden will reach 4 per cent of  GDP. 
.  . 
The report considers the effects of  some events that might affect expenditure pressures.  .  . 
a)  If unemployment were  to fall  at  the level  indicated  in  the  1994  medium  term 
economic survey, the elderly burden in the years 2005 and 2030 would be 1 point 
lower than in the ?aseline projection. 
b)  If  the average retirement age were to increase by 2 years, the elderly burden would 
be 1. 5 points lower than in the baseline. 
c)  If  labour inputs in the production of services for the elderly.were reduced by 1 per 
cent p.a. due to higher productivity, the burden would be 1.5 points lower than in 
the baseline. 
d)  Each year of increase in average lifetime due to lower mortality of elderly people 
would add 0.7 points to the elderly burden. 
These forecasts were updated on the basis of 1995 official population projections.  92 The 
projection period was also prolonged to the year 2040. A smaller increase in total public 
expenditure for  the elderly  is  predicted  after the year ·2010.  The  wedge between the 
projections teaches 0.5 percentage points ofGDP by the year 2030. 
Ministry ofFinance also estimates the ratio of  pension expenditure on elderly people. On 
the basis of 1994 population projections, the ratio is  expected to increase from 9.3  per 
cent  in  1995  to  10.9  in  2010  and  13  in  2030.  On  the  basis  of 1995  population 
92  See Ministry of  Finance (1995, Annex 3). 55 
projections, the ratio would reach  12.7 per cent in 2030,  13  in 2035  and  12.7 in 2040 
(Table Il.3, point 3)93.  .  · 
- ·~ . 
93  These data were provided by the Ministry of  Finance in September 1995. ·: 
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4.  Englert, Fasquelle and Weemaes (Bureau du Plan p>, 1994 
Old~age Dependency Ratio<3> %  I 
··Dependency Ratio (Number of  pensioners I Number of  workers)% 
Private employment growth= 0.75% (GDP growth= 2.35%)  I  Private employment growth =  0% (GDP growth= 2.26%) 
Average pension I Average wage% 
PriYate employment growth= 0.75% (GDP growth= 2.35%)  I  Private employment growth =  0% (GDP growth= 2.26%) 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate % 
Private employment growth= 0.75% (GDP growth= 2.35%)  I  Private employment growth =  0% (GDP growth= 2.26%) 
Pension expenditure I GDP % 
Private employment growth== 0.75% (GDP growth= 2.35%)  I  Private eri1ploy:ment growth= 0% (GDP growth= 2.26%) 
5. Dehitle et aL  (Administration des Pensions i 4>, 1995 
Baseline Scenario<5l  · 
Dependency Ratio (Number of  Pensioners /Number of  Workers)% 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate<6l % 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate<7l in alternative scenarios: 
Lower employment (  -10% after 10 years) 
Higher employment (+iO% after 10 years) 
Higher wage growth ( 1. 7  5% I 2 years) 
No wage growth 
No pension indexation · 
Higher wage growth (1.75% yearly) and no pension indexation 
Higher retirement age(+ 2 years) 
Higher retirement age, higher employment(+  10% after 10 years), 
higher wage growth (1.75% yearly) and no pensions indexation 
:.f.,  ·Jc::.·  4:· 
I  , ..  ,.-:  .. -.. 
I  I  22.51 
I  I 
551 
55 
I  I 
311 
31 
I·  I· 
15.21 
15.2 
I  I 
10.51 
10.5 
I)  'Ibe Social Security System comprises all the contributory schemes for the employed and self-employed in both the private and the public sectors. 
2)  The data reported in the table are quoted from an updated version of  the papet prepared in October 1994. 
J) Number of  people aged 65 and over I Number of  people between 15 and 64. 
4)  All data refer to the public sector err,tployees.  Data attibuted to the year 1995 actually refer to the year 1994. 
5)  Based on constant employment, a 1.5% wage growth every two years and wage indexation. 
6)  Computed as the ratio of  total pension expenditure on total wage expenditure. (See Table p. 22).  . 
7)  Computed as the raticl of  total pellllion exp~;nditure on total wage expenditure. (See Tables pp. 31, 35, 38, 43, 46, 49, S3, $7). 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
45.6 
32.5 
32.6 
32.3 
32.5 
32.5 
32.5 
32.5 
30.7 
30.6 
I  '  ' .  •; 
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26.21  28.21  34.51 
60.11 
62.1 
64.21 
70.4 
75.61 
83.6 
31.61 
31.6 
31.91 
31.7 
30.91 
30.8 
171 
16.9 
19.21 
19.4 
22.21 
22.9 
11.61 
11.9 
12.31 
13.4 
141 
15.4 
69.4 
36.3  47.4  61 
37.6  50.3  64.3 
34  42.3  55.2 
36.4  47.4  61 
36.3  . '  47.3  61.1 
35  44  55.8 
33.3  39.9  49.3 
27.7  33.2  45.7 
23.7  25  34 
.., 
':':''·:J:':': 
43.31 
89.31 
95.2 
29.61 
29.5 
25.11 
25.7 
15.71 
16.7 
65.5 
67 
61.8 
65.6 
65.5 
58.6 
50.3 
52.7 
38.9 
Table 11.2b 
I 
2050 
:--,·.:=J-: 
47.21.  46.3 
93.71  92.2 
98.7  97.9 
28.21  26.9 
28.1  26.8 
25.11  23.6 
25.4  23.9 
15.71  14.7 
16.5  15.6 
100 
64.5 
64.6 
64.9 
64.7 
64.4 
56.8 
48.1 
48.2 
36.8 
\A 
I  .... 
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DENMARK 
1.  Jensen and Nielsen, 1995a 
Old-age dependency ratio0)%  I  261  251  241 
Government ex:penditure for the elderly I GNP 
a)VVageindexation  Low fertility scenario  11 
Medium fertility scenario  11.3  11 
High-fertility scenario  11 
Price indexation  Low fertility scenario  9.8 
Medium fertility scenario  11.3  9.8 
High-fertility scenario  9.8 
Government expenditure for the elderly I GNP % 
in case of a further decrease in the retirement age 
a) Wage indexation  Low fertility scenario  11.2 
Medium fertility scenario  11.3  21.3 
High-fertility scenario  11.2 
Price indexation  Low fertility scenario  10 
Medium fertility scenario  11.3  10 
High-fertility scenario  10 
2.  Jensen and Nielsen, 1995b 
Old-age social security implicit tax rate% 
a) Wage indexation  11  10.7 
b) Price indexation  Labour productivity growth = 1%  11  10 
Labour productivity growth =  2%  11  9.3 
c) Compromise scenario 
(wage indexation for transfers; expenditure for social  I  I  111  10.41 
services growing as wages- 1 per cent p. a.) 
3.  Ministry of Finance, 1995<2) 
a)  1994 Population Projection 
Old-age Dependency Ratio<3l %  I  I  33.61  33.51 
Government expenditure for the elderly I GDP % 
Before tax  13.1  13 
Aftertax  10.9 
Pension expen<4ture for the elderly I GDP %  9.3  9.2 
')  1995 Population Projection 
Governm. expend. for the elderly / GDP % -Before Tax I· 
Pension expenditure for the elderly I GDP %  I 
13.11 
9.3  131  9·.2. 
I)  Numik.'f of people ageii6S and over I Numbl..'l' ofpeoplebetw;,.'en 20 and 64, 
2)  Integrated with data pr;Ovided diroctly by the Ministry ofFinMce in September 1995 
:n Number of people aged 60 and over I Number ofpeople'between 18 and 59. 
. 
l  • 
251  271  301  321 
11.8  14 
11.8  13.8 
11.8  13.7 
9.5  10.2 
9.5  10 
9.5  10 
12.3  14.7 
12.3  14.4 
12.3  14.3 
9.8  10.6 
9.8  10.4 
9.8  10.3 
10.7  11.4  12.6  13.3 
9.5  9.7  10.1  10.1 
8.5  8.2  8.2  7.8 
10.31  10.81  11.81  12.21 
36.21  40.61  42.31  43.91  . 
13.7  15.1  15.7  16.2 
11.4 
9.8  10.9  11.4  11.7 
13.71 
9.8 
151 
10.9 
15.61 
11.3 
16.11 
11.6 
'  .. 
331 
13.9 
10.1 
7 
12.61 
46.51 
17.2 
12.3 
16.91 
12.1 
35 
16.4 
15.6 
15 
10.8 
10.3 
9.9 
17.5 
16.6 
15.9 
11.3 
10.7 
10.3 
13 
49.5 
18.3 
15.1 
13 
17.81 
12.7 
Table IL3 
18.4,.  18 
13  12.7 
J 
I) 
!") 
(? 'Ill  -..... 
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II.4 FINLAND 
The Finnish pension system is based on two tiers: a) the National Pension Schenie (NPS) 
securing  a  basic flat-rate  minimum  pension to  all  elderly ·citizens ·and a  means-tested 
component  to  low-income  elderly,  disabled  and  survivors;  b)  an  ·earnings-related 
"al.  h  94  occupat10n . pens10n sc  erne. 
In 1994 employment pensions represented 68 per cent of  total pension expenditure. The 
rise in the replacement ratio due to the maturing of employment pension  scheme~ will 
increase this share and lower the share of basic pensions.  It has been estimated that by 
the year 2000 employment pensions will represent 75 per cent oftotal pensions.95 
Falling birth rates since the 1970s and increased longevity have reduced the growth of 
the Finnish population and  changed its  age composition.  This  process has  been more 
acute than in most other OECD countries.  According to  national  projections96,  these 
trends are expected to continue over the next 35  years:  the old-age dependency ratio is 
bound to increase substantially.  The old-age dependency ratio  is  expected to increase 
from the actual 22 per cent to about 43  per cent in 2030,. with a very high rise in the 
number of"old" pensioners (aged over 75  years) after the year 2020. Effects on pension 
expenditure will be relevant in the second part of  the next decade, when people from the 
post-war "baby boom" generation enter the age bracket relevant for early retirement.  97 
Furthermore, although the overall labour force  participation ratio  is  relatively  high in 
Finland, participation among men aged 55 to 64 currently ranks among the lowest in the 
OECD area .and  has  declined  fairly  rapidly in recent years:  nowadays nine  out of ten 
retire before the statutory pensionable age of 65  and the average retirement age is  58  . 
years in Finland. 
The pressures on pension schemes might be reduced by an  increase in employment.  In 
spite of the high overall participation rate (reflecting a high full-time participation ratio 
among women),98 domestic reserves of  potential labour force are still relevant, since the· 
unemployment rate reaches .17 per cent. 
94 
95 
96 
69 
98 
For a description of the system see OECD (1992b, 1995c) and Central Pension Security Institute (1994). 
Detailed statistics conceming the pension system are reported in Central P~nsion Security Institute - Social 
Insurance Institution (1994). 
See Tuukkanen (1995a). 
See Ministry of  Social Affairs and Health (1994). 
See OECD (1995c). 
See OECD (1992b). 57 
. In 1991  the Ministryof Social·Affairs and Health99 projected an increase in the share of 
pension benefits in GDP from 10,1 per cent in 1990 to 13.3 per cent in 2010 and 18,5 in 
2030 (Table 11.4, point 1). The sharp recession ofthe early 1990s negatively affected this 
outlook. After the steady increase of thy  1980s, the share of public welfare expenditure 
in GDP  rose dramatically by  an  additional  10  per~entag~ points ..  Pension expenditure 
largely contributed to this trend: in 1994 it represented about 14 per cent of GDP.  The 
increase  in  pension  expenditure  expected  after  the  tum of the  century  has  actually 
occurred in the early 1990s. 
The high and rising pension burden is also related to a number of problems inherent in 
the functioning of the system,  such as ·weak eligibility conditions,  disincentives through 
welfare dependency,. and the lack of  incentives to control spending. 100  . 
A number of reforms were considered in order to relieve future pressures. In 1992 two 
committees  appointed  within the Ministry  of Social  Affairs  and  Health made  several 
· . reform  proposals.  One  of the  committees  suggested  that  the  average  retirement  age 
· should  be  gradually  increased  from  58  to  61  years  by  2020.  The  increase  should  be 
achieved through measures such as the abolition ofthe lower retirement age·ofthe public 
sector employees and the ·reform of the early retirement schemes.  Additional measures 
were proposed to contain the growth of future pension payments, notably by changing 
the indexation procedures of benefits.  Proposals from the other committee, dealing with 
the funding issue, were essentially designed to smooth the increase in contribution rates 
by raising the funding rate up to 201 0; after that, funds would be gradually depleted. The 
ratio .of occupational pension benefits to the wage bill, expected to increase from 10 per · 
·cent in 1991 to 25 per cent in 2010 and 40 per cent in 2030, would have reached only 32 · 
per cent. The proposals concerning the financing would have contributed in stabilising at 
25  per·cent the ratio of occupational pension contribution to the wage bill; the ratio was 
otherwise expected to increase from  17 per cent in 1990 to about 25  per cent in 2010 
and overJ5 per cent from 2030.101  . 
Several of the proposed reforms  have  recently been introduced.  TP,e  most  significant 
measures are the following: 
a)  public.;.sector pension benefits were reduced to the levels applying to private sector 
workers; 
b)  effective in 1994, the minimum age for early disability retirement was raised from 
55 to 58 years; 
c)  the minimum age for entitlement to an unemployment pension was raised in several 
.  - . 
steps after 1986 from 55 to 60 years;  .  . 
d)  other eligibility requirements were tightened with effect from 1994; 
99  As reported in OECD (1992b  ). 
100  See OECD (1995c  ). 
101  See OECD (1992b). .... 
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e)  employees• contribution to .  employment pensi0n schemes were introduced; pension 
indexation  is  to ·be  based  on  the  dynamics  of prices  and  of wages  net  of 
contributions;  · 
f)  in 1993 the old-age retirement age for public sector workers was raised from 63 ·to 
65 years, the same age that applies in the private sector. 
In spite of  these reforms, future pension expenditure trends are still not reassuring. The 
latest report from the Committee on Social Expenditure of  the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health evaluates the  large potential  cost pressures  arising  from the demographic 
shock.102 According to its projections103,  in the period 1994-2010 the share of pension 
expenditure on GDP will increase by 0.6 to 3.9 percentage points. It would reach 15.2 
per cent in the rapid growth scenario,  17.3  per cent in the baseline scenario or 18 .  .9  per 
cent in the slow growth scenario, depending on different assumptions concerning labour 
productivi7, unemployment rate, real GDP growth and real wage growth (Table 11.4, 
point 2). 10  By the year 2030 p~nsion expenditure is expected to reach respectively 17.7 
per cent,  18.8 per cent and  19.6 per cent.  Over the period 1994-2030.it will increase by 
3.1 to4.6percentagepoints.105  . 
Since the employment pension scheme is partly funded,  contribution increases will not 
equal pension expenditure increases.  The increase .in. the ratio  of contributions to GDP 
will actually be less steep than the increase in the expenditure to GDP ratio. In the period 
1994-2010 the contribution ratio will increase by 0.3  to 2.1  percentage points. Over the 
period 1994-2030 it will increase by 4.0 to 3.1  points. 
OECD (1995c)  assessed  the long-term implications  of welfare  spending  on Finland's 
fiscal  position.  While  showing  the  unsustainable  debt  dynamics  associated  with  the 
expansion  of pension ·expenditure,  106  it  concluded  that  the  welfare  system  reforms 
implemented  so  far  are  largely  insufficient  to  contain  the  rising  trends  in  welfare 
expenditure. 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
See Ministry of  Social Affairs and Health (1994 ). 
The projections carried out by the Committee are based on estimates of the ratio of pension expenditure to 
GDP  in 1994 which were higher than the actual outcome (as indicated by  the Government Institute for 
Economic Research in September 1995): 14.6 to  15 per cent (in the different scenarios) as against 14 per 
cent. The difference is due to the higher than expected GDP growth and to the 0.5 per cent cut in benefits 
indexation implemented in 1994. 
In the baseline scenario, average GDP growth in the period 1994-2030 is 1.8 per cent; the unemployment 
ratedectines from  19 per cent in 1994 to  13.9 in the next decade and to 7.4 and 5.1  in the following two 
decades. In the rapid growth scenario, GDP growth is 0.5 per cent higher and unemployment declines.to 8.9 
per cent in the next decade and to  5.1  in the following  two decades.  In the slow growth scenario, GDP 
growth is 0.5 per cent lower than in the baseline; unemployment is  17.8 per cent in the next decade and 
11.1 and 5.8 in the following two decades. 
As already pointed out, the projections are based on a ratio of pension expenditure to GDP in 1994 which 
was higher than the actual outcome. 
See OECD (1995c). 59 
The Committee on Social Expenditure  suggested  some further  changes in  the Finnish 
pension system and estimated their effects in the event of  immediate implementation. The 
following measures were considered:  ·  · 
a)  Increasing retirement age,  either by increasing the minimum retirement age or by 
incentive measures (this measure would decrease social expenditure by 0.6 per cent 
ofGDP in 2000 and by 2.1 per cent in 2030). 
b)  Abolishing the adjustments of  pension benefits to real wage increases (with effects 
respectively estimated at 0.3 and 1.4 per cent ofGDP). 
c) 
d) 
e) 
Limiting the maximum of pensionable time between the pension contingency and 
retirement age (65) to 35 years instead of  40 years, (0.3  and  1.1  per cent). 
Basing the pensions on the whole wage history rather than on the last 4 years of 
employment (0.1  and 0.8 per cent). 
Lowering the annual accruing rate ofpension rights from 1.5  per cent of reference 
. wage to 1.25 (0.1  and 1.6 per cent). 
These· measures,  in  combination with  further  cuts  in  health .care and social  services 
expenditure, could reduce total future spending by  around 2. 5 per cent of GDP in the 
year 2000 and 6.5 per cent of  GDP in 2030. 107 
On  18  May  1995,  the  social  partners  reached  an  agreement  on the  reforms  of 'the 
employment  pension  schemes  and  of the  national  pension  scheme.108  Parliament  was 
expected to enact on the basis of the agreement; reforms were. expected to take effect at 
the beginning of 1996. The main aspects of the reform concerning employment pension 
schemes are the following: 
a) 
. b) 
c) 
The pensionable wage will be calculated on the basis of  the last 10 years' earnings, 
.  109  instead of  the present 4 years'.  . · 
The indexation system of occupational pensions paid  after the age of 65  will  be 
modified; the present index (mean ofthe consumer price index- with 0.5 weight-
and  the wage index - 0. 5 weight) will  be substituted by  a new  index where the 
weight of  the price component is 0.8 and the weight of  the wage component is 0.2; 
· increases. in  contributions  paid  by  employees  will  be  deducted  from  the  wage 
component of  the index. 
The pensions paid to workers taking early--retirement will be lowered. 
The  mam  aspects  of the  reform  concerning  the  national  pension  schemes  are  the 
following: 
107  The cost effects of the measures are calculated in the baseline scenario. 
108  The following part largely draws on Tuukkanen (1995b  ). 
109  Both the new ten-year rule for pensionable wage and the present four-year are applied to each separate job. 60 
d)  All benefits will be means-tested (at present, there is  a flat-rate component and a 
means-tested  component).  Pensioners  presently  receiving. the  means-tested  part 
will not suffer any loss.  Those receiving only the flat-rate part will lose part of  the 
benefit.  As the national pension is  means-tested against the employment pension 
benefits, losses will depend on the amount of  the latter. If  the employment pension 
benefit  is  high  enough,  the  pensioner  will  lose  his/her  national  pension  benefit 
totally.  The  reform  will  be  implemented  gradually:  the  adjustment  of existing 
pensions will be achieved by suspending indexation. 
In the long-term,  the reforms  are  expected to reduce pension expenditure by  about 2 
percentage points of  GDP. It is also expected to reduce from 2 percentage points to 0.6 
points the increase in the employment contribution rate projected for 1996. FINLAND 
1.  Ministry of Social Mfairs and Healtb<2>, 1991 
Pension Benefits I GPD % 
2.  Social Expenditure Committee<3), 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 1994 
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1)  Statutory Pension System compiises the National Pension Scheme and the private and public sectors occupational pension schemes. 
2)  As reported in OECD (1992b). 
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4)  Number of  people aged65 and over I Number of  people. between 20 and.64.  As reported in the diagram 22 on page 70 ofOECD (1995a).  The data attributed to the year 1990 actually refers to the year 1992. 
5)  Recipients ofNational Pension in their oWn. right. .  ·  ·  ·  • 
6)  Population from  16 to 64 years. 
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ll.5FRANCE 
The French pension system comprises more than 500 PAYG schemes (about i20 basic 
schemes and about 400 supplementary ones). 11°  Contribution rates, retirement age,  and 
formulae for calculating pensions may change substantially among the different schemes. 
Private sector employees have a two-tier system:  the first tier consists of the "general 
scheme"  (regime general, which pays  about a third of  total pension benefits111)  and of 
the  scheme  for  farm-"employees;  the  second  tier  comprises  many  supplementary 
occupational schemes.  For some groups of employees there is  also  a third tier;  some 
companies  and  some  supplementary  schemes  also  ·provide  optional  supplementary 
schemes  (regimes  surcomptementaires),  which  are  usually  funded.  Self-employed 
workers are covered by an occupational basic pension scheme ·and sometimes also by a 
supplementary  one.  Public  sector  employees  are  covered  by  different  "special 
schemes", 112  that  provide  a  single  pension  corresponding  both  to  basic  and 
supplementary cover.  Citizens  aged  65  and  over without adequate income  are paid  a 
pension  by  a  special  public  fund. 113  This  fund  also  supplements  pensions  up  to  a 
minimum level. 
The French pension system is characterised by a relatively.high number of  pensions paid. 
This is due to the low retirement age, to the two or three tier system, and to the limited 
contribution  requirement  for  pension  entitlement.  "A  retiree  who  has  worked  the  · · 
required number of years receives on average 'a pension from 2.8  schemes,  1.5  from a 
basic scheme and 1.3 from a supplementary scheme." (OECD, 1994d, p. 81). 
Pension expenditure has risen from 5 per cent of  GDP in 1960 to more than 12 percent 
in 1991. 114 Up to the early  1980s expenditure growth was mainly  due to Government's 
policy of uprating  pensions.115  In  the  following  decade  it  was  mainly  due  to  a  large 
increase in the number of retirees. 116 The lowering of retirement age from 65  to 60117, 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
For a  description of the French  pensiop.  system see  Government  of France (1991),  Andre  and  Saillard 
(1994), and more concisely, OECD (1994d). 
Government of  France (1991, p. 178). 
There are more than 100 special schemes, among which 78  are already closed (i.e., no  new members are 
emolled). 
Fonds de  Solidarite  Vieillesse,  constituted within the  1993  Reform.  The  'minimum  vieillesse' (i.e., the 
minimum income for elderly citizens) was previously paid by the Fonds National de Solidarite. 
See OECD (1994d). 
In 1971  the maximum basic pension was raised from 40 to 50 per cent of  referment income. From the same 
year referment income was calculated on the ten best-paid years  r~:~.ther than on the fmal ten years.  The 
minimum pension was substantially raised in 1974 and 1981.  · 
See OECD (1994d). 62 
and  the  introduction  of early  retirement  prov1s1ons  for  unemp~oyed workers largely 
contributed to this trend. Government ofFrance (1991) and General Planning Committee 
(1995) stress that by the early  1990s the average standard of living of retirees,  having 
improved significantly during the 1970s and 1980s, had reached that of  the workers. 
In the 1980s and the early 1990s pension expenditure has been giving cause for concern 
both for  the  short term budgetary pressures  and  for the long-term  prospects.  It was 
widely recognised that contribution rates were already relatively high and that they could 
not be raised to much higher levels in order to fund the expected· increase in expenditure. 
The outlook for the pension system and the reforms to be implemented have been the 
subject of debate for many years. 118  Up  to  1993,  however,  no  major reform had  been 
introduced. Efforts to reform the system have been hampered by its complexity. 
Cost containment was achieved by modifying pension indexation: adjustments based on 
gross wages dynamics were first  substituted with adjustments related to wages net of 
. social .insurance contributions (1982) and  then to  expected  price  dynamics  (1987).  In 
some years,  due to an underestimation of inflation and  to the lack of a catch-up rule, 
pensioners actually suffered purchasing-power losses. 119 
In 1991  the state and  the prospects of the pension system were examined in a "White 
Paper" aimed at stimulating the debate on pension reform. 120 The document is based on 
long-term projections of total pension expenditure.121  The main indicator for evaluating 
the future  of the pension system is  the  ratio  of pension expenditure  on gross  earned 
income (i.e., the contribution rate that would cover all  pension expenditure - about  19 
·per cent in 1990). Eight different p.rojections are considered depending on assumptions· 
concerning demography, the participation rate of older workers and the unemployment 
rate.122 
a) 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
Demography123. Two scenarios are considered:  a)  the total fertility  rate remains 
stable  at  its  current  level  (1. 8  children  per  woman);  b)  the  total  fertility  rate 
gradually reaches 2.1. In both cases mortality keeps declining up to the year .2000 
and than stabilises and there is no net migration. Over the whole period 1990-2040, 
The retirement age was lowered in 1983  for  private employees,  in 1984  for  independent tradesmen and 
shopkeepers, and in the following years for fanners.  · 
See Saint-Etienne (1988), Verniere (1990a, 1990b), Cazes et al. (1992), Andree and Saillar.d (1994). 
See OECD (1992a). 
See Government of France (1991 ).  The Livre blanc;  sur les retraites wa,s  drafted by a working group  co" 
ordinated by the Commissariat General du Plan and involving several ministries. 
The  projections were  based  on  the MARGARET  model  developed  at the Direction  de  Ia  Prevision  of 
Ministry of  Finance. See Verniere (l990a, 1990b  ). 
In all scenarios real wage growth is assumed to be at a level of  2%. 
The  demographic  projections  of the  White  Paper  refer  to  the  estimates  produced  by  INSEE  (lnstitut 
National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economique:s) in .1986, ·-
~.  . . 
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in the first scenario the ratio of population. aged 60  and  over to population aged 
between 15 and 59 increases from 31.4 to 55.3  per cent. In the second it increases 
to 47.5 per cent. 
b)  Participation  rate.  The  rate  concerning  citizens  aged  between  55  and  64 ·is 
supposed to be stable up to 2010 and then either a)  stable again or b)  gradually 
increasing towards the 1975 level. 
c)  Unemployment  rate.  Two  scenarios  are  considered:  a)  the  unemployment  rate 
declines from 9.2 per cent to 8 per cent in period 2005-2010 and to 6 per cent after 
2030, b) it declines faster to 4.5 per cent in 2005-2010 and 3 per cent from 2030. 
As  to the transfer .ratio,  since  new  pensioners  are  retiring  with  longer  contribution 
periods and can claim higher benefits than can older pensioners, it is assumed that 1t will 
keep increasing up to the year 2040. The ratio of  average expenditure· per inactive citizen 
aged 60 or over to average gross income per worker contributing to the system increases 
from 41  per cent in 1990, to 48  per cent in 2010 and 54 per cent in 2040 (Table II.5a, 
point  1  ).  Therefore  pensioners'  living  standards  are  going  to  overcome  workers' 
standards.  Even within a favourable  economic  and  demographic· scenario  and  starting 
from the actual global parity of  workers' and pensioners' living standards, the net transfer 
ratio  in the  most  extreme  case would  end  up  providing  pensioners  with  an  average 
purchasing power nearly double that ofthe workers: 124 
In all scenarios the contribution rate that would fully fund ·pension expenditure increases 
by  about  3  points  up  to the year 2005.  Afterwards,  with the baby boom generation 
gradually retiring, the contribution rate increases much faster and  the scenarios diverge 
noticeably.  In 2015  the  rate  ranges  between  27  and  30  per cent.  In 2040  it ranges 
between 31  and 42per. cent.  Both the dependency and  the transfer ratios contribute to 
raising  expenditure.  Even in  the  most  favourable  circumstances,  pension  expenditure 
would put enormous pressures on social contributions or general taxation. 
Thefollowing.changes are suggested for the general scheme. 
a)  Pensions should to be adjusted to price dynamics or to the dynamics of  wages net 
of  social security contributions. 
b)  Pensions  should be calculated  on the basis  of the average of the· 25  best annual 
salaries. 
c)  .  The number ofyears required for the payment of  a full pension should be gradually 
raised from 37.5 to 41- 42 years. 
According to the White Paper, the indexation of  pension to price dynamics and the other 
changes  considered  would  have  allowed  the  equilibrium  contribution  rate  to  remam 
stable up to 2010, rather than increasing by 7. 5 percentage points.125 
124 
125 
According to Government ·of France (1991, p.  1  09) "the equity between the generations would no longer be 
assured". 
See table F, p.  160. 64 
In July 1993 some refOrms were decided following the guidelines indicated in the White 
Paper. The reforms aimed at "preserving the fundamental rights of  the individuals insured 
and the solidarity mechanisms, and at guaranteeing the equity between the generations . 
called  to  share  the  strain  of old-age  insurance  expenditure"126.  The  reform  mainly 
affected  the  basic  pension  schemes  (accounting  for  42  per  cent  of total  pension 
expenditure in 1992).127  .  . 
a) 
b) 
c) 
Pension  adjustments  are  to  be  based  on  price  dynamics  rather  than  on wage 
dynamics.128 
Basic pensions are to be calculated on the 25 best-paid years.  The transition ;from 
10 to 25 years will take place gradually up to the year 2007. This Teform will link 
more closely contributions and benefits. 
The number of  years required for the payment of a full  pension is to be gradually 
raised from 37.5 toAO. 
d)  · A  new Fonds de  Solidarite  Vieillesse  was created in  order to transfer from  the 
pension schemes to the central Government the responsibility for welfare pension 
expenditure. 
In 1993 the Actuariat ofthe CNAV129 carried out some projections ofthe consequences 
of the  reform  on  pension  expenditure.  130  Two  different  economic  scenarios  were 
considered,  a  favourable  one  and  an  unfavourable  one.  In the  first,  the  equilibrium 
contribution rate was projected to increase from around 18 per cent at the moment of  the 
reform, to 24.5 per cent in 2010 if the reform was not considered, 22.5 per cent if the · 
reform measures were considered but not the price indexation of  pensions, and to 19 per 
cent if price indexation was also  considered (Table II.5,  point 2).  In the unfavourable 
economic scenario, the projected rates for 2010 were respectively 28.3, 26 and 23.2 per 
cent.  Price-indexation. accounts  of most  of the reduction in  expenditure.  The rise  of 
expenditure is  particularly high between 2005  and 201 0.  The comparison between the 
· projections in the two scenarios  shows  how economic  growth. influences  the ratio  of 
pension expenditure to GDP. 
In 1995 the General Planning Committee131  updated the 1991  projections of the White 
Paper.taking t~e.effects of  the 1993 Reform into  consi~era:tion. The new projections are 
based on rather less optimistic assumptions than those ofthe White Paper. 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
AB reported in Commissariat GemJral du Plan (1995, p.  11 ). 
OECD (1994d). 
Pensions were actually indexed to prices since 1987. Wage indexation was suspended on a yearly basis. 
Caisse Nationale pour I  'Assurance Vieillesse. 
See Ruellan (1993). 
Commissariat General du Plan. The study was carried out by an inter-administrative working group chaired 
by Raoul Briet. 
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a)  Demography. The new demographic projections carried out by INSEE in 1992 (on 
the basis  of the  1990  census)  are much more alarming  than the older ones.  The 
following  scenarios  are  considered:  a)  total  fertility  rate  remains  stable  at  its 
current  level  (1.8);  b)  total  fertility  rate  gradually  decreases  to  1.5.  In  both 
scenarios  the  mortality  rate  keeps  declining  until  2050;  a net  inflow  of 50,000 
persons per year is  also  projected.  In the first  scenario,  the old-age dependency. 
ratio increases from 31  per cent in 1990 to 39 in 2010 and to 63 in 2040. 
b)  Participation  rate.  Three  scenarios  are  considered:  a)  the  participation  rate. 
continues  to  decline  (this  assumption  is  included  in  the  "main scenario");  b)  a 
further  increase  in  women  participation  rates  is  allowed  (leading  to  a  higher 
participation  ratio  than  in  the  main  scenario);  c)  a  further  decrease  in  the -
participation rate of  young generations is allowed (leading to a lower participation 
ratio than in the main scenario). 
c)  Macroeconomic scenarios.  Several different scenarios are considered on the basis 
of different  assumptions  concerning  the  unemployment  rate  and  productivity 
growth. The "main scenario" assumes a constant total factors productivity growth 
of 1.5  per cent and a small  decrease in the unemployment rate to the  "structural 
rate" assumed at 8. 5 per cent. 
If  the effects of the 1993  Reform are not taken into consideration, in the main scenario 
the equilibrium contribution rate would increase from  18.9  per cent in  1990 to 3  2 per 
cent in 2020 and 48 per cent in 2040. In the final year the rate would be 6 per cerit higher 
· than in the tilost pessimistic scenario of the 1993  White Paper. This is  du~ to a greater . 
increase in the dependency ratio:  the ratio basedon the most unfavourable scenario  of· 
the White Paper is similar  to that based  on the most  favourable  scenario  of the new 
projections.  The gross transfer ratio would not change.  Because. of the increase in the 
equilibrium contribution rate, the net transfer ratio would increase from 40.6 per cent in 
1990 to 104.3 per cent in 2040 (as against 90.7 per cent prediCted in the White Paper). 
The 1993 Reform improves the financial. situation of the Regime General. According to 
General  Planning  Committee  (1995),  under  the  macroeconomic  assumptions ·of the 
White  Paper,  price  indexation  and  the  new  rules  for  the  assessment  of pensions  are 
expected to reduce pension expenditure by 26 per cent in the year 2010. The transfer of. 
part  of total  outlays  fro~ the Regime  General  to  the  State  accounts  (through  the 
constitution of  the 'Fonds de Solidarite Vieillesse') is expected to decrease the burden by 
a  further  six  percentual  points. 132  Taking  the  updated  macroeconomic  scenario  into 
consideration,  the reform would  maintain the financial  deficit  of the Regime General 
stable up to the year 2005. 
1n  · 
132 
133 
In 2010 the reduction in the outlays of  the Regime General is estimated as 202 billion of 1993 Francs, of 
which 17.8 per cent is attained through the new pension calculation rules, 63.4 through price iridexation and 
18.8  per  cent  through  the  institution  of the  'Fonds  de  Solidarite  Vieilliesse'.  See  General  Planning 
Committee (1995), Table 37, p.  129. 
The deficit, expressed in terms of  the total taxable wages, is estimated as 1.7 per ce11t in 1993, 0.9 p~r cent 
in 2005 and 4.3 per cent 2015. See Government ofFrance{l991), p.  132. 66 
If the fictional  single  pension scheme representing all basic  and  supplementary French 
pension schemes is taken into consideration, the equilibrium contribution rate would be 
decreased by  the reform by 4 percentual points  ~n 2015  and  7. 2 percentual points· in 
2040. The increase in the dependency ratio is not expected to be affected by. the reform, 
since  very  limited  effects  are  expected  on the  choice  of retirement  age.  The  reform 
reduces  only  the  tendencial  increase  in  the  transfer  ratio.  The  ratio  of average 
expenditure per inactive citizen aged 60 and over to average income per worker paying . 
contributions to the system is  estimated to rise from 40.6 per cent in  1990 to 46.1  per 
cent in 2040. By the year 2040, the equilibrium contribution rate would increase by more 
than 20 points, reaching 40.8 per cent.  In spite of the improvements due to the reform 
measures, by the year 2040 the equilibrium contribution rate would still be very high (p. 
76).  The ratio  of pensioners'  incomes,  considered to be equitable in  the early  1990s, 
would become "inequitable" (p. 77). 
The General Planning Committee has also carried out some projections on the basis of  an 
hypothetical  extension  of the  1993  reforms  to  all  the  schemes.  The  equilibrium 
contribution rate is expected to increase by 5 percentual points by 2015 and  14 points by 
the  year  2040  (which  is  respectively  4  and  6  points  less  than  in  the  main  scenario 
considered above). In this case the net transfer ratio would increase much less than in the 
previous case.  It would remain constant until 2015; thereafter, it would increase up to 
57.2 per cent by the year 2040. 
OECD (1995,  p.  41) estimates that the  1993 Reform would keep the· general  pension 
scheme close to balance until20  10.  Thereafter the increase in the number of the elderly 
and the fall in the working age population would lead to a "rapid erosion of  the financial 
soundness of  the pension system": without further measures it could move from close to 
balance in 2010 to a deficit of 4 per cent ofGDP in 2030 (Table 11.5b,  point 4).  OECD 
considers  several  policy  options  that  could  limit  the  rise  in  the  future  deficit ·of the 
pension system.  More specifically, the following 3 measures could reduce the deficit of 
the pension system by 3.8 percentage points ofGDP: 
a)  An increase in retirement age by 5 years. 
b)  An increase in the contribution rates by 3 percentage points on top of the current 
rates. 
c)  A decrease in the transfer ratio by more than 10 per·cent. ·134 
Both the General Planning Committee (1995) and OECD (1995) focus on the difference 
between the private sector pension schemes (the Regime General and  some other .minor 
schemes) and the special  old-age pension schemes which have not yet been reformed. 
The cost. of the latter schemes, which apply to civil  servants and to employees of most 
state-owned  companies,  is  increasing  fast.  This  also  raises  pmblems · of fairness  -
particularly  as  private  sector employees  will  see  the  rate of return on their  pensions 
134  Levy (1995a) examines the  possibility of increasing the role  of funded  pension schemes  in France.  He 
points out that the  "increasing use. of life insurance instruments and company-sponsored funds  in France 
suggests that French households may  be inclined to  a greater reliance on financial  savings as a souce of 
retirement income". OECD (1995) also stresses this point. 
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decline·between now and 2014. The General Plaruilng Committee (1995, p.  147) points 
to  11 an intra-generational  iniquity  between  private  sector employees,  who will  have  a 
moderate  progression ·in  their  average  pension,  and  the  pensioners  of the  special 
schemes, who will continue to have important progressions in their average pensions11 • Table IL5a 
FRANCE  I <t) 
1.  Government of France (Livre Blanc i 2>,  1991 
Old-age Dependency Ratio<3> % 
Low fertility scenari<J (1FR=1.8)  I 
31.41  33.11  33.71  33.91  37.71  I 
45.61  I  I  I  . 
55.3 
High fertility scenari<J (1FR=2.1)  31.4  33.1  33.7  33.6  ·37  43.3  47.5 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate (Pension ExPenditure I Gross Earned Income)% 
a)  Low fertility scenario (1FR=l.8) 
Stable participation rate 55-64 and small unemployment decrease<4>  18.9  19.8  21.1  22.2  26.2  30  33.4  36.7  39.4  41.7  41.9 
Stable participation rate 55-64 and large unemployment decrese<4J  18.9  19.6  20.7  21.5  25.1  28.9  32.1  35.4  38  40.3  40.5 
Rising participation rate 55-64<5>  and small unemployment decrease<4>  18.9  19.8  21.1  22.2  25.5  28.4  31  33.3  35.1  36.4  36.3 
Rising participation rate 55-64<5> and large unemployment decrease<4>  18.9  19.6  20.7  21.5  24.4  27.5  29.9  32.2  33.9  35.2  35.1 
b) High fertility scenario (1FR=2.1) 
Stable participation rate 55-64 and small unemployment decrease<4>  18.9  19.8  21.1  22.2  26  29.4  32.2  34.6  36.4  37.6  36.7 
Stable participation rate 55-64 and large unemployment decrese<4>  18.9  19.6  20.7  21.5  25  28.4  31  33.4  35.1  36.2  35.4 
Rising participation rate 55-64<5> and small unemployment decrease<4>  18.9  19.8  21.1  22.2  25.3  27.9  29.9  31.5  32.5  33  32 
Rising participation rate 55-64<5> and large unemployment decrease<4>  18.9  19.6  20.7  21.5  24.3  26.9  28.9  30.5  31.4  31.9  30.9 
Scenario with low fertility, stable participation rate 55-64 and large 
tmemployment decrease 
Dependency Ratio<6>% 
I 
46.51 
I 
471  471  521  I 
62.31 
I  I 
74.9 
Implicit Gross Transfer Ratio<7>  %  40.6  43.9  48.2  51.6  53.21  54 
Implicit Net Transfer Ratio  <B>  %  50.1  55.3  64.9  76.1  85.9  90.7 
2.  National Old-Age Insurance Fund (CNA  V)CJ>,  1993 
a)  Before the 199 3 Reform 
Equilibrium .Contribution Rate00l % 
Employment growth= 1% p.a., real wage growth= 1,5% p.a.  I  I 
18.51  20.21  21.61  24.5 
Employment grO\vth = 0% p.a., real wage growth= 1 % p.a.  18.3  21.1  23.8  28.3 
b)  After the 1993 Reform 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate<! OJ% 
Employmont grov.1h " 1% p.a, ""'1 w>oge gwwth" 1,5 % p.a, woge-indexntil  18.4  19.8  20.6  22.5 
Employment growth= 1% p.a., real wage growth= 1,5 % p.a., price-indexation  18  18.3  18.3  19 
Employ~nent  gro\\th = 0% p.a., real wage growth= 1% p.a., wage-indexation  18.3  20.6  22.6  26 
Employment giowth = 0% p.a., real wage growth= 1%  p.~., price-indexation  18  19.5  20.8  23.2 
I) Government of  France (1991) refers to a fictional single pension scheme representing all basic and supplemental)' French pension schemes. 
~ational Old-Age Insurance Fund (1993) refers to the Regime General. This scheme,does not comprise the public sector employees and some other special categories (as the self-employed workers). 
2)  Total gross wage growth ~  2% p.a. 
3)  Number of people aged 60 and over I Number of  people between 15 and 59.  Computed from Tableau 1, page 77.  The data concerning 1995 have been reported from Eurostat (1994). 
4)  Small unempolyment decrease: Unemployment rate down from 9.2 per cent to 8 per cent in 2005·2010 and 6 per cent from 2030.  · 
Large unemployment decrease: Unemployment rate down from 9.2 per cent to 4.5 per cent in 2005·2010 and 3 per cent from 2030. 
5)  Participation Rate of 55-64: stable up to 2005 and rising gradually to 1975 level between 2005 and 2040. 
6)  Number of  inactives aged 60 and over I Number of contnbutors. 
7) ·Ratio of  average expenditure per inactive citizen aged 60 and over to average income per worker paying contnbutions to the system.  Calculated from Table 12 assuming that the value for 1990 =  Equilibrium Con1ribution Rate""''/ Dependency Ratio,...,. 
8)  Ratio of average expenditure per inactive citizen aged 60 and over to average income per worker net of  contributions.  Calculated from the Implicit Gross Transfer Ratio and the Equilibrium Con1ribution Rate. 
9)  Caisse Nationale pour l'Atsurance Viellesse.  The d.jlta are report::d in Ruellan (1993).  · 
iO)  Computed by dividing ~sion  expenditure in 199ls (MDF 290:,)) by value of 1 point of  con1ribution in 1995 (MDF 15. 7). ·Other data computed by adding to 18.5 per cent the increase in the  con1ributi~ rate requi:;a1d )0 finance expenditure. ~ 
·,;}• 
FRANCE  II 
General Planning Committee<•), 1995 
Dependency Ratio(2) %  I 
311  331  341 
Before the 1993 Reform 
Dependency Ratio<3l  %  46.5  49.2 
Implicit Gross Transfer Ratio<4l%  40.6  44.7 
Implicit Net TransferRatio<5l%  50.1  57.3 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate%  18.9  22 
•)  After the 1993 Reform on Regime General 
Dependen~y  Ratio<3l  %  46.5  49.2 
Implicit Gross Transfer Ratio<4l%  40.6  42.5 
Implicit Net Transfer Ratio<5l%  50.1  53.7 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate %  18.9  20.9 
Scenario: extension of 1993 Reform to all schemes 
Dependency Ratio<3l  %  46.5  49.3 
Implicit Gross Transfer Ratio<4l%  40.6  40.2 
Implicit Net Transfer Ratio<5l %  50.1  50.1 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate %  18.9  19.8 
341  391  431 
49.6  55.7  62.1 
46.4  48.5  51.5 
603  66.4  75.7 
23  27  ~2 
62.1 
. 45.1 
62.6 
28 
62.2 
38.6 
50.8 
24 
. 
t 
471 
68.7 
52.4 
81.8 
36 
'.  ..• 
521 
74.9 
53.4 
89 
40 
1) Commissariat 'General du Plan.  Data refer to a fictional single pension scheme representing all basic and supplementary French pension schemes.  Data reported in this table refer to the main scenario of  the study. 
(Small unemployment decrease, decreasing total participation rate and. TFR=!.S).  · 
2)  :--Jumber of people aged 60 and over I Nuinber of  people betwen 15 and 59. Based on the main scenario (TFR=l.8, decreasing mortality and yearly migrations inflow of  50,000.) 
3) :--Jumber of  inactives aged 60 and over I Number of  cont,ributors.  Calculated as Equilibrium Contribution Ratio I Gross Transfer Ratio (as defined in footnote 4  ). 
571 
82.6 
53.3 
95.1 
44 
4)  Average Pension I Average Gross Income per worker paying contributions to the system. Clllculatedfrom Tables 20 and 21  assuming, as in Table 7 of  Government of  France (1991), that the Dependency Ratio in 1990 is 46.5%. 
5)  Average Pension I Ave~age Income per  worker net of  contributions.  Calculated from the Implicit Gross Transfer Ratio and the Equilibrium Contribution Rate.  , 
Table II.5b 
611 
87.7 
53.6 
101.2 
47 
6? 
88. 
54.2 
104.3 
48 
88.5 
46.1 
77.9 
40.8 
88.4 
38 
57.2 
33.6 
\1'.. 
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. ll.6 GERMANY 
The Gennan pension system is based on two pillars: the schemes providing basic P  AYG 
pensions  to  all  employees  and  some  self-employed  workers,  and  the  occupational 
schemes providing supplementary pensions to some employees. 135  Most basic pensions 
are paid by the "statutory pension insurance", which is by far the most important old-age 
scheme,  136 and by the pension scheme for civil servants. 
During the eighties the ratio of pension expenditure to GDP declined.  The outlook  for 
the German pension system was, however, rather less reassuring. 137 
a) 
b) 
c) 
Retirement age was declining. 138 The labour participation rate of  the 60 to 65  ~ear 
old men accordingly declined from 72 per cent in 1970 to 3  3 per cent in 1986.1 9 
Life  expectancy  was  increasing.  Between  1970-1972  and  1984-1986  life 
expectancy for 60 year old men and women increased respectively by  1.8  and 2.5 
years. Further gains were expected for the following years. 
The fertility rate had declined significantly. In 1992 the total fertility rate was down 
to 1.3.140 
These changes were expected to determine a considerable increase both in the old-age 
dependency ratio and in the ratio of  the number of pensioners to the number of  workers: 
the first was.projected to ipcrease from 36 per cent in  1990 to 79  per cent in 2030, the 
second from 59 to 118 per cent. 141  The benefit ratio was also expected to increase. The · 
contribution rate required to cover expenditure was projected to rise from 22.8 per cent 
in 1990 to 28.7 in 2010. The workers' contribution rate was projected to rise from 18.5 
to 24.5 per cent.  · 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
For a description of the system see Schmal (1992a), Mayer (1994).  For a survey of its recent development 
see Deutsche Bundesbank (1995). For a description of the state and the prospects of West German pension 
system in the early eighties see Hauser (1982). 
The  statutory  pension insurance  covers  approximately  80  per cent  of employees  and  70  per cent  of 
expenditure spent on old-age protection. 
See Federal Ministry of  Labour and Social Affairs (1989) and OECD (1989b). 
While out of  the generation born in 1905 3/5 of  the males and 2/5 of the females had retired at 65 or over, 
in the generation born in 1920 only 1/3 of both males and females retired at 65 or over.lnjust 15 years the 
normal retirement age of  65 years had become an exception. 
More generally the labour participation rate of  men between 15 and 65 years decreased from 90 per cent  in 
1970 to 79 per cent inl986; longer education periods also contributed to this decline.  On the "COntrary, the 
labour participation rate of women increased from 47per cent in 1970 to 51  per cent in 1986. It did not 
reach the levels ofFrance (55 per cent) or the Unied Kingdom (61  per «ent). 
See European Commission (1994a). 
See Federal Miriistry of  Labour and Social Affairs (1989). 69 
The longer term outlook was even more worrying.  After 2015 the contribution rate of 
employers and employees was ~rojected to rise steeply, reaching 28 per cent in 2020 and 
36 per cent by the year 2030.14 
In 198 9,  in  order to restrain expenditure growth, the Government  enacted the  "1992 
Pension· Reform Act."143 The reform, that was agreed upon by the main opposition party 
(the  SPD),  maintained  the  fundamental  features  of the  German  pension  system, 
particularly the payment of PAYG pension related to lifetime earnings  and  indexed to· 
wages. 144 The reform aimed at  spreading the burden of ageing in a "balanced" manner 
between the workers contributing to the system, the federal  state and the retirees.  The 
major changes introduced by the act are the following: 
a)  A shift from gross wage dynamics to the dynamics of wages net of contributions 
and taxes as a reference for pension adjustments; this measure aimed at ensuring a 
stable relationship between the standard wage and standard pension. 
b)  The gradual increase (between the years 2001  and 2012) in the standard retirement 
age from 63 for men and 60 for women to 65 for both men and women. 
c)  · The abolition of  the present flexible retirement-age schemes145 and the introduction 
of  a new scheme allowing retirement from age 62 with a penalty on the amount of 
pension paid (0.3 per cent for each month of anticipa,ted retirement with respect to 
the standard age of 65); in case retirement takes place after the standard age,  the 
pension is increased by 0.5 per cent for each month, up to a limit. of2 years. 146 
d)  The  introduction  of a  so-called  "self regulating  mechanism":  each  year  the 
contribution rate is  to be  set at a level that ensures a cash reserve equal to one 
month  pension  expenditure;  federal  subsidies  are  to  be  linked  to  average  ·net 
earnings per worker and the contribution rate applying to workers. 
d)  The introduction of  new rules concerning pension credits for years with limited or 
null  contributions; pension credits for years  spent in ·higher  education have been 
reduced. 
e)  The upgrading of  pensions for low-income earners. 
The reform was expected to reduce the projected total equilibrium contribution rate by 
about three percentage points: the rate was expected to rise from 23. 1 per cent in  1990 
to less than 26 per cent in 2010 (Table II.6a, point 1). The contribution rate of  employers 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
See Social Council (1994) and the projections reported in Deutsche Bundesbank ( 1995). 
For a survey of  the main reform proposals formulated in the second.part of  the eighties see Mayer (1994). 
See Mayer (1994 ). 
Early retirement was allowed from the age of 60 for women with 15  years of insurance (among them 10 
years were to be included in the last 20 years) and from the age of 63 for men and women· with 35 years of 
insurance). The process will start in 2001  and will be completed in 2012 for women and 2006 for men. 
Schmiihl (1992a) notices that these coefficients are below the rate of an actuarial fair calculation. They do 
not represent an effective incentive to postpone retirement. 
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and employees was projected to rise to 21.4 per cent by the year 2010. 147  The longer 
term outlook also improved considerably, with the latter rate reaching  ~2.  8 in 2020 and 
26.9 in 2030. 148 
Pension expenditure has also been largely influenced by the Unification of  the country. 149 
As Schmahl (1992, p.  36) noted, "The old-age pension schemes of the former GDR and 
Federal Republic fundamentally diverged in view of  their conception and ·objectives, their 
position in the overall  economic process and  above  all  in. income  redistribution,  their 
organisational structure, the coverage, the level and structure of benefits as well as  in 
financing." 
After unification, homogeneity was rapidly reached by extending to Eastern Germany the 
fundamental principles of  the West-German old-age pension schemes.  In 1990 and  1991 
the Eastern pensions  were  repeatedly  revalued.  The  increases  aimed  at adapting  the 
living conditions in East and West Germany. A target value was fixed:  after 45  years of 
service an "average earner" should receive 70 per cent of  the average net e~ngs  of all 
the insured.  Within a year, the East German  pensions  were on average  increased  by 
about 60  per cent.  From the beginning  of 1992  the  West· German  pension  law  was 
extended to  East Germany; most of  the regulations of the "1992 Pension Reform Act" 
coming into force for botli parts of Germany.  The  extension implied  some important 
improvements in Eastern pensions: most widows' pensions were raised from 25 to 60 per 
cent  of the  pension  of the  deceased  spouse;  retirement  ages  were  lowered;  the  .  . 
possibilities of  claiming invalidity pensions were improved. 
Because of these changes East German pension expenditure increased considerably and 
required large transfers from West German pension schemes. 150  According to Federal 
Government .of Germany  (1994),  the  balance of the  peJ!sion  expenditures  in  the new 
Lander will get more and more negative and will have to be covered by the surplus of  the 
Western Lander. 
In 1994 the Social Council updated its  1989 projections covering the period up to the 
year 2030. If  no new measure is taken, the contribution rate of  employers and employees 
will  reach 27  per cent by the year 2030  (Table II.6b,  point 2).  Federal contributions,' 
currently  linked  to  the  increases  in  the  contribution  rates  of the  employers  and 
employees, will also rise considerably.  151 
147 
148 
149 
150 
151 
See Federal Ministry of  Labour and Social Affairs (1989). 
See Social Council ( 1994  ). 
The financial situation of  German  pen~ion schemes in the years before ~d  after the Unification is examined 
in Deutsche Bundesbank (1991 and 1995). 
According to Scluniihl (1992b), in 1992 more than 45 per cent of  the East German pensions were frnanced 
through the West German contribution revenue. The transfers represented about 10 per cent of contributory 
revenues raised in West Germany.  · 
According to the projections presented in Bersch-Supan (1995), if  the net benefit ratio is fixed at the current 
72 per cent, the workers' contribution rate would reach 34 per cent in 2030. 71 
The burden of civil service pensions is also  growi~g rapidly. 152 In spite of the changes 
implemented by the 1992 Reform153,  assuming constant employment in the civil service, 
the number of  these pensions will increase from under 0.8 million to over 1.2 million by 
the year 2030.154  .  .  · 
New medium-tefm. projections concerning the whole country were carried out in 1994 by 
the German government. 155  Different assumptions  concerning labour participation and 
the. rate of  growth of  income were taken into account with minor effects on the projected 
increases  in  the  contribution  rate.  In  the  Medium  Scenario,  the  employers  plus 
employees' contribution rate was projected to increase gradually from 18.4 per cent in 
. 1995 to 19.6 in 2000 and 21 per cent in 2008 (Table 11.6b, point 4). 
In 1995 the Government updated the projections, and prolonged the projection period to 
the  year 2009.  The  ensuing  contribution  rate  of the  employers  and  employees  was 
· .· estimatedslightly higher,  starting from  18.6 per cent in 1995  to 20.2 per cent in 2000 
~nd 21.9 in 2009 (Table 11.6b, point 5).· 
Deutsche Bundesbank (1995) draws attention to the matter of  the sustainability of  future 
increases in the ·contribution rate and in the related federal  subsidies.  On the one hand, 
tax rates· are already relatively high:  total social contribution rate is  higher than 39 per 
cent of  eligible earnings and the share of all the social contributions and taxes to GDP is 
about 44.5 per cent.  On the other, the costs of  unification have had a negative effect on 
public finance.  "Given this situation, it appears likely that the present pension insurance 
· system cannot be maintained in the long run unless further perceptible adjustments are· 
made".156  A  "continuation  of the  reform  of the  pension  insurance  system  and  -
analogously- the civil service pension scheme" should therefore be considered. 
152  See Deutsche Bundesbank (1995). 
153  Pensions required from 2001 onwards before the age of65 will be reduced. 
154  The increase is largely due to increases in staff levels which occurred in the seventies. 
155  See Federal Government of  Germany (1994). 
156  Deutsche Bundesbank (1995), pp.  29-30.  The same document provides a brief summary of recent reform 
proposals.  ·  · GERMANY  I 
1. Social Advisory Board<2), 1989 
Old-age Dependency Ratio<3) % 
a) Before the 1992 Reform 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate % 
Employers+ Employees Contribution Rate % 
Government Contribution Rate% 
b) After the 1992 Reform 
., 
Dependency Ratio  (Number of  pensions I Number of  workers) % 
Total Contribution Rate% 
Workers Contribution Rate% 
Government Contribution Rate % 
Gross Benefit Ratio<4l % 
Net Benefit Ratio(5) % 
1)  This scheme covers all private sector employees and some self-employed workers. 
381  441 
71 
25.2 
20.3 
4.4  4.6  4.9 
51  49.7  48.7 
70.1  "70.6  70.6 
47 
28 
23.8 
4.2 
77 
26.3 
21.2 
5.1 
47. 
70 
48 
70.5 
..  .. 
51 
25.5 
Table 11.6a 
'  57  67  79 
28.1  31.  36.4 
11 
24.  26. 
2)  Gutachten des Sozialbeirats zum Rentenreformgesetz 1992.  The main results have been reported in Social Advisory Board (1989) and Federal Ministry ofLabow: and Social Affairll  (1989).  Yearly wage growth= 3% from 1993; employment growth: from 
1990 to 1995 0.5% p.a.; from)996 to 2004 -0.1% p.a.; from 2005 to 2013 constant; from 2014 decreasing.  · 
3)  Number of  People over 60 I Number of  people between 20 and 59. 
4) Average Gross Pension I Average taxable Labour Income. 
5)  Average Net P"ension I Average taxable Labour Income. 
~ Table 11.6b 
GERMANY  II 
sta~tl~:!~~st~h  :t~~~W~&:•·~~~.W~(~l'•'•··, 
AF1TIR THE UNIFICATION 
1.  Eurostat, 1994 
Old-Age Dependency Ratio<2l%  37  43  45  47  50  55 
2.  Social Advisory Board<3\  1994 
Employers + Employees Contribution Rate % 
a) without the 1992 Reform  19.3  21.9  24.4  25.6  26.9  29  32.7 
b) with the 1992 Reform  18.6  19.7  21  21.5  22.1  23.1  25 
3.  Axel Boersch-Supan; 1994 
Contribution rate (benefit ratio fixed)<4l %  19  20  22  23.5  25  26.5  28  31 
Benefit ratio (contribution rate fixedi4l%  72  69  63  58  55  52  49  44 
Pension Gap (Benefit and contribution rates fixed)<4>  bn DM  0  8  24  43  60  79  98 
4.  Federal Government<5), 1994 
Employers +Employees Contribution Rate<6l % 
a) Low labour participation (0.3% yearly growth)  18.4  19.7  . 20.9  21.3 
b) Medium labour participation (0.5% yearly growth)  18.4  19.6  20.6  21 
c) High labour participation (0.7% yearly growth)  18.4  19.5  20.4  20.5 
7.  Federal Govemment<7), 1995 
Employers +Employees Contrihution Rate<6l % 
a) Low labour participation (0.3% yearly growth)  18.6  20.3  21.7  22.1  22.2 
b) Medium labour participation (0.5% yearly growth)  18.6  20.2  21.5  21.8  21.9 
c) High labour participation (0.7% yearly growth)  18.6  20.1  21.3  21.5  21.6 
1)  This scheme covers all private sector employees and soine self-employed workers. 
2)  Number of  People over 60 I Number of  people between 20 and 59. 
3)  Gutachten des Sozialbetrats zun Rentenversicherungbericht 1994.  Annual rate growth of  wage in old Uinder =  3. 7% from 1995 to 1998 and 3% thereafter; in the new ones 100% of  average income of  old Ltinder will be reached by the year 2010. 
Yearly employment growth gradually decreasing up to the year 2005; th~reafter constant up to the year 2019; thereafter constant employment ratio. 
4)  As reported in the graphs on page 24.  ·  ' 
)) Rentenversichenmgbericht der Bundesregierung, 21107/94. 
. 6)  Annual rate growth of  wage in old Lttnder = 3%; in the new ones 95% of  average income ofoi..!Lander will be reached by the year 2005. 
7)  Rentenversicherungbericht der Bundesregierung, July 1995. 
'  '. 
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36.9 
27 
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41 
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11.7 GREECE 
Pensions are provided by a large number of social insurance institutions that often have 
different rules. IKA, which provides the pensions of  most private employees, and OGA, 
which  caters  for farmers,  are  the  most important.  Public  employees  have  their  own 
h  . h  'fi  1  157  sc  emes w1t  spec1 1c ru es. 
P~nsion expenditure §:rew from 5 per cent of  GDP in the early sixties to nearly 8 per cent 
in the late seventies.1  8 The path of  growth accelerated in the eighties: between 1980 and 
1989 its share of  GDP rose from 7,. 8 to 15.1 per cent. In this period the growth was due 
to a 50 per cent increase in the number of pensioners .and  a 50 per cent increase in the 
average pension. 159  Given a 2.2 per cent yearly increase in the population aged 65  and 
over, it was tentatively estimated that, under the existing rules, in the 1990s the ~ension 
to GDP ratio would have risen at an annual rate of  0. 3 to 0.4 percentage points. 16 
The sources of  this critical situation were numerous:161 
a)  Eligibility requirements for pension entitlement were generous162 and there was an 
.  .  .  1  163  . 
b) 
c) 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
164 
mcent1ve to rettre ear y. 
In most cases  pensions were  close  to the ·level  of the last  salary;  public  sector 
employees' pension were often above that level/64 most pensions were ind'exed to 
wages.· 
J?isability  benefits  and  early  old-age  benefits  on  ''dangerous  and  unhealthy 
occupations" were widely granted. 
For a description ofthe system see IMF (1992). 
All data reported in this paragraph refer to GDP levels estimated before the 1994 revision of  Greek National 
Accounts. The revision raised the GDP estimate for 1988 by about 20 per cent 
See OECD (1990a), which refers to  estimates of Ministry of Health, Welfare,  and Social Insurance and 
OECD. 
See OECD (1990a). 
See European Commission (1992a) and OECD (1993a  ). 
Although for the majority of  the insured population the standard retirement age was 65 for men and 60 for 
women (65  for men and women in the farmers'  scheme), there were several relevant exceptions: private 
employees could retire at 58 if  they reached a contribution period of at least 35  years;  civil servants could 
retire with 25 years of  service (15 years for married women) irrespective of  age. 
Private employees could obtain a "minimum pension" with a contribution period of 13  years, which was 
only ten per cent lower than the average pension; there were no restrictions on regular employment of  public 
sector pensioners. 
This, in the private sector, was due to the fact that pensions were based on earnings r~ceived in the la~t one 
or two years before retirement; this provided an incentive to pay salary increases at the end of  the career. 73 
Some projections on pension expenditure have been provided by IMF (1992), relying on 
. World· Bank demographic projections and  on expenditure estimates carried  out by the 
Ministry ofHealth, Welfare and Social Insurance (Table 11.7). It should be noted that the 
projections are not directly comparable as they are based on different definitions of the 
social  .security  system,  different  methodologies  and  different  macroeconomic 
assumptions. 
World Bank population projections assume a recovery in the fertility rate to replacement 
level by 2030. In spite oftherecovery, the ratio of population aged 65  and  over relative 
to population aged 15-64 is expected to rise from 21  per cent in 1990 to 32 per cent in 
2010, 43 per cent in 2030 and 53 per cent in 2050. 
IMF (1992) estimated that, under the rules existing before the 1990 reform and under a 
constant transfer ratio, demography was going to raise the share of pension expenditure 
in  GDP. to 21  per cent in 2010,  29 per cent in 2030 and  34 per cent in 2050.165  The 
growth of expenditure would have been even greater had the expected increase in the 
transfer· ratio been taken into account. Expenditure would have reached 23  of  GDP by 
the year 2000. 
A first  set of measures aimed  at  restoring the viability of the  system was ·  adopted in 
1990: 166 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
e) 
f). 
The contribution periods required for pension eligibility were incre~sed. 
Eligibility criteria for disability were tightened and benefit entitlements curtailed. 
The minimum pensionable age was increased for public employees. 
The functional relationship of  pension to years of service was modified for younger 
workers in order to provide an incentive to civil servants to retire later. 167  . 
Employees' pensions were indexed to public  sector wages (that the government 
intended to control strictly), rather than to private sector ones (which are objects 
of  collective bargaining) 
Private sector pensions were to be calculated on the basis of  the last 5 (rather than 
2) years of  earnings. 
· After the 1990 Reform, the short term outlook was much more favourable.  The decline 
in the transfer ratio was expected to offset the deterioration of the dependency ratio for 
some years. However, from the late nineties, the transfer ratio recovers its rising pattern. 
.. 
By the year 2010 it  reaches the level previously expected for the year 2000.  Pension  ··-: · · 
expenditure reaches 16 per cent ofGDP by the year 2000 and 26 per.cent in 2010. 
165 
166 
167 
These projections refer to GDP levels estimated before the 1994 revision of  Greek National Accounts. 
Law 1902/90. See OECD (1991a). 
The previous rule attributing 1/35 of last salary for  each year of service has been substituted with a rule 
attributing 1/50 of last salary for each of  the first 25  years, 2/50 for each of  the following 5 years, and 3/50 
for each year between 30 and 35. ..  , 
.. 
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A second package of measures was passed in  1992.  In order not to penalise workers 
close to retirement age,  most of the measures affecting the expenditure side were to be 
phased in gradually from  1993  to 2007. 168  As with the 1990 reform bill,  the short term 
cash problems  of the  social  security  system were attacked  primarily with increases in 
contributions. The contributions increase were particularly marked for funds for the self-
employed. The main measures concerning benefits were the following:  · 
a)  Minimum service requirements and minimum age for pension disbursement were 
gradually raised for public employees. 
b)  Private  employees  replacement  rates  wen~  gradually  reduced  by_  about  1  0 
percentage  points  over  ten  years;.  minimum  pensions  were  reduced  for  those 
retiring before the standard age limits. 
c)  To reduce the incentive for early retirement a 1 per cent premium on replacement 
rate was introduced for contribution years in  excess of 15,  for  minimum pension 
recipients. 
d)  The age of awarding a "welfare pension'' to uninsured citizens, was reduced from 
68 to 65 years. 
New entrants into the labour force became subject to new uniform rules: 
a)  Standard old-age limits of  65 for men and women. 
b)  Early retirement at 60 with a reduced pension. 
c)  Maximum replacement rate of 80 per cerit of last five  years of earnings for those 
with 3  5 years of  work. 
d)  Minimum contribution period of 15 years. 
e)  Lower minimum pension. 
f)  Restrictions on pensioners' employment and survivors' pensions. 
According to projections carried out for the period 1994-1999 by the Ministry of  Health,. 
Welfare and  Social  Insurance,  public  expenditure  on pensions  (net  of expenditure  for 
public sector employees' pension, 2.4 per cent of GDP in.1994) should rise from 8. 9 per 
. cent  of GDP  in  1993  to  10.1  per  cent  in  1999.169  Expenditure  growth  would  be 
accelerated by a considerable increase in the number of  pensions paid (3 .4 to 4.2 per cent 
per year).  The same document stresses the need for new measures aimed  at correcting 
long-term imbalances. 
168 
169 
Law 2084/1992. See OECD (1993a). 
In 1994 Greek 1988 GDP was revised upward by about 20 per cent.  The estimates concerning the following 
years were revised accordingly.  · GREECE 
BEFORE THE 1990 REFORM 
Old-Age Dependency Rati<PY% 
Dependency Ratios: 
Elderly I Workers<3l% 
Pensioners I Contributors% 
a)  Pure Demographic Effects 
Benefit Ratio<4l % 
Pension Ex-penditure I GDP % 
b)  Increasing Benefit Entitlements<5l 
Benefit Ratio<4)% 
Pension Ex-penditure I GDP % 
AFTER THE 1990 REFORM 
Increasing Benefit Entitlements\"> 
Dependency Ratio<3l % 
Benefit Ratio<4l% · 
Pension' Expenditure I GDP% 
AFTER THE 1992 REFORM 
Pension Expenditure I GDPCTJ% 
21.2 
35.3 
45 
33.5 
15.1 
34 
15.1 
22.4 
37.2 
47.6 
34 
16.3 
47.5 
29 
13.8 
48.7 
35 
16.9 
48.7 
28 
13.7 
8.9 
I)  The Social Security System comprises the·schemes for public and private employees and for self-employed workers. 
2)  Number of  people aged 65 and over I Number of  people between 15 and 64. 
3) Number of  people aged 65 and over /Number of  Labour Market participants  . 
. 4)  Average Pension I Per Capi~  GOP. 
24.2 
40 
50.5 
33.5 
16.9 
36 
18.2 
50.5 
27 
13.5 
9.5 
55.1 
41 
22.3 
55.1 
28 
15.5 
10.1 
5)  Assuming a real GOP growth of 1.8% in 1991, 2.5%from 1992 to 1995 and 2.7% up to 2000. See Tables 6 and 7 of  Annex I ofiMF(1992). 
6)  Assuming a ·real CTOP growth of2.5% from·1992 to 1995 and 2.7% up to 2010. See Tables 8 and 9 of  Annex I ofiMF(l992). 
27.7 
45 
55.6 
33.5 
18.6 
42 
23.3 
55.6 
29 
16 
31 
49.5 
33.5 
19.6 
58.3 
34 
20 
32.3 
52.1 
33.5 
20.9 
62.4 
41 
25.9 
3681 
60.6 
33.5 
24.3 
Table II.7 
~o4~  1  2oso 
42.9  50.31  54.1 
71.9  841  89.3 
33.5  33.5  33.5 
29.1  33.5  34.2 
7)  Excluding public sector employees' pensions.  Based on new GOP estimates and the following assumptions: Real wage growth: l.  7% in 1994 and from 1995 to 1999 gradually increasing from 0.9% to 2.2; employment growth: gradually increasing 
from 0.3% in 1994 to 1.4% in 1999.  · 
Source: IMF (1992) for projections "Before and after the 1990 R:eform" and Ministry of Health, Welfare and Social Insurance for projections "After the 1992 Reform". 
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11.8 IRELAND 
The state runs a contributory pension  scheme  ("social insurance")  and  a means-tested 
non-contributory scheme ("social assistance"). 170  Both schemes  provide,  on a flat-rate 
basis, old-age and survivors benefits. The insurance scheme also pays invalidity benefits. 
A corresponding benefit; the disabled persons maintenance allowance, is provided for on 
a means-tested basis under the Health Acts.  All public sector employees and nearly 40 
per cent of  private workers are also covered by occupational pension schemes.171 
In  1990,  social  i115urance  and·  social  assistance  pension  expenditure  amounted 
respectively to .3 .1  and  1. 3 per cent of GDP.  In .1991 ·Ireland was the EU country with 
the lowest ratio of old-age pension expenditure on GDP (5.0 per cent). 172 Two features 
differentiate the Irish pension system from those of  the other EU countrie~: 
a)  Ireland is the only country (apart from Portugal) that has not introduced automatic 
indexation of public pensions.  Although in the long run benefits have been raised 
broadly in line with increases in prices, the lack of  indexation brings uncertainty to 
pensioners. According  to  OECD  (1994c,  p.  73)  there  is  "an  unwillingness  to 
remove pension· increases in social welfare benefits from the political arena." 
b)  Ireland is the only country that does  not ·have a national income-related pension 
scheme.  · 
The  link  between contributions and  benefits  is  rather weak.  Insurance  and  assistance 
pensions  do  not  differ  significantly.  Within  the  insurance  scheme,  "in  certain  cases 
pension  payments  are.  still  significantly  out  of proportion  to  periods  of insurance 
completed,  while  in  other  cases  insured .  persons  may  fail  to  ~ualify for. any  pension 
payment, despite having being insured for considerable periods. "1  3 
The  problems  of the  public  and  the  private  pension  schemes  were  addressed  by  the 
Government in  1986 with the establishment  of the National Pensions Board,  that was 
given the task of submitting proposals on both grounds.  In  1990 the Pension Act was 
passed by Parliament; most of  its provisions came into force on 1 January 1991. The Act 
introduced  minimum  funding  standards  and  rules  concerning  the·  disclosure  of 
information and the protection of  the rights of workers who change employment; it also 
proVided  the equal treatment of men and  women and  established the .Pensions Board. 
170 
171 
172 
173 
The Irish pension system is examined in National Pension Board (1993) and in OECD (1994c  ). 
The number of  per~ons covered by occupational pension schemes have be~n growing from the 1960s. The 
assets of  private-sector occupational schemes have been estimated to have gro"Ml from 6 per cent of GDP in 
1975 to  38 per cent in 1989.  "In a short period of time, therefore, hish pension funds have gro"Mt from 
relative insignificance to a position were they are a major depository of savings and an important source of 
investment capital." OECD (1994c, p.  16). 
See European Commission (1993a). 
National Pension Board (1993, p.  159). 76 
The Board is  responsible for  regulating  occupational pension schemes  and  for  setting 
administration standards for them. 
The reform of the public pension schemes has been addressed· by the National Pension 
Board in 1993 in its Final Report. 
The Report provides estimates ofpublic pension expenditure up to the year 2035 (Table . 
II.8).  Estimates are based on a projection of Irish population that assumes a decline in 
the birth rate,  some improvement in life  expectancy and a marked  decline  in outward 
migration flows.  The number of  persons of  retirement age is .expected to increase slowly 
over up to the year 2006 and then increase steadily over the following 30 .years. The old-
age dependency ratio is projectedto increase from 18.6 per cent in 1990 to 20.1 in 2010, 
26.4 in 2020 and 33.6 in 2030.  · 
The flow of  new old-age pensions basically·depends on the number of  people reaching 65 
years of age. 174 The Report projects the number of pensions paid up to the year 2035 
specifYing the numbers of social insurance and social assistance pensions. It predicts a 
gradual shift· from the latter to the former scheme. 
The  number  of  insured  people  is  projected  assuming.  a  constant  age-specific 
unemployment rate. The number of new entrants into the labour market is· estimated by 
applying the 1987 ratios of  insured population to total population in the 16-23 age range. 
The number of social insurance contributors is  expected to peak· in 2015  and  then to 
decline to a level close to the present level by the year 203 5. 
The ratio of  pensioners to workers is projected to remain stable up to 2010, and then to 
rise  abruptly from 3  3 per cent to  41  per cent in 2020  and  61  per cent in  203 5.  The 
increase reflects the extension of pension insurance to self-employed workers and,  to a 
larger  extent,  the  ageing  process.  Assuming  a  constant  transfer ratio  (based  on the 
. implicit  assumption  of raising  pensions  in  line  with wages), 175  the  ratio  of pension 
expenditure to taxable income is more or less constant up to 2010 (on a 13-14 per cent 
level), and than reaches 17 per cent in 2020 and 25 per cent in 2035 .. 
The National Pension Board does not propose fundamental  changes in the structure of 
the pension system.  Although it recognises that  "ideally~ the aim of  the national pension 
system should be to provide pension benefits which maintain a reasonable relationship 
with previous income levels, 'so that established standard of  living can be maintained  It and 
that "it is highly unlikely that the present system :  ..  will  ever achieve the completeness 
and the h~vel of coverage which this aim requires"  (p.  21), the Board does not propose 
the  introduction  of income-related  pensions.  It  considers  that  full  earnings-related 
pensionS would be payable when the dependency ratio would be much higher than the 
present one, and that current and future job creation might be endangered by the reform. 
174 
175 
The model allows for the fact that some people retire later than 65. 
Benefit projections are based on the rates of  payment current at July 1990 (p. 247). Contribution projections 
are based on current earnings level. .  ,.. 
77 
· The major proposals are the following. 
a)  The amount paid by the assistance scheme should be raised to the level paid by the 
insurance  scheme,  since  the  non-means-testing  of the  latter  benefits  provides 
"sufficient recognition of  the contributory principle underlying social security" (p. 
11). Widow's and invalidity pensions should be raised to the level of  insurance old-
age  pensions.  Disability  Assistance  under  the  Social  Welfare  Acts  should  be 
introduced. 
b}  The real value of benefits should be maintained.  There is no proposal concerning 
the introduction of  an indexation rule. 
c) 
d) 
e) 
f) 
g) 
h) 
176 
177 
The minimum contributions required for old-age and retirement pensions within the 
insurance scheme should be raised from.3 to 10 years. 
The amount of pension paid by the insurance scheme to each individual should be 
determined with a new formula that relates more strictly the amount paid. to the 
number of  years of  contribution. 
A standard pensionable age of  65 for all pensions should be introduced. Changes in 
retirement age should be  considered in the future in  the light of changes in the 
labour market. 
Individuals deferring retirement beyond age 66  should be paid higher benefits on 
actuarial basis (a 5 to 7 per cent increase for each year of  deferment). 
Social insurance sho~ld be extended to new entrants to public sector .employment.  . 
"In time,  this .  would  result in  all  employees in both the private  and  the public ·. 
sectors  having  the  same  range  of pension  cover  under  social  insurance  and 
contributing on the same basis to the costs involved." (p. 9)  .. 
An actuarial review of projected long-term costs should be carried out every five 
yearsP6 Contribution rates should be fixed well in advance177 and gradually raised 
to finance the increase in expenditure. 
National Pension Board (1993,  p.  174) points to  the uncertainty concerning the levels of emigration and 
long term rmemployment. 
Any  excess contributions should be deposited in a  separate accormt  with the exchequer.  When pension 
payments exceed contributions, these funds will be drawn down.  ·  · IRELAND 
National Pensions Board~  1993 
a)  Old-age Dependency Ratio<2)  %  18.6  18.1  20.1  26.4 
b)  Number of pensioners ·(OOO's)  377  386  391  396  419  460  514  582 
c)  Number of social insurance-contributors (OOO's)  1114  1142  1189  1230  1259  1264  1239  1183 
d)  Dependency Ratio (b/c) %  33.8  33.8  32.9  32.2  33.3  36.4  41.5  49.2 
e)  Transfer Ratio<3l%  41.1  40.4  40.6  41.1  41  40.9  41.3  41.3 
f)  Total Pension Expenditure (mill £ - constant prices)  1196  1364  1391  1425  1512  1656  1857  2102 
g)  Taxable Income<4l (mill£-constant prices)  8604  9998  10431  10779  11073  11127  10840  10343 
h)  Implicit equilibrium rate of taxation (fig)  13.9  .  13.6  13.3  13.2  13.7  14.9  17.1  20.3 
1)  Occupational Pension Schemes are not considered in this table. 
2)  Number of  people aged 65 and over I Number of  people between 16 and 64.  Data attributed to the years 1990, 2000, 2010, 2020, 2030, 2035 actually refer to the years 1991, 2001, 2011, 2021, 2031, 2036. 
3)  Average Pension I Average Taxable Income per Worker (Employees plus Self-Employed). 
4)  Income of Employees and Self-Employed.  Taxable Income computed as (estimated contributions in million£) *  (!/contribution rate). See Table 9 of  National Pensions Board (1993). 
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31.7 
645 
1133 
56.9 
41.3 
2320 
9861 
23.5 
Table 11.8 
33.6 
679 
1106 
61.4 
40.9 
2423 
9644 
25.1 
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ll.9  ITALY 
The public pension system covers dependent and self-employed workers.178 It consists of 
several schemes, mostly run on PAYG basis. The National Social Security Institute179  is 
the major public agency acting in the pension area.  It administers nearly 70 per cent of 
total pension  expenditure  and  provides  old  age,  disability  and  survivors  pensions  to 
private sector employees and to most self-employed workers. 180  About 25  per cent of 
total pension expenditure is administered directly by the state, which provides pensions 
to public  sector employees,  to work-disabled citizens and to war related  disableq  and 
SUfVlVOrS. 
Public pension expenditure rose from 5.0 per cent of GDP  in  1960  to  7.5  per cent in 
1970,  10.2 per cent in  1980  and  15.5  per cent in  1994,  far  outstripping the growth in 
other kinds of social  spending,  which increased from  5.1  to 6.7,  6.7  and  th~n 7} per 
cent. 
The number of  pensions paid in Italy rose from 7.5 million in 1960 to 12.5 in 1970,  16.5 
million in 1980 and over 19 million in 1990. The growth in. the number of pensions paid 
can be ascribed to employment trends, lower death rates and the effects of reforms. The 
most  noteworthy  of these  reforms  were the  extension  of social  security. to the self-
employed  and  to needy  elderly  or disabled  persons  and  the introduction of seniority 
pensions. 181  Another factor in the increase was the easing of eligibility requirements for  · · 
certain  benefits,  namely.  the  social  insurance  disability  fensions  in  the  sixties  and 
seventies and the welfare disability pensions in the eighties.  82 The average pension rose 
from 28 per ~ent of  average gross earnings of  empioyees to 36 per cent in 1990. This rise 
stems  from  the  increase  in  the  average  number  of contribution years  and  the  stead~ 
improvement  of the  rules  governing  both  initial  pension  awards  and  indexation.1  3 
Finally,  there has been a steady relative increase in the numbers  of retirees  entitled to . 
178 
179 
180 
181 
182 
183 
For a description of  the system and its prospects see Franco and Frasca (1992) and Canziani and Demekas 
(1995). 
Istituto Nazionale per Ia Previdenza Sociale - INPS. 
The National Social Security Institute also provides welfare benefits for elderly citizens. Its expenditures are 
covered by social security contributions and by state transfers. 
Seniority pensions enable private sector workers to retire at any age provided they have  paid contributions 
for 35 years. Public sector workers already had special rules ;ulowing them to retire with  20 to 25 years of 
contribution. 
The expansion  of the number  of beneficiaries was  further  spurred  in  the  eighties  by  early  retirement 
programmes for economically ailing firms and industries in which labour demand contracted significantly. 
In the later eighties the rise was accentuated by measures raising old age welfare benefits and the minimum 
social security retirement benefit for  low-income workers, increasmg the minimum level of the pensions 
paid to the self-employed to the level granted to employees and redetermining the level of earlier pension 
awards.  · 79 
. larger pensions (civil servants, for instance) and a reduction in groups with comparatively 
small  benefits  (self-employed  farm  workers  and  the  recipients.  of old  age  welfare 
pensions). 
Demographic prospects are rather worrying because of the present low fertility rates. 
Assuming  constant fertility  rates,  a  further  increase  in . life  expectancy  and  no  net 
migration,  the ratio of population aged 60  and  over relative to population aged  20-59 
would rise from 37 per cent in  1990 to 51  per cent in 2010 and  59  per cent in 2030 
(Table ll.9c, point 16). 
The need to reform the Italian pension system was recognised in the late seventies  .. · In 
1981 it was stressed in a l\1inistry of Treasury Report, which also outlined some reform 
guidelines.  The first long-term forecast of Italian pension expenditure carried out in the 
same years pointed to substantial increases in the ratio of  pension expenditure to GDP. 184 
.Several  new  projections  were  carried  out  in  the  second  half of the  eighties.  The 
·forecasting methodology .was  also  gradually  improved.  However,  for  some time there 
was no agreement on expenditure trends. Franco and Morcaldo (1986) projected a large 
rise in the Employee Pension Fund equilibrium contribution rate, while Alvaro, Ricci and 
Pedulla  _(1987);  National  Soci.al  Securit~  _Insti~te  (19~i)  and  t~e  State  General 
Accounting  Office  (1988)  proJected  a  lumted  mcrease.  Accordmg  to  the  latter 
projections, the pension system was already approaching maturity and the ageing proce·ss 
could be partially offset by  a large increase in female labour force participation. It was 
therefore argued thatthe need for corrective measures was limited. 
Despite the many reform proposals put forward by successive Ministers for Labour and 
Social  Security,  no  major  reform  was  implemented.  Pension  benefits  were  actually 
increased, particularly for self-employed workers (in 1990). 
In the  early  nineties  it  became  gradually  apparent  that  this  optimistic  view  was  not 
consistent with actual expenditure trends. All projections concurred OJ?. the seriousness of 
the situation. Both the National Social Security Institute (1991) and  the State General 
Accounting Office (1991).pointed to alarming trends. 
Later  projections,  carried  out  after  the  1992  pension  reform  presented  even· more 
worrying  pre-reform  expenditure  trends.  According  to  the  National  Social  Security 
Institute  (1993),  the  equilibrium  contribution  rate  of the  Private  Sector· Employees1 
Pension Scheme was projected to rise from 42 per cent in  1992 to 54 per cent in 2010 
(Table II.9a, point 1). The State General Accounting· Office (1994) put the rate at 50 per 
cent  in  2010  and  60  per  cent  in  2025  (Table  II. 9a,  point  2).  According  to  State 
Accounting Office estimates, the equilibrium rate for public sector employees1  schemes 
would have risen from 40 per cent in 1994 to 73  per cent in 201 0. The equilibrium rates· 
for the principal categories of self-employed workers would also have risen significantly, 
because of the demographic trends and  the reforms that went into  effect in  1990.  The 
184  See Morcaldo (1977)and Ministry of  the Treasury (1981). 
185  On this debate see Castellino (1986) and Gr<mchi (1989). 
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National Social Security Institute (1991) estimated that the rate for artisans would rise 
from  11  per  cent  in  1990  to  27  per  cent  in  2010,  and for shopkeepers· and  other 
businessmen from 11 to 22 per cent. 
The  pension  system  was  extensively  reformed  in  1992,  under  the  pressure  of the 
exchange rate crisis  and  the urgent need to curb the deficit.  The main features of the 
reform, which aimed at limiting the public pension expenditure to GDP ratio at its 1992 
level, were the following: 186 
a)  The age of retirement was raised  (over ten years) from  55  to 60  for women and 
from 60 to 65 for men in private employment. 
b)  The reference.period for calculating pensionable earnings was lengthened (ov~r ten 
years)  from  5 to  10  years;  for  younger workers  it was  extended to the whole 
working life; past earnings were to be revalued at a rate equal to the rise in the cost 
of  living plus one percentage point. 
c)  The minimum  number of years of contributions giving  entitlement to an  old-age· 
pension was raised (over ten years) from 15 to 20. 
d)  The reference index for  pension benefits indexation was changed from· wages to 
prices; government was allowed to introduce discretio.nary additional adjustments . 
through the Budget. 
e)  The  minimum  number  .of  years  of contributions.  required  for  public  sector 
employees to be entitled to a  s~niority pension was gradually raised to 35  (i.e.  to 
the requirement already in effect for private sector workers' seniority pensions).  ·. 
In order to restrain public expenditure in the short term, in 1992 and in the two following 
years the adjustment of  pensions to price .dynamics was limited, the disbursement of  new 
seniority  pensions  was  curtailed  and  the  gradual  increase  in  retirement  age  was 
accelerated. 
The  1992  reform  substantially  changed  the  outlook  for  pension  expenditure.  The 
National  Social  Security  Institute  (1993)  projected  a  decline  in  the  equilibrium 
contribution rate for the Private Sector Employees' Pension Scheme (from 42 per cent in 
1992 to 40 per cent in 2010 - Table II. 9a, point 1  ).  The State General Accounting Office 
(1994) expected it to change from 41  per cent in  1995 to 36 per cent in 2010 and 37 in 
2025 (Table II.9a, point 2). According to the latter institution, in spite ofthe reform, the 
equilibrium contribution rate for public  sector employees'  schemes would still increase 
(from 42 per cent in 1994 to 46 per cent in 2010- Table Il.9b, point 5). The equilibri1:1m 
rates for the. principal categories of self-employed workers were expected to more than 
double by the year 2010 (Tables II. 9b, points 6 and 8; II. 9c, point 11 ). 187 The GDP ratio 
186 
187 
The reform is examined in Franco (1993). 
The increase projected by National Social Security Institute (1993) was actually higher than that projected 
in National Social Security Institute (1991) before the reform was implemented.  · 81 
of the total  expenditure of the main  public  pension  schemes  was expected  to  decline 
slightly up to the year 2005 and then to incr~ase.gradually. 188  · 
The National Social Security Institute (1993) and the State General Accounting Office 
(1994)  projected  expenditure  also  on the  assumption  of discretionary  adjustment  of · 
pensions to wage dynamics. It  was considered that expenditure savings produced by the 
shift from wage to price indexation were not certain,  since discretionary adjustments to 
real  wage dynamics  could  be granted through the  yearly  budgets. 189  Assuming  wage 
indexation of pension benefits,  the equilibrium contribution rate for the Private Sector 
Employees' Pension Scheme would rise to 46 per cent by the year 2010 and to 54 per 
cent by the year 2025 (Table II.9a, point 2). 
In 1995  both institutions released more unfavourable projections.  In spite of the  1992 
reform,  according  to  the  National  Social  Security  Institute, 190  the  equilibrium 
contribution rate for the Private Sector Employees' Pension Scheme would remain stable 
at  its  1995  level  (  49  per  cent  - Table  II. 9a,  point  3).  According  to  State  General 
Accounting Office (1995) it would decline from 47 per cent in 1995 to 42 per cent in the 
period 2010.:.2020  and then increase to 46 per cent in 2030 (Table U.9a,  point 4).  The 
equilibrium contribution rates. of  the schemes of  self-employed workers were also revised 
upward (Tables Il.9b, points 7 and 9; II.9c, point 12). 
These expenditure prospects and the high level of  equilibrium contribution rates pointed 
to the need for  a new major reform.191  It was also  recognised  that seniority pensions 
were excessively reducing the effects  of the increase  in .  standard  retirement  age.  The 
reform was introduced in  mid-1995.  It aimed at cutting pension exrenditure over the 
coming  decade,  thereby  contributing  to budgetary  consolidation.19  It  also  aimed  at 
increasing the incentive to supply labour (by linking pensions to individual contributions) 
and changing the distributive effects· of pension expenditure (by removing the relatively 
favourable treatment previously granted to workers with short or dynamic  careers)~ 
The main features of  the reform are the following: 193 
a)  Old-age pension will be related to the contributions paid over the whole working . 
life (capitalised at the rate of growth of GDP) and to retirement age (i.e.,  to life 
'  194  ' 
188 
189 
190 
191 
192 
193 
expectancy).  · .  ·  · 
This profile is obtained  by  summing up  the expenditure to  GDP  ratios  estimated by  the  State General 
Accounting Office for the pensions of public sector employees and by the National Social Security Institute 
for the pensions of  private sector employees and the self-employed. 
See State General Accounting Office (1994, p. 24): 
As reported in Senate ofltaly (1995). 
See Castellino (1995), CER (1994), IRS (1995) and Padoa-Schioppa (1995). 
Most expenditure cuts are achieved through the tightening  of the eligibility conditions for  seniority and 
survivors pensions. 
The ~eform is examined in Bank ofltaly (1995) and IRS (1995). 
.~ . 
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b)  Workers will be allowed to chose their retirement age between 57 and  65. years. 
Pensions will be related to average life expectancy at the age of  retirement. 
c)  Seniority pensions will be gradually abolished. 
d)  The minimum number of  years of contributions required for  an old-age pension is 
reduced  from  17  to  5.  The  supplementation  of old-age  pension  up  to  a  set 
minimum  level  will  be  abolished.  Welfare  pensions  for  elderly  citizens  are  to be 
reformed from 1996 . 
e)  New measures are introduced to provide greater incentives for the development of 
supplementary pension schemes. 
The long-term effects of the reforms have been examined in State General Accounting 
Office  (1995a,  1995b). 195  The  results  depends  on the  assumptions  concerning  GDP 
growth and the adjustments to demographic changes of the coefficient relating pensions 
to capitalised  contributions.  These  adjustments,  which  can  be  implemented  every ten 
years,  are  not  automatic.  Without  adjustments  (and  assuming  2  per  cent  real  GDP 
growth),  the  equilibrium  contribution  rate for  the  Private  Sector Employees' .Pension 
Scheme would decline from 47 per cent in  1995 to 40 per cent in 2010, then rise to 48 
per cent in 2030,  and  decline again afterwards (Table 11.9a,  point 4).  As  compared to 
pre-reform legislation, the rate would be.lowerup to the year 2022,  then it would  be 
higher up to year 2047. The implementation of  the adjustments would substantially affect 
the equilibrium contribution rate after 2020.  The rate would peak at 45  per cel)t  about 
2030  and would  always  be  lower  then  the  pre-reform  rate.  Smaller  (greater)  GDP 
growth rates would increase (reduce) the _equilibrium contribution rate; they would also  · 
increase (reduce) the financial effects of  the reform as against pre-reform legislation. 196  ·. 
The effects of the reform on the equilibrium contribution rate of self-employed workers 
would be much bigger (Tables 11.9b, point 10; 11.9c, point 13).  A substantial part ofthe 
increase in the transfer ratio that would have been determined by the 1990 reform would 
not take place. 
The GDP  ratio  of pensions  paid  to  private  sector  employees  and  to  self-employed 
artisans,  shopkeepers and other businessmen (8.2 per cent in  1995197)  would  decline 
up to the year 2010 (by about 0.5 percentage points). It would then increase to 8.9 per· 
194 
195 
196. 
197 
The  amount  paid to each  pensioner  will  be  calculated  by  multiplying· capitalised  contributions  by  a 
coefficient ranging from 4.7% (for those retiring at 57 years of age) and 6.1  % (for those retiring at 65 
years  of age).  Coefficients can be revised every ten years taking two elements into account:  changes  in 
demographic ·prospects;  a  comparison  of the  rates  of growth  of GDP  and  earnings  assessed  for  social 
security contributions). 
These projections do  not  consider the effects  of some measures that will increase expenditure (e.g., the 
adjustment to  wage dynamics  of a part of each pension from  the year 2009).  No  projection taking  into 
consideration the adjustment of  pension to wage dynamics has been presented.  · 
According to Bank ofitaly (1995), which takes a critical view of  the long tenn financial effects of  the 1995 
refonn, the refonn reduces the ratio of the Private Sector Employees' Pension Scheme expenditure to GDP, 
as against pre-refonn legislation, only if  yearly GDP real growth is not greater than 15 per cent. 
In 1995 these pension schemes represented about 55 per cent of  total public pension expenditure. 83 
cent by the year 2030 in the scenario without adjustment of coefficients and to 8.3 per 
cent  in  the  scenario  with  adjustment  (Table  II.9c,  point  15).198  The  expenditure 
reduction with respect to pre-reform trends would amount to 0.4-0.5 per cent of GDP 
in 2010 and to 0.2-0.8 points in 2030. 
198  Assuming lower GDP  growth (1.5  per cent p.a.), the expenditure to  GDP  ratio would be higher:  in the 
scenario with adjustment of coefficients the ratio would remain stable up to the year 2010 and increase to 
9.0 per cent by the year 2030. 
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1. National Social Security Institute<1>,  1993 
Before 1992 Reform: Dependency Ratio %  86  87  88  90  94 
Transfer Ratio %  49  53  56  58  59 
Equilibriwn Contribution Rate %  42  46  48  50  54 
Pension Expenditure I GDP %  7.7  7.9  8.3  8.6  9.2 
After.1992 Reform<2):  Dependency Ratio%  86  86  82  81  84 
Transfer Ratio %  49  51151  51155  50157  49158 
Equilibriwn Contribution Rate %  42  43144  41/44  39144  40/47 
Pension Expenditure I GDP %  7.7  7.417.5  7.017.5  6.7/7.6  • 6.818.0 
I 
2  ..  State General Accounting Office<3l, 1994 
Before 1992 Reform: Equilibriwn Contribution Rate %  44  44  46  50  55  58  60 
Pension Expenditure I GDP %  7.8  7.8  8.2  8.8  9.4  9.9  10.1 
After 1992 Reform<2):  Equilibriwn Contribution Rate %  41/42  37/40  35/42  36146  37150  38153  37154 
•.  .  Pension Expenditure I GDP %  7.4/7.4  6.7/7.2  6.2/7.4  6.218.0  6.418.6  6.4/9.0  6.3/9.2 
3.  National Social Security Institutet4>,  1995  . 
Before 1995 Reform: Equilibriwn Contribution Rate %  47.2  49.4  48.1  46.9  47.8  48.8  49.1  49.1  48.8 
Pension Expenditure I GDP %  7.8  7.3  7.1  7.3  7.4  7.5  7.5  7.4 
• 
·t State Generid Accounting Office<3>, 1995 
Before 1995 Reform: Dependency Ratio %  94.5  91.3  90.9  91.4  92.5  94.4  100.2  106.2  103.7  94.5 
Transfer Ratio %  50  48.4  47.3  46.2  45.4  44.5  44.1  43.5  40.6  38.4 
Equilibriwn Contribution Rate %  47.3  44.2  43  42.2  42  42  44.1  46.2  42.1  36.3 
Pension Expenditure I GDP %  7.3  6.9  6.7  6.6  6.5  6.5  6.9  7.2  6.6  5.6 
After 1995 Reform, without adjustment of  coefficients<6): 
Dependency Ratio %  94.5  90.2  89.1  88.1  89.9  91.8  98.9  104.3  102.3  91.1 
Transfer Ratio %  50  48  46.9  45.7  45.8  .  45.4  45.6  45.7  42.7  39.5 
Equilibriwn Contribution Rate %  47.3  43.3  41.8  40.3  41.2  41.7  44.4  47.7  43.7  36 
Pension Expenditure I GDP %  7.3  6.7  6.5  6.3  6.4  6.5  6.9  7.4  6.8  5.6 
After 1995 Reforni, with adjustment of  coefficients<6): 
Dependency Ratio %  94.5  90.2  89.1  88.1  89.9  91.8  98.9  104.3  102.3  91.1 
Transfer Ratio %  50  48.  46.9  45.6  45.4  44.5  43.9  42.9  38.8  34.5 
Equilibriwn Contribution Rate o/o  47.3  43.3  . 41.8  40.2  40.9  40.8  42.7  44.7  39.5  31.4 
Pension Expenditure l GDP %  7.3  6.7  6.5  6.2  6.3  6.3  6.6  7  6.1  4.9 
l) INPS (Jstituto Nazionale per la Previdenza Sociale ). Real GDP growth= 2%; real wage growth= 1.5%; employment growth= 0.6%, 0.4o/o. 
2) The 1992 Refonn introduced price-indexation of  pensions. Discretionary adjusbnents to wage dynamics can be implemented with the Budget. Where two data are presented: the left assumes price indexation of  pensions, the right assumes wage indexation. 
3) Ragionerla Generale deJJo Stato. Real GDP growth and real wage growth= 1.8%, 2.6%; employment growth= 0%.  .' 
4)  INPS(lstituto Naziona/e per Ia Prevfdenza Socia/e ). Real GDP growth= 2%, 1.7%, 1.5%; real wage growth= 1.6%, 1.5%; employment growth= 0.4%, 0.2%, 0%. 
5) Ragioneria Generale .dello Stata. Real GDP growth and real wage growth~  2.0%; employment" 0%. 
6) Pensions will be calculated by multiplying capitalized contributions by age..coeficients. Coefficients ean be revised every ten years taldng demographic projections into account.  ~ 
I  .  ~ 
-~ State General Accounting Office(7), 1994 
1992 Reform: Equilibrium Contribution Rate % 
Pension Expenditure I GDP % 
1992 Reform<2J: Equilibrium Contribution Rate% 
Pension Expenditure I GDP % 
National Social Security Institute00, 1993 
1992 Reform(2): Equilibrium Contribution Rate% 
Pension Expenditure I GDP % 
National Social Security Institute<'), 1995 
1995 Reform: Equilibrium Contribution Rate % 
National Social Security Institute<tOl, 1993 
1992 ReformCll; Equilibrium Contributioh Rate % I 
Pension Expenditure I GDP % 
--
9. National SocialS~curity Institute<ll), 1995 
1995 Reform: Equilibrium Contribution Rate%  I 
--
State.General Accounting Office<12>,  1995 
1995 Reform: Dependency Ratio % 
Transfer Ratio % 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate % 
Pension Expenditure I GDP % 
After 1995 Refotm, with adjustment of  coefficients: 
Dependency Ratio % 
Transfer Ratio % 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate % 
Pension Expenditure I GDP % · 
7)  Ragioneria Generale dello Stato. Real wage growth= l.Oo/o. 
131 
0.4 
I 
43 
3.3 
42 
3.3 
I 
151 
131 
0.5 
I 
49.7 
33.7 
16.8 
0.5 
49.5 
33.6 
16.6 
0.5 
8)  INPS (Jstituto Nazionale per Ia Previdenza Sociale). Real income growth= 2%; employment growth= -l.S%. 
181191 
0.610.6 
21 
56.2 
38.5 
21.6 
0.6 
55 
37.3 
20.5 
0.6 
9)  il'-.'PS (lstituto Nazionale per Ia PreVidenza Soctale ). Real income growth= 2%, 1.7%, 1.5%; employment growth= -1.5%. 
iO)  INPS (istituto Nazionale per Ia Previdenza Socia/e ). Real income growth= 2.0%; employment growth= 0%. 
11)  INPS (Jstttuto Naziona'{e per Ia Previdenza Sociale ). Real income growth = 1.9%, 1. 7%, 1.5%; employment growth= 0%. 
• 12)  Ragioneria Generale ~ello Stato. Real incor,11::' growth=,  ~.0%; employment growth= 0%. 
1101125 
0.810.9 
24126 
0.8/0.9 
62.5 
41.2 
25.7 
0.7 
61.7 
39.7 
24.5 
0. 
73.8 
42.4 
31.3 
72.8 
38.8 
28.3 
0.8 
120 
79.6  85.1 
42.2  41.6 
33.6  35.4 
. 78.3  83.8 
36.2  33 
28.3  27.7 
0.8  0.8 
lll,r  ~ 
Tablell9b 
104 
43 
89  93.4  93.6 
40.6  38'.8  37.4 
36.2  36.2  35 
1 
87.6  91.2  91.3 
29.6  23.9  20.6 
26  21.8  18.8 
0.7  0.6  0.5, 
~ 
-~ ... 
ITALY III  '  ., 
' 
~~·~m~m~~ 
11. National Social Security Institute110l, 1993 
1992 Reform<2l: Equilibrium Contribution Rate % I 
Pension Expenditure I GDP % 
12. National Social Security Institute<ll), 1995 
Before 1995 Reform: Equilibrium Contribution Rate% I 
13.  State General Accounting Office111l, 1995 
Before 1995 Reform: Dependency Ratio% 
Transfer Ratio % 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate % 
Pension Expenditure· I GDP % 
After 1995 Reform, with adjustment of  coefficients: 
Dependency Ratio % 
Transfer Ratio % 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate % 
Pension Expenditure I GDP % 
14.  CER<13>,  1995  (All main schemes) 
Before 1992 Reform: Equilibrium Contribution Rate % 
Pension Expenditure I GDP % 
After 1992 Reform<2l: Equilibrium Contribution Rate% 
·Pension Expenditure I GDP % 
15.  State' General Accounting Otlice15l<UJ,  1995 
Employees and Self-Employed Artisans Businessmen) 
Expenditure l GDP %: 
1995 Reform 
After 1995 Refm;m• 
a)  without adjustment of  coefficients 
b)  with adjustment of  coefficients 
GDP and wage growth =  2% 
GDP and wage growth =  1. 5% 
16.  National Statistical Office+ 
Institute for Research on Population<••) 
'aged 60 and over I People between 15 and ~9 
aged 65 and over I Poople between 15 and 64 
13)  Ccntrt~ Europa Rlctm~hfl. 
I 
I 
I 
121 
0.3  I 
I 
131 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
121 
0.4 
I 
50.4 
28.8 
14.5 
0.4 
50.3 
28.8 
14.5 
0.4 
40 
12.7 
39 
12.4 
8.21 
8.21 
8.2, 
8.2 
39.3 
26.6 
171181 
0.5/0.5 
201 
57.2 
33.9 
19.4 
0.5 
56.1 
33 
18.5 
0.5 
45 
13.9 
40142 
12.5/13.2 
8J 
7,81 
7.:1 
14)  ISTAT (lstituto Nazlonale di Stotlstlca) and lRP (lstituto dl Ricerclte sui/a Popolazlone ). Ar. reported in Gesano (1993). 
221241 
0.710.7 
I 
62.4 
37.4 
23.3 
0.6 
61.7 
35.8 
22.1 
0.6 
48 
14.8 
40144 
12.4113.8 
81 
7.81 
7.8, 
8.1 
27/30 
0.810.9 
311 
66.5 
39.2 
26.1 
0.7 
65.6 
36.6 
24 
0.6 
53 
16.0 
42/52 
13.0114.9 
8.11 
7.71. 
7.6, 
8.1 
50.7 
34.3 
' 
'  '  . 
I 
401 
69.9  74 
40.4  41.3 
28.2  30.5 
0.7  0.8 
68.9  72.6 
36.3  34.6 
25  25.1 
. 0.7  0.7 
57 
16.9 
45/  ... 
13.5/15.71  13.8/16.2 
8.11  8.21 
7.91  7.91 
7.8, 
8.3 
7.8, 
8.4 
'  .I • 
I 
79 
41.6 
32.9. 
0.9 
77.3 
32.2 
24.9 
0.7 
8.81 
8.41 
8.11 
8.7 
44 
83.6 
41.5 
34.6 
0.9 
81.9 
29.3 
24 
0.6 
9.11 
8.91 
8.!1 
77.2 
50.1 
Table IT.9c 
88.5  89.7 
40  38.6 
35.4  34.6 
0.9  0.9 
86.3  87.5 
24.2  21.2 
20.9  18.5 
0.5  0.5 
8.51  7.5 
8.11  6.8 
7.~,  5.9 
6.5 
t:: 
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11.10 LUXEMBOURG 
The Luxembourg pension system is based on two main pillars: 199 
a)  The contributory pension system which  covers  all  private sector employees  and 
self-employed workers; it comprises the AVI (Etablissement d'Assurance contre Ia 
Vieillesse et l'Invalidite) covering manual workers, the CPEP (Caisse de Pension 
des Employees Prives) insuring private sector clerical workers and self-employed· 
workers  exercising  an  intellectual  activity,.  the  CPACI  (Caisse  de  Pension  des 
Artisans,  Commerr;ants et lndustriels) covering businessmen and artisans,  and the .  · 
CPA (Caisse de Pension Agricole) insuring farmers. 
b)  The non-contributory pension schemes covering all public sector employees. 
Pensions are granted to all workers aged 65 and over meeting some requirements. There 
are also some non-compulsory schemes: insured workers who have left employment can 
pay contributions in order to increase their contributory record (assurance continuee); 
workers can also buy complementary insurance (assurance comptementaire). In 1986 a 
guaranteed minimum income for all the elderly (over 60) was introduced. 
Pension expenditure represents almost 50 per cent of total social security outlays.  The 
share ofpension expenditure on GDP rose from 7.5 per cent in 1970 to 10.4 per cent 'in 
1994. The increase was due to demographic changes, the maturation of  the schemes, the. 
extensive use of  early-retirement benefits  (especial~ in the iron and steel industry) and toe 
various reforms which raised the level ofbenefits20  .  . 
Over the period 1980-1994, in spite of a 38 per cent increase in the number of  pensions 
paid by the contributory schemes, the ratio of  pensioners to workers decreased from 48.6 
to 4 7. 5 per cent.  In the public sector the ratio of  pensioners to workers decreased from 
61.4 to 55.7 per cent.  The decline  in  the  ratios is due to the substantial increase  in 
employment: 40 per cent in the private sector,  35  per cent in the public sector.201  The 
increase in the activity rate of  women largely contributed to these trends. 
The outlook for the Luxembourg pension system was examined in  1995  by a working 
group including representatives of  several public institutions  .. A Report covering both the 
contributory  and  non-contributory  schemes  was ·published  by the Ministry  of Social 
199 
200 
201 
The evolution and the present structure of the Luxembourg pension system are extensively described in  · 
General Inspectorate for Social Security (1994, 1995). 
According  to  General  Inspectorate  for  Social  Security  (1994),  over  the  period  1985-1994  the  average 
pension increased by 79.4 per cent. One fourth of  the increase ( 19.4 per cent) can be attributed to reforms 
and discretionary adjustments of  pension benefits. 
See General Inspectorate of  Social Security ( 1994 ). 85 
Security. Projections were carried out up to the year 2015 for the private sector schemes 
and up. to the year 2030 for the public sector ones. 
The number of  pensions is projected on.the basis of  the rate of  growth experienced over 
the period  1992-1995.  Up  to  the  year  2015  the  number  of pensions  is  expected  to 
increase at a yearly rate of about 2.3  per cent in the private sector and  1 per cent in the 
public  sector.  Pensions are assumed  to be fully  adjusted to wage  dynamics.  Different 
employment  scenarios  are  considered.  As  to the  private  sector,  the  following  annual · 
growth rates are taken into consideration: 0 , 1,  1.6, 2 per cent. As to the public sector, 
only the 0,  1 and 2 per cent rates are considered .. 
Assuming constant employment, in· the private sector the dependency ratio would rise 
from 48.4 per cent in 1994 to 76.3  per cent in 2015  (Table II.10, point 1).  The transfer 
ratio is  also  expected to increase.  The equilibrium contribution rate,  calculated as the 
ratio of  pension expenditure to total taxable income202, would rise from 22.3 per cent in 
1994 to 36.6 per cent in 2013.  In the  most  favourable  case  (2  per cent  employment 
growth),  the  dependency  ratio  would  reach  51.5  per  cent  in  2015;  the  equilibrium 
contribution rate would reach 25.8 per cent by the year 2013. 
In the public sector, under the constant employment assumption,  the dependency ratio 
would rise from54.1 per cent in 1994 to 65.1  per cent in 2015  and 77.1  in 2030 (Table 
Il.10,  point  2).  The  equilibrium  contribution  rate  (calculated  as  the  ratio  of p"ension 
expenditure to totallabourincome) would rise from 40.6 to 51.3  and  6~.5 per cent. The 
transfer ratio would increase from 75 per cent in 1994 to 78.8 in 2015 and 82.4 in 2030. 
Assuming 2 per cent employment growth, the dependency ratio would decline ·to 44.5 
per cent in 2015 and to 43.8 per cent in 2030.  The equilibrium contribution rate would 
decline to 3  6. 9 and 3  7.1 per cent. 
In order to compare the equilibrium contribution rates in the two sectors, public sector 
pension expenditure must be  divided  by  public  sector wages up  to the private  sector 
ceiling (plafond). In 1994 the public sector contribution rate was 44.3  per cent as against 
23.6 per cent for the private sector.  In spite of the greater increases projected for the 
private  sector  rate,  it  would  remain  below  the  public  sector  one  over  the  whole 
projection period. 
202  Private sector wage income is subjected to social security contributions up to a certain level (plafond). Total 
taxable income represents 91.6 per cent of  total wage income. 
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1.  Ministry of Social Security, 1995 
a) Constant employment scenario 
Dependency Ratio(!) % 
· ·Equilibrium Contribution Rate<2J % 
Transfer Ratio % 
b) Lov.· employment scenario (1% yearly) 
·  Dependency Ratio0l % 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate<2J% 
c) Medimn employment scenario (  1.6% yearly) 
Dependency Ratio<1J % 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate<2l % 
d) High employment scenario (2% yearly) 
Dependency Ratio<lJ % 
Equilibrium.Contribution Rate<2l% 
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2.  Ministry of Social Security, 1995 
a) Constant employment scenario 
Dependency Ratio<3l % 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate (total wagesi4J% 
Transfer Ratio% 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate (total wages up to the 
private sector plafondPl% 
b) Low employment :'!Cenario ( 1% yearly) 
Dependency Ratio<3J % 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate (totalwagesi4J% 
Transfer Ratio% 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate (totalwages up to the 
private sector plafondPJ% 
c) High employment scenario (2% yearly) 
Dependency Ratio<3J % 
Equilibrium ContributionRa:te (total wagesPJ% 
Transfer Ratio % 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate (total wages up to the 
private sector p1afondi5l % 
1)  Number of Pensioners I Number of  Contributors. 
2)  Pension Expenditure I Taxable Income. 
3)  Nwnber of  Pensioners 1  Number of  public employees. 
4)  Pensioo EKpenditure I Wages of  public sector employees. 
21.4 
21.4 
21.4 
21.4 
'>  Pension Exprndilhre I Wagea oftlto public K>ctor omployees up to tho private acgtor plllftmd. 
48.4  54.31 
22.3  25.7 
46.1 
48.4  54.3 
22.3  24.7 
48.4  49.5 
22.3  23.9 
48.4  49.5 
22.3  23.9 
54.1  55 
40.6  41 
75  74.5 
44.3  44.8 
54.1  52 
40.6  39.4 
75  75.8 
44.3  42.9 
54.1  49.1 
40.6  37.8 
75  77 
44.3  41.2 
I  30.21 
'  27.1 
25.3 
24.6 
56.7 
42.4 
74.8 
46.3 
51.1 
39.2 
76.7 
42.7 
46.1 
36.2 
78.5 
39.4 
69.11 
62.6 
54.4 
51.8 
60.1 
45.7 
76 
49.9 
51.6 
40.6 
78.7 
44.2 
44.7 
36 
80.5 
39.1 
'  • 
36.6 
30.6 
27.6 
25.8 
'' 
I 
I 
I 
I 
'  . 
76.3 
62.5 
55.6 
51.5 
65.1 
51.3 
78.8 
56 
53.6 
43.5 
81.2 
47.3 
44.5 
36.9 
82.9 
40.1 
70.1 
57.1 
81.5 
55.8 
46.2 
82.8 
44.6 
37.5 
84.1 
74.2 
61 
82.2 
56.9 
47.4 
83.3 
44 
37.2 
84.5 
Table ll.10 
77.1 
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82.4 
57.8 
48.2 
83.4 
43.8 
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11.11  THE NETHERLANDS 
The Dutch old-age pension system .is  based  on two  pillars:  a public P  AYG universal 
scheme (AOW203)  providing a flat-rate benefit for all  residents and a group of industry 
and company funded schemes, formed by the occupational or supplementary pensions?04 
In both cases retirement age is  65  and  survivors'  benefits  are  also  provided.  In 1987 
pensions paid were respectively 6.3 and 3.9 per cent of  net national income, up .from 4.7 
and 2.2 per cent in 1970 (Huijser, 1990). 
A very peculiar feature of  th~ Dutch pension system is the large expenditure on disability 
benefits. All residents in the Netherlands are covered against disability205  and in the last 
few  decades disability pension expenditure has represented one of the main sources of 
concern and  one  of the  main  focuses  of policy  action.  Between  1970  and  1990  the 
number of  disabled workers quadrupled. In 1990 they corresponded to. 14 per cent of  the 
labour force and expenditure was nearly 5 per cent of  GDP. The relatively large recourse 
to  disability  benefits  depends  on  the  generous  eligibility  conditions,  on  their 
attractiveness as a form  of early retirement,  on their extensive use as  a  substitute for 
unemployment  benefits  to  which  they  may  be.  preferred  both  for  financial·  and 
psychological reasons?06 In the Dutch disability scheme, in comparison with the Belgian 
and the German ones, "the number of  new entrants (as a percentage of  those who work) 
is  twice  as  high,  new  entrants  are  younger,  are  less  lik((ly  to  leave  the  system  and 
psychological diseases are much more frequent". 207  ·  · 
Most  of the  corrective  measures  discussed  or  implemented  in  the  area  of pension 
expenditure  in  last  decade  regards  dis~bility benefits.  From  the  second  half of the 
eighties,  in  order  to  reduce  expenditure;  the  eligibility  requirements  we're  tightened, 
maximum benefits being cut from 80 to 70 per cent of  final wage. In the same period, the 
automatic indexation of all public pensions was also suspended and eventually replaced 
by a new system allowing the government to take account of  special circumstances.  208 
In 1986 the Committee on the Financing of  Pension Schemes209  was appointed with the 
aim of formulating proposals that could reduce the effects  of ageing  on basic pension 
203 
204 
205 
206 
207 
208 
209 
Algemene Ouderdoms Wet-AOW. 
The main features of  the system are outlined in Huijser (1990), Nelissen (1994) and Besseling (1994). For a 
brief  suivey of  its evolution see Verbon (1988) 
See European Commission (1992b) and OECD (199lc). 
See OECD (199lc). 
See European Commission (1992b  ). 
See European Commission (1993a). 
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expenditure.  In its  1987 report the committee projected an increase of the dependency 
ratio from  19.8 per cent in 1985 to 25.8 and 25.3 per cent in the year 2010 respectively 
in the medium and high fertility scenarios  and to 44.4 or 41.4 per cent  in 2030 (Table 
ll.11a, point  l). The increase in the ratio of pension expenditure to assessable income 
was not expected to be  very  alarming:  depending  on the favourable  or unfavourable 
demographic and macroeconomic scenarios, the ratio would have changed from 11.6 per 
cent in 1985 to a range between 9. 7 and  13.1  per cent in 2010 and a range between 12.3 
and 15.3 per cent in  2030. No action was therefore taken.210 
In  1991  the  government  produced  a  Memorandum  on pensions  that focused  on the 
supplementary schemes.  The Memorandum suggested a· shift from final-pay benefits to 
benefits related to the average wage earned during the whole working life.  The latter 
type of benefits would have been less regressive in the redistribution of income. Neither 
employers nor workers' representatives were inclined to accept the proposal.  211 
The matter of  the prospects of  the Dutch pension system was raised again in 1993 by the 
SCientific  Council  of Government Policy  (WRR).Z12 The  WRR  used  two  scenarios 
developed  by  the  Central  Planning  Bureau  (CBP)  and  added  to  each  of them  two 
different sets of  assumptions concerning demographic evolution: "young population11  and 
"old population". In the first set of  assumptions, total fertility rate is 2,  average expected 
life for men.is 74, and immigration is high.  In the second, fertility is 1.6, life  expect~cy  is 
76, and immigration is low. 
The two scenarios were respectively denominated  "Global  Shift"  (GS)  and  "European 
Renaissance" (ER). The first scenario implies an economic stagnation of  the Netlieilands. 
The pension system is left unchanged, and  "by around the year 2005 there is more than 
one benefit claimant per employed  person.  The rising  collective burden reinforces ·the 
lack  of labour  market  stimuli  and  creates  an  inflationary  environment. "213  When the 
situation gets very critical the pension system is  eventually reformed.  The ER scenario 
assumes rapid  economic growth.  It envisages  the implementation of policies  aimed  at 
increasing financial  incentives and  the pressure to accept suitable employment.  Pension 
schemes are rapidly reformed. In the GS  scenario the ratio of total pension expenditure 
to earned income rises from 19 per cent in 1990 to 28-31  per cent in 2010. In the ER in 
the latter year it reaches 25 per cent (Table 11.11a, point 3). 
The  WRR  recommended  the  government  to  announce  reform  measures  to  be 
· implemented from the year 2010 onwards. 
210 
211 
212 
213 
According to Dekkers et al.  (1994, p.  71 ), this optimistic conclusion was based on the "assumption that the 
AOW benefit level was not linked to the wealth-position of the working population. This assumption was 
inconsistent with the then !ltill valid Law on Linkage (Koppelingswet)."  · 
See Dekker et a!.  (1994). 
De Wetenschappelifke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid. 
Besseling (1994, p. 45). 88 
According to Huijser (1990),  the growth of basic pension expenditure. could be rather 
larger.Z14  If pension rules  remain unchanged,  the premium percentage will  have to be 
raised from 11.9 per cent in 1990 to  ~ 4.1  per cent in 201 0 and to nearly 20 per cent in 
2025 (Table 11.11a, point 2). 
Similar outcomes are reached by Dekk:ers et al.  (1994) and by Nelissen (1994), by means 
of the NEDYMAS microsimulation model developed at the University of Tilburg (see 
Box 4).Z15  Starting from a representative sainple of the population, the model creates a 
fictitious  panel  in  which  individual  histories  are  projected.  The  model  provides 
projections concerning the basic and the supplementary pension schemes. In.Dekkers et 
al. -(1994) the contribution rates required· to finance the schemes are projected up to the 
year 2060. Under existing retirement rules, the rate required to finance the basic system 
would reach 14.3  per cent in 2000, 18.4 in 2020, 21.6 in 2040 and 22.8 in 2060 (Table 
11.11a, point 4). The effects of  several policy measures are also considered. 
In spite of  their funded nature, the complementary pension schemes are also likely to be 
negatively influenced by the ageing process. The problems stem from the defined benefit 
nature of the schemes and "from too low contributions in the past compared with the 
current  pension claims".216  Additional  reserves  will  have  to  be  formed  by  raising 
contributions. According to Huijser (1990), the ratio of  the schemes' pension expenditure 
to total wages should remain stable up to the year 2000 and then increase substantially in 
the following decades (Table II.llb). The ratio ofthe premiums paid to the schemes to 
total wages should increase accordingly. Dekk:ers et al.  project a substantial increase of · · 
the contribution rate after the year 2020.  · 
214 
215 
216 
The projections by Huijser are based on a model made up of  five  demographic and economic sub-models. 
Two  scenarios are considered:  a)  a basic  scenario assuming labour productivity groWth = 1.5  per cent, 
inflation= 3 per cent, capital market interest rate= 4 per cent, unemployment rate= 5 per cent.one; b) a 
stationary scenario assuming stable 1?-bour productivity and price  levels  and  interest and  unemployment 
rates as in the basic scenario. Table II.ll reports only the basic scenario.  , 
Starting from a representative sample of  the Dutch population, the model creates a fictitious panel in which 
individual life histories  are simulated.  The  model  considers  320  characteristics  of the  individuals  and 
adjuststhem in every period of  the simulation. See Dekkers et al. (1994) and Nelissen (1994). 
Dekkers et al. (1994), p. 70. 
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1.  Committee on the Financing of Pension 
Schemes, 1987 
Dependency Ratio<2l % 
Medium demographic scenario 
High demographic scenario 
Pension Expenditure I Assessable Income% 
High fertility and high economic growth 
Medium fertility and high economic growth 
High fertility and low economic growth 
Medium fertility and low economic growth 
2.  Huijser13>,  1990 
a)  Pension Expenditure I NNJ<4l % 
b)  Pension Expenditure I Total Wages% 
c)  Benefit Ratio15l% 
d)  Dependency Ratio<6l% 
3.  Scientific Council of Government Policy 
(WRRi7l, 1993 
Old-Age Dependency Ratio<Sl % 
'Young Population' 
·'Old Population' 
Pension Expenditure i Earned Income % 
a)  No adjustment scenario ('Global Sb.ift') 
'Young Population' . 
'Old Population' 
b)  Scenario. with pension reform  ('European 
Renaissance') 
'Young Population' 
'Old Population' 
4.  Dekkers- Nelissen- Verbon, 1994 
Contribution Rate ·o;. 
1)  Algemene Ouderdoms Wet.  This scheme covers aU residents. 
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6.9 
13.1 
14.9 
2)  Number of elderly (65 and ovor) I Population of workina age (between 20 and 64). 
J)  l'toj~ctiOIIlJ accordlnl! to 'BMle Scenario': Inflation rate l%, rate wage inQrea8e 4. S%, capital market lntorest rate 6%, actuarial real r;lle of interest 4°AI. 
4)  Computed from b) a!!Sunllni1; total wages I NNI (National :Net lneorn.e) ratio QOI!Stant at 1990 level. 
~) Average Petillion I Average W4ge.  Cillllpllted lfOii! b) 111d d). 
6) Number of pensions I NOiilber of petSOI!S liable to payment of premium. 
7)  WeterMchappelijke Raad voor het  ~egeringsbeleid, 
S)  Nui11btt ot  people aged 6S and liWI' I Number of  people between  I~ and 64. 
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25.3 
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7.5  8.6  9.5  10.5 
14.1  16.2  18  19.9 
39.9  38.1  37.3 
35.3  47.2  53.4 
20.6 
23 
11  12 
12  13 
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11  12 
15.5  17.1  18.4  19.7 
.•. 
44.4 
41.4 
12.3 
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1.  Huijser<2>,  1990 
a)  Pension Expenditure I Total Wages  I·  I· 
6.41  I 
6.31  6.3,  6.8, 
Premiums I Total Wages  6.8  6.7  6.9  7.6 
2.  Scientific Council of Government 
(WRRi3\  1993 
Old-Age Dependency Ratio<4l % 
'Young Population'  I 
,.  I 
18.71  I  I  I  'Old Population'  18.7 
Premiums I Earned Income% 
a)  No adjustment scenario ('Global Shift') 
'Young Population'  I  I  ~I  ~I  I 
111  I  'Old Population'  11 
) Scenario with pension reform ('European 
Renaissance') 
'Young Population'  I  I  I  :I  I 
101  I  'Old Population'  10 
3.  Dekkers- Nelissen • Verbon, 1994 
Contribution Rate  I  I  I  I  I  12.71  12.41 
1.  Ne1issen, 1994 
Contributions I Tot-al Wages<5l %  17.8  19.1 
I) These schemes cover the vast majority of  private sector employees and the civil servants. 
2)  Projections according to 'Basic Scenario': inflation rate 3%, rate wage increase 4.5%, capital market interest rate 6%, actUarial real rate of interest 4%. 
3) Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid 
4) Number of  people aged 65 and over /Number of  people between 15 and 64. 
5)  Data refer to 5 years brackets (e.g., data reported here for 1995 actually refers to 1995-2000). 
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· 11.12 PORTUGAL 
In the last two decades the Portuguese pension system underwent substantial changes.Z17 
Several important reforms were implemented.  Between 1976 and  1984 many different 
schemes were integrated into three main schemes: 
a) 
b) 
The Social  Security pension scheme  (IGFSS) which comprises  the  contributory 
General Pension Scheme for private employees and self-employed, the Agricultural· 
Special  Scheme  and the non-contributory  scheme which  provides  means-tested 
benefits to all elderly citizens not covered by the contributory schemes. 218 
The public employees scheme.219 
c)  The bank employees scheme. 
Since the mid-1980s, real pension expenditure per beneficiary far outstripped real wage 
increases.  220 According to OECD (1993b) "the sharp increase in spending per beneficiary 
reflects improved generosity (a fourteenth month of  pension payments was added) and a 
structural shift from low pensions in agriculture to higher pensions in. the non-agricultural 
sector. Due to favourable demographic developments and strong revenue growth, it has 
been  possible  so  far  to  finance  the  Social  Security  system  without  an  increase  in 
contribution rates".  Between 1985  and  1991  the ratio of Eension expenditure to GDP 
increased by about 1.5 points, reaching 9 per cent ofGDP.Z1  .  · 
According to Borges and de Lucena (1988), in the late eighties the pension system was·. 
far  from  mature.  The  number  of pensions  was  expected to  rise  because  a  higher 
percentage of  ~itizens wa~  going to be eligible for retirement pensions. New pensioners 
were going to retire with longer contributory records,  thereby  increasing the average 
pension.222 In the absence·of a formal indexation mechanism, however the future level of 
the average pension appeared rather uncertain. 
217 
218 
i19 
220 
221 
222 
For a description of the  ~stem see  Borges  and  de  Lucena  (1988),  Lopes  Ribeiro  Mendez  (1992) and 
Instituto de Seguros de Portugal (1995).  · 
Regime Geral, Regime Especial Agricola and Regime Niio Contributivo. In the general scheme some special 
professional groups of  private employees have  specia~ conditions concerning contribution rates (e. g. football 
players, priests, actors, etc.); these are  often not considered in the projections.  The Agricultural Special 
Schemes was closed in 1986 (no new workers were admitted). 
Caixa Geral de Aposentafoes. Since September 1993, new public employees are covered by the general 
regime. 
Between  1985  and  1991  real  average  old-age  pension  increased  by  about  100  per  cent,  while  real 
compensation per employee increased by less than 20 per cent (see OECD, 1993b, p. 35). 
See OECD (1993b  ). 
See Borges and de Lucena (1988). 
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Borges and de Lucena (1988) projected Portuguese social security expenditure up to the 
year 2050 by integrating a demographic model,  a general equilibrium economic model 
and a financial model of  social security. According to their projections, which are largely 
referred in OECD (1993b  ),  in the present decade the financial  situation of the pension 
system  appears  sustainable.  The  demographic  conditions  would  not  deteriorate  and 
strong real wage growth could lead to fast revenue increases. Long term projections are 
less reassuring: from the year 2000 onwards the pure demographic dependency ratio will 
increase significantly.  The maturation of the pension schemes will also  add to pension . 
expenditure dynamics. Even assuming price-indexation of pension benefits, a substantial 
acceleration in spending growth will occur. 
According  to  the  Borges  and  de  Lucena  baseline  scenario,  the  ratio  of pension 
expenditure to GDP should increase from 6 per cent in 1987 to 7 per cent in 2010, 8 per 
cent in  2020  and  13  per  cent  in  2050  (Table  11.12,  point  I).  Pension  expenditure 
dynamics will be accelerated by  an increase in the ratio of average pension to average 
wage.  The  ratio  of pension  expenditure  to  total  social  security  expenditure  would 
gradu~ly  rise from 60 per cent to 80 per cent. 
Pension expenditure dynamics will also be influenced by the sharp demographic changes 
occurring in the latter decades: the total fertility ratio dropped from 3.1  in  1960 and 2.8 
in  1970  to·2.2 in  1980  and  1.5  in  1990.Z23  Demographic  projections  of the  old-age 
dependency ratio  are  provided by  Lopes Ribeiro  Mendes (1992).  Three scenarios are 
considered: a baseline scenario, a high ageing scenario and a recuperation scenario. The 
dependency ratio is  projected to increase from 20 per cent iri  1990 to· 23.5 per cent in 
2010 and 25-26.5 in 2020 (Table II.12, point 2). The ratio of pensioners to contributors 
is  expected  to  increase  at  a  slightly  reduced  rate;  by  the  year 2020  it  should  range 
between 65 and 67 per cent, as against 53 per cent in 1990. 
New  expenditure  estimates  were  carried  out  in  Portuguese  Federation  of Insurance 
Companies (1994); they were not forecasts,  but theoretical exercises aimed  at showing 
the effects  of social,  demographic  and  economic  changes  on  old-age  pensions.  Two 
fertility· scenarios are considered, both involving a recovery in· total fertility ratio up to 
2010. In the first scenario the total fertility ratio reaches 2.1, in the second it reaches 1.7. 
Accordingly, the old-age dependency ratio is  projected to increase from 23  per cent in 
1990 to 27 per cent in 2010, 35 - 37 per cent in 2030 and 42- 50 per cent in 20sq (Table 
II.l2, point 3).  The ratio of pensioners to workers is· expected to increase from 40 to, 
. respectively,  50,  60  and  80  per  cent.  The  ratio  of pensioners  to  workers  actually 
contributing to finance the pension system is expected to converge gradually to the ratio 
of pensioners  to  workers.  The  maturing  of the  system  would  also  contribute  to 
expenditure dynamics by raising the average pension to average wage ratio (Chait 18). 
The transfer ratio would increase from 27 per cent in 1990 to 52 per cent in 2010 and 65 
per cent in 2030; itwould then decline to 61  per cent by the year2050. The equilibrium 
contribution rate is projected to rise from  13  per cent in 1990, to 27 per cent in 20 I 0, 47 
in 2030 and 49 in 2050. 
223  See European Commission (1994a). 9.1 
In 1993 several reforms were introduced in the Portuguese pensions system:224 
a)  The retirement age was gradually raised for women from  62 to 65  years.  Every 
year the retirement age for  wom~n  is· raised by 6 months. 
b)  The formula for calculating pension· payments was modified: the number of years 
considered in the assessment·ofpensionable earnings was increased.from the best 5 
years out ofthe last 10 to the best 10 years out ofthe last 15; average earnings are 
to be calculated on the basis of 14  salaries rather than 12;  a minimum period of 
contributions of 120 days  per year is to be taken into  consideration; the accrual 
rate per year of  contribution was reduced from 2.2 per cent to 2 per cent; earnings 
serving as the basis for calculation are to be  indexed to  prices  (previously· they 
c) 
were not adjusted).  ·  · 
The public sector employees' special pension benefits were abolished in September 
1993. New public employees will be covered by the general regime.225 
The effects of  these reforms were taken into consideration by the projections carried out 
in  1995  by  the  Centre  for  Financial  Economics  Research226  (a  research  institute 
associated to the Lisbon Technical University).Z27  The projections are based on recent 
official demographic forecasts, on the assumption that the ratio between the number of 
pensioners and the total population of each age and  sex group (i.e., the eligibility ratio) 
remains  constant,  and  on the  assumption that the  benefit  ratio  is  constant  over the 
projection period. 
Demographic changes would raise the ratio ofthenumber of  pensioners to the number of 
workers from 56 per cent in 1995 to 61  per cent in 2010 and 69 per cent in 2020.  The 
equilibrium contribution rate would increase from 25.8 per cent in 1995 to 28.1  per cent 
in 2010 and 3 1.4 per cent in 2020. 
224 
225 
226 
227 
Onthe revenue side, the self-employed contribution rate was raised significantly. 
This scheme was significantly more favourable than the general scheme in terms of  contribution rates and 
benefits; therefore in 1993, it was modified in line with the general scheme.· 
Centro di Investiga9iio sobre Economia Financeira. 
The projections are endorsed by the Ministry of  Finance, which has also financed them. 
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1.  Borges and Lucena<2), 1988 
Old-age Dependency Ratio<3l% 
expenditure I GDP % 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate % 
(for total social security expenditure) 
2.  Lopes Ribeiro Mendes, 1992 
Old-age Dependency Ratio<3J% 
Baseline scenario 
High ageing scenario 
Recuperation scenario 
Dependency Ratio (Pensioners I Contributors)% 
Baseline scenario 
High ageing scenario 
Recuperation scenario 
' 
3.  Portuguese Federation of Insurance Companies(4), 1994 
Old-age Dependency Ratio<5J% 
High fertility (TFR::: 2.1) 
Low fertility (TFR =  1. 7) 
Dependency Ratio (Pensioners I Workersi6l% 
Dependency Ratio (Pensioners I Contributorsi6)% 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate<6J %. 
Pension expenditure in real terms<6) (1990=1 00) 
Implicit Transfer Ratio<'J % 
4. Centre for Financial Economics Research, 1995 
Old-age Dependency Ratio<3J% 
Dependency.Ratio (Pensioners I Contributors) % 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate<8l % 
19.7 
19.7 
19.7 
53.5 
53.5 
53.5 
23 
23 
41 
48 
13 
100  ' 
27 
21.1 
21.1 
21.1 
. 48 
55 
17 
160 
31 
22.5 
22.4 
22.5 
55.7 
55.7 
55.7 
25 
25 
46 
51 
20 
210 
39 
22.7 
56.4 
26.9 
23.5 
23.4 
23.5 
47 
49 
24 
280 
49 
58.3 
26.7 
7 
23.6 
23.7 
23.7 
67 
67.3 
67.1 
27 
27 
51 
52 
27 
320 
52 
24.7 
61.4 
28.1 
.  ' 
' 
24.5 
24.7 
24.4 
54 
55 
32 
360 
58 
25.9 
64.8 
28.7 
,•  ' 
25 
8 
41 
26.1 
67.5 
65.6 
29 
30 
60 
6} 
'  37 
390 
61 
27.5 
31.4 
Table 11.12 
35  41 
37  46 
71  84 
72  85 
47  53 
440  500 
65  62 
1)  Projections 1. and 3. cover the contributory general regime for employed and self-employed workers and the agricultural regime; they  do not cover the special reliime for public employees and bank employees and the non-contributory schemes. 
Projection 2. covers also the non-contributory pension schemes. 
2)  These figures are based on the Baseline Scenario.  As reported in the charts 2, 4 and 5. 
3). :Number of  people aged 65 and over I Number of  people between 15 and 64. 
4)  Associa,ao Portuguesa de Seguradores.  As reported in the charts 4,14 and 16. 
45 
13 
53 
42 
50 
80 
80 
49 
620 
61 
5)  Number of people aged 65 and over I Number of  people between 20 and 64:  ~ 
6)  Based on the 'High Fertility' scenario.  ~ 
7)  Based on the Pensioners { Contributors Ratio and the Equilibrium Contribution Rate.  · 
,8)  Average pension d)'ltamiCS "'wage dynamics.  .  f 92 
II.l3 SPAIN 
The Spanish pension system  comprises. a  general. scheme  which covers employees  in 
industry  and  services  and  several  special  schemes  covering  public  sector  employees, 
some groups of private sector employees  (rural workers,  miners,  fishermen,  etc.)  and 
self-employed  workers.  A  non-contributory  scheme .  introduced  in  1990  provides  a 
uniform pension to poor elderly and disabled residents.  228  · 
During theseventies pension expenditure rose  substantial~ due both to the broadening 
of eligibility  criterit1;  and  the ageing  of the  population?2  Between  1980  and  1985 it 
increased by 6.35 per cent p.a. in real terms; its share on GDP increased from 5.6 to 7.5 
per cent.  This tendency was due to the substantial increase in the number of pensions 
(largely determined by the expansion in the number of invalidity  pensi9ns23<)  and  the 
increase in the average pension (due to the substitution of old pension with new richer. 
ones and to reforms improving some specific benefits).  · 
Some measures aimed at reducing pension expenditure were taken in 1984 and 1985. 
a)  In 1984 the eligibility requirements for invalid~ty.pensions were tightened. 
b)  In 1985 a minimum period of 15  years of contribution was introduced to qualify 
for an old-age pension; the formula for the calculation of pensions was modified: 
pensions were to be calculated· on the basis of earnings over the last the last  10 
years rather than over the last 5.  · 
In  the  following  year~,  under  strong  social  pressures  the  government  significantly 
increased  minimum  pensions.  Lower  pen~ions were also  increased  above .  the inflation 
rate. Between 1988 and  1993, the average pension rose from 82 to 95  per cent of the 
minimum wage.  231  In 1990 a new  non-contributory  pension  system providing welfare 
benefits was introduced.  In 1993  some special schemes were incorporated in the Social 
Security  contributory  pension  schemes.  Over .  the  period  1985-1990  real  pension 
expenditure increased by 5.4 per cent p.a.; the expenditure to GDP ratio remained stable 
at 7.5 per cent. In the following five years real Eension expenditure increased by 5.3  per 
cent p.a.; the GDP rose to 9.1  per cent in 1995.  32  · 
228 
229 
230 
231 
232 
For a description of  the Spanish pension system see Ministry of  Labour and Social SecUrity (1995) and Levy 
(1995b  ). The debate on pension reform is examined in Herce and Perez-Diaz (1995b  ). 
OECD (l988b) reported the ratio of  expenditure to GDP as 3.2 per cent in 1  ?70 and 7.3 per cent in 1980. 
The average yearly increase in the number of all pensions over the period  1980-1985 was4.2 per cent, 
while the  average increment in the number of  invalidity pensions was 7.3 per cent (Ministry of  Labour and 
Social Security, 1995, p. 49). 
See European Commission (l994a). As reported in Ministry of Labour and Social Security (1995, p.  55), in 
the last ten years the average pension increased by about 2.5  ~ercentual points per year in real terms. 
See Ministry of  Labour and Social Security (1995, p.  39). 
.· . .  """ 
93 
Spain, which is presently one of the Europ.ean. countries with the youngest population, 
will  face  a  strong  agein~ process.  According  to the projections  carried  out by  the 
National· Statistical Office  33 (Census of 1991 ), the old-age dependency ratio (population 
aged 65 and over I population aged 20-64) would increase from 23.7 per cent in 1991 to 
25.2 per cent in 1995, 28.4 in 2010 and 32.4 in 2020.234  In recent years this trend has 
determined  some  concern  about  the  long-term  perspectives  of the  Spanish  pension 
system.  Several projections have been carried out by academics and private institutions; 
in 1995 the Ministry forLabour and Social Security produced official for~casts. 
Sanchez  Alvarez  (1992),  235  assuming  a  constant  eligibility  ratio,  estimates  that the 
number of pensioners would increase by· nearly  50  per cent by the year 2020 and by 
nearly 100 per cent by the year 2040. Assuming a GDP growth rate of  2 per cent, he also . 
projects the ratio of  pension expenditure to GDP under different assumptions concerning 
the increase in the average amount of each pension (Table II.13a, point  1  ).  Assuming 
also ·constant employment ratios,  Sanchez Alvarez projects the pensioners .  to workers 
ratio to increase by 40 per cent by the year 2020 and by nearly 120 per cent by the year 
2040. Assutiring a constant transfer ratio, the same trend would apply to the equilibrium 
contribution rate. If  the employment ratio recovered its 1960s level,  in 2020 the ratio of 
pensioners to workers would be slightly below its 1990 level; in 2040 it would be 45 per 
cent  higher.  If the  total  fertility  rate  remained at  its  1990  level  (1.4),  the  ratio  of 
pensioners to workers would rise by 45  per cent in 2020 and by more than 150 per cent 
· in2040. 
According  to  Sanchez  Alvarez,  some  non-demographic  factors  will  also  influence 
pension expenditure  growth.  First  of all,  some  Spanish  pension  schemes ·are  not yet 
totally mature.  New pensioners will  retire with longer contributory periods.  Secondly, 
although pensions are indexed to prices, increases in real terms should not be ruled out. 
The transfer ratio is  th~refore likely to increase, as has been the case in the last decade.  236 
Bengochea  and  Errasti's  proJections  (1994)  are  based  on  slightly  more  favourable 
assumptions on fertility rates.  2  7 Assuming constant eligibility and employment ratios, the 
233 
234 
235 
236 
237 
INE,  Censo tie 1991. 
The total fertility rate is assumed to remain stable at 1.13 over the whole projection period. Life expectancy 
at birth is expected to increaSe from 76.94 years in 1990 to 78.58 in 2005.  · 
According to Sanchez Alvarez, even assuming a recovery in the total fertility ratio from 1.4 to 1.8, the old-
age dependency ratio (computed as population aged 65 and over I population aged 15-64) will increase from 
20,6 per cent in 1990 to 28.6 in 2030 and 46.1 per cent in 2050. A large part of the total increase in the 
ratio will occur in the period 2020-2045, due to the retirement of  the 'baby-boom' generation of the sixties. 
The "baby-boom" took place in Spain some 10-15 years after than in the rest of  Europe. 
In  the years from 1982 to 1990 real pensions increased at a higher rate than real wages. 
In the low fertility scenario, total fertility rate gradually increases from  1.46 in 1995 to 2.08 in 2050: the 
old-age dependency ratio increases from 21  per cent in 1995 to 54 per cent in 2050.  In the high fertility 
scenario total  fertility ratio increases from  1.55  in 1995  to 2.10  in 2020:  the old-age dependency ratio 
increases from 21  per cent to 49 per cent.  These data are not directly comparable with those of Sanchez 
Alvarez as the denominator is different. 94 
dependency ratio, calculated as the ratio of pensioners to workers, will rise from 26 per 
cent in  1995  to 69 per cent in 2040 (Table II.13a, point 2).  Assuming that the transfer 
ratio  is  also  constant,  the ratio  of pension  expenditure  to  total  labour  gross  income 
would increase from  16  to 40  per cent.  Bengochea and  Errasti  also  consider a more 
favourable  economic scenario with  a higher  employment rate and  a higher retirement 
age: the share of  pension expenditure to total labour gross income would then increase at 
a much lower growth, reaching 38 per cent by the year 2040. 
Barea Tejeiro and Fernandez Moreno (1994) provide similar demographic projections.· 
The ratio of real pension expenditure to the number of contributors would increase by 
nearly 30 per cent between 1991  and  2011  and by 50 per cent between 1991  and 2026 . 
(Table II.13a, point 3). 
In 1995 Herce carried out some new projections ofthe socio-economic consequences of 
the ageing  of the population up  to the year 2051.  According to his  medium scenario, 
which considers a gradual increase in the total fertility ratio up to 1. 8 in the year 2026, 
the old-age dependency ratio is expected to rise from 21.2 per cent in  1991  to 34.2 per 
cent in 2026 and 50 per cent by the year 2051 (Table II.13a, point 4). Assuming constant 
real  average  benefits,  the  whole  social  expenditure  for  the  elderly  would  double; 
according to Herce, this increase represents the lower bound of  expenditure growth, ·as it 
is very likely that real per capita benefits will increase.  · 
. Levy (1995b) estimates the long-term financial prospects of  the pension system assuming 
a constant transfer ratio. The ratio of old-.age to working-age population is estimated to · 
rise fr()m 25 per cent in 1995 to more than 60 per cent in 2050. The dependency ratio is· 
projected to double over the same period, increasing from 49 per cent in 1995 to 109 per 
cent in 2050. Assuming price indexation of pensions and a  five year gradual increase in 
the number of  years of contribution required for pension eligibility,  pension expenditure 
would increase from  8.5 ·per cent of GDP in  1995  to 17.6 per cent by the year 2050 
(Table II.13b, point 5)?38 
A parliamentary commission, including representatives of  the four main Spanish political 
parties was set up in  1994 in order to draft a proposal for reforming the social security 
system.  Early  in  1995  a  broad  agreement  on the  reform  was  reached  (the  "Toledo· 
Pact'').Z39  The  draft  proposal  was  later  endorsed  by  all  other  political  parties  in 
Parliament.  The Commission stresses the future viability of the present P  A  YG pension 
system.  Radical  changes  are  considered  unnecessary  and  undesirable.  A  number  of 
reforms  should  adjust  the  current  system  to  new  economic  and  demographic 
circumstances. The Commission proposes the following changes: 
a)  Strengthening  the  distinction  between  the  funding  of insurance  and  welfare 
penswns. 
238 
239 
Levy (1995b) also considers a scenario of gradual increase in the participation rate for most age brackets 
and  higher employment.  In this  scenario  the  dependency  ratio  declines  by  one  seventh.  The  share  of 
pensions to GDP does not exceed 16.5 per cent at the peak of  the 'dependency ratio (around 2040). 
The Facto de Toledo is examined in Ministry for Labour and Social Security (1 995). 
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b)  A gradual integration of  the.special pension regimes into the two main regimes for 
employees and self-employed. 
c)  Strengthening the link between contributions and individual benefits. 
According to the Commission, the indexation of pensions to price increases and the 65 
year standard retirement age should be retained;  social security contributions should be 
lowered;  some welfare benefits should be improved.  The public pension system should 
balance through the economic cycle; a reserve fund should be set up in order to allow for · 
deficits in cyclical downturns. The state and the prospects of the public pension system 
should be assessed in detail every five years. Private pension schemes should supplement 
the public schemes on a voluntary basis. 
In  1995  the  Ministry  for  Labour  and  Social  Security  produced  detailed  projections 
concerning the perspectives of  the Spanish social security system. Pension expenditure is 
forecast up to the year 2030. The projections are based on demographic forecasts carried 
out by the National Statistical Office (see above). 
Different methodologies are utilised for the period 1995-2010 and the period 2010-2030. 
As  to  the  former  period,  the  number  of pensions  is  pr~jected on the  basis  of the 
probability 9f surviving of existing pensioners  and  the flow  of new pensions resulting 
from actual workers. Old-age, invalidy· and  survivors' pensions are projected  sep~~tely. 
In the following  period,  the number  of pensions  is  estimated  by  means of a multiple 
regression. Pensions are expected to increase from 7.0 million in 1995 to 8.4 in 2010 and 
10.6 in 2030. The growth in the number of pensioners will be rather limited in the .Period 
2000-2005 because the new retired will be people born around the years of  the civil war. 
It will accelerate thereafter, when the baby-boom generation reaches retirement age.  . 
The number of  contributors is projected to increase from  12.4 million in 1995 to 14.8 in 
2010 and  17.6 in 2030: this is  due to an increase in the activity rate in  the 20-64 year 
bracket  (from  66  to  70  per  cent  over  the  period  1995-2010)  and  a  decline in the 
unemployment rate (from 22.7 to  15.8 over the same period).240 In spite of the increase 
in the number of  pensions, the dependency ratio is expected to rise moderately from 56.7 
per cent in 1995 to 57.1 in 2010 and to 60.3 in 2030. 
Taking into account the price indexation arrangement,  and considering the 'substitution 
effect'  (ne~ pensions  are  on average  higher  than  the ·pensions  they  replace241),  the 
·average pension is expected to increase by 27 per cent in.realterms up to the year 2010, 
and by 70 per cent by the year 2030.  In spite of that,  as per capita GDP is  assumed to 
increase faster, the transfer ratio (calculated as the average pension on per capita-GDP) 
would  decrease:  from  50  per  cent  in  1995  to  40  per·  cent  in  2020  under  the less 
favourable assumption of  a 2 per cent yearly GDP growth. 
240 
241 
Compared to other European countries, Spain has a very high level of unemployment (24 per cent in 1994) 
and a low participation rate. See Levy (1995b  ). 
See, for instance, the data reported in Ministry ofLabour and Social Security (1995, pp.  135, 152, 157). 96 
As a result, the share of pension expenditure on GDP  would rise from 9.1  per cent in 
1995 to 9.8 per cent in 2010 and to 11.2 per cent in 2030. Assuming a ·real GDP yearly 
growth of2.5 per cent, the increase in the ratio would be extremely limited (9.2 per cent 
in 2010 and 9.5 in 2030).  · 
Ministry  for  Labour  and  Social  Security  (1995)  also  examines  the  effects  of some 
possible reforms. If  pensions were revaluated at a yearly rate one percentual point below 
price dynamics, pension expenditure on GDP would be reduced by 1.3  percentual points 
in  2010  and  3.2 in  2030.  A  2  year  increase  in  retirement  age would  decrease  the 
expenditure to GDP ratio by about half a point by the year 2030. A similar reduction is 
projected for the introduction of  a uniform accrual rate for the calculation of pensions. 
The lengthening  of the period  considered for  determining the  pension is  expected  to 
decrease the expenditure ratio by 0.2 points of GDP.  The reform in the calculation of 
invalidity pensions would decrease it by  0.3  points.  Finally,  the reduction of invalidity 
rate would reduce the share of  pension expenditure on GDP by 0.15 percentual points. 
The Report (p.  13)concludes that a set of measures which would increase contributory 
revenues,  strengthen  the  link  between  contributions  and  benefits  and  separate  the 
financing of  social security and welfare pensions, could ensure the viability ofthe security 
system. 
The prospects of the  Spanish pension  system have been examined  also  in Herce  and 
Perez-Diaz (1995b). Pension expenditure is forecast up to the year 2025; in the baseline 
scenario real GDP and employment'are assumed to grow respectively at 2.5  and  1.0 per 
cent p.a.242 The number of  pensions is expected to increase bl54 per cent, as against a 
3  9  per  cent. increase  in  the  number  of insured ·  workers?4  The  average  pension  is 
projected to increase by 44 per cent in real terms,  as  against a 108 per cent increase in 
per capita GDP.  The increase in  the dependency ratio  is  offset by  the  decline  of the 
transfer ratio. The ratio of pension expenditure to GDP increases from 9.6 per cent in 
1995  to  9.9  per  cent  in  the  year  2000;  thereafter  it  remains  stable.  The  ratio  of 
contributory revenue to GDP is projected to decline from 7.4 per cent in 1995 to 6.4 per 
cent in 2025. This decline determines an increase in the deficit of  pension schemes. Herce· 
and Perez-Diaz stress that the gap between pensions and contributions will increase more 
dramatically after 2025, with the retirement of  the baby-boomers. 
Two alternative employment scenarios are considered.  A  1. 7 per cent yearly growth in 
employment would allow the deficit to remain constant; a 0. 5 per cent yearly nite would 
increase the deficit by  1.2 additional points. Five reform measures are evaluated. Three 
of them  are  similar  to those  considered  in Ministry  for  Labour  and  Social  Security 
(1995):  the  lengthening  of the  period  considered  for  determining  the  pensions,  the 
242 
243 
The projections are based on demographic forecasts canied out in 1994 by the Instituto de Demografia. 
The number of  pensions is projected on the basis of the probability of surviving of existing pensioners and 
the flow of new pensions.  The ratio of new pensions to  population for  each age  class is assumed to be 
constant over time at present levels. 
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· increase  in  standard  retirement  age,  the  cut  of pension  indexation.  The  two  other 
measures involve  a lowering  of the accrual rate  and  an  increase in the  discount rate 
applied to early retirement pensions.· SPAIN  I 
Sanchez Alvarez, 1992 
Dependency Ratio( I) % 
Expenditure in real terms (1990=100) 
Average real pension growth = 0 
Average real pension growth = 1 
Average real pension growth= 2 
Expenditure I GDP<2l (1990=1 00) 
GOP growth = 2%, average real pension growth = 0 
GOP growth = 2%, average real pension growth = 1 
GOP growth = 2%, average real pension growth = 2 
I  Dependency Ratio (Pensioners f Workers) % 
2.  Bengochea and Errasti, 1994 
Old-age Dependency Ratio(3l% 
Low fertility 
High fertility 
I  Dependency Ratio (Pensioners I Workers )'4l % 
Expenditure I Total labour gross income<5l% 
Barea Tejeiro and Fernandez Moreno<6l, 1994 
Old-age Dependency Ratio<7l % 
Real Pension Expenditure I Contributors<SJ ( 1991 =  1  00) 
Herce, 1995 
tvtd-Age Dependency Ratio<9l% 
Dependency Ratio (Pensioners I Contributors po)% 
Social Ex'Penditure for the elderly (1991=100)( 11) 
20.6  24.6 
100  112  122 
'!00  135 
100  149 
100  100 
100  Ill 
100  122 
. 100  107  113 
211  24 
21  24 
31 
. 19 
20.6 
100 
21.2  23  25.2 
491  50  60 
100  125 
1)  Number of People !!Sea 65 and over I Number of people between 16 and 64. These figures are based on the medium fertility scenario. 
:'.)  Assuming constant eligibility and employment ratios and a 1.8 total fertility ratio. 
3)  Number of people aged 65 and over I Number of people between 20 and 64. 
4)  A'suming constant activity and employment ratios.  Data attributed to  1995 actually refer to 1993. 
5)  Assuming a constant average pension to labour income ratio.  See esquema 5, p.  164. 
6)  Data attributed to the years 2010 and 2025 actually refer to the years 2011  and 2026. 
1)  Number of people aged 65 and over /Number of people between 14 and64. 
8)  Computed assuming pension expenditure per member of each age bracket constant at 1991  level. 
128 
118 
26'.11 
26.2 
134 
164 
199 
90 
110 
134 
124 
26 
26 
34 
21 
·27 
129 
.  27.41 
70 
135 
141 
132 
.29.21 
28.6 
148 
200 
268 
82 
110 
148 
141 
29 
29 
38 
24 
311 
81 
1511 
35.7 
160  174 
259 
385 
79 
117 
174 
155  174 
39 
37 
51 
32 
33.4 
150 
34.21  381 
I  1751 
9)  Number of people aged 65 and over I Number of people between 16 and 64. These figures are based on the medium fertility scenario of the InStitute de Demogmfia, with a gradual increase of TFR up to 1.8 in the year 2026. 
Data attributed to the years 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2020, 2025, 2030,2035,  2040, 2045, 2050 actually refer to the years 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016, 2021; 2026,2031, 2036, 2041, 2046, 2051.  · 
10)  Data attributed to the years 2000, 2010, 2020 actually refer to the years 2002, 2012, 2022. 
11)  Data attributed to the years 2000, 2010, 2020, 2030, 2040, 2050 actually refer to the years 2001, 4011, 2021, 2031, 2041, 2051. 
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188  198 
326 
533  . 
74 
121 
198 
196  217 
591 
46 
69 
40 
421  481 
I  2011 
Table U.13a 
202 
349 
599 
68 
117 
202 
I 
I 
521 
I 
221 
54 
49 
50 
196 
~ 
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~ SPAIN  II 
Levy, 1995 
Baseline Scenario 
Dependency Ratio0l % 
Pension Expenditure I GDP(2) 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate growth 
b) Higher employment and participation rate 
Dependency Ratio0l % 
Pension Expenditure I GDP(2) 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate growth 
Partial prefunded pension system 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate growth 
of Labour and Social Securlty(3>, 1995 
Age Dependency Ratio<4J % 
of Pensions (1995=100) 
of Contributors (  1995= 1  00) 
Dependency Ratio(s) % 
Average yearly Pension (1995=100) 
Per Capita GDP (1995=100) 
Low growth scenario(3J 
High growth scenario(3) 
Average Pension I Per Capita GD¥6!% 
Low grov.1h scenario<3l 
High growth scenario<3l 
Expenditure yeady growth % 
effects of  -increase in number of  pensions 
-indexation 
-other factors 
Pension Expenditure I GDP % 
Low grov.1h scenario<3J  · 
High growth scenario(3) 
I  ""nsitivity Analysis - Effects on Expend. I oop<7J %: 
Price indexation + I% per year 
Price indexation - 1% per year 
Higher retirement age (  + 2 years) 
d) Lower invalidity rate 
e) Uniform accrual rate 
f)  Longer reference contribution period 
g) Invalidity pensions related to contributory record 
1)  Ratio of  pensionen to worken. 
49.4 
47.3 
'12.3 
2.8 
7.1 
2 
7.5 
7.5 
23. 
50.2 
~) Growth "f  the average contribution rate to fmance pension• B!•uming year 1995 a.• ba~  yoor. 
53 
8.8 
100 
51 
8.3 
100 
100 
27.1 
57.3 
100  116 
50.5  48.1  . 
50.5  47.4 
10.5  6.8 
2.3  1.9 
9.1  9.3 
9.1  9.2 
61 
9.8 
120 
57 
9.1 
110 
110 
27.4  28.4  30.3 
119  126 
119  124 
57.1  58 
127  136 
141  159 
132  151  174 
46.9  45.1  42.9 
45.1  42.3  39.3 
.  5.8  5.8  5.9 
1.1  1.2 
3  3 
i.7  1.6  i.6 
9.6  9.8  .10.1 
9.2  9.2  9.3 
+1,6 
-1.3 
-0.181  -0.27  -0.4 
-0.08 
-0.33  -0.43 
-0.09  -0.12 
-0.16  -0.21 
181 
203 
40.5 
36.2 
141 
135 
59.4 
157 
5.9 
1.1 
3 
1.7 
.10.7  . 
9.3 
.  , 
1501 
150 
141 
60.3 
6.1 
1.2 
3 
1.8 
11.2 
9.5 
+4,4 
.-3.2 
-0.54 
-0.15 
-0.58 
-0.1 
-0.28 
<  • 
I 
3)  Real ODP growth= 3.7% in 1996, 4.0% in 1997 and 2.0% (low growth ocenarill) or 2.5% (high growth scenario) yearly from the year 1998 onwards. Employment growth~· 2.4% in \996,2.9% in 1997, 2.0% in 1998 and 0.9% yearly frotn 1999 onwards. 
4) Number of  People aged 65 and over I Number of  People aged between 20 and 64. 
5)  NUtnber of Pen~  ian• I Number of  Contributon. TI1e number of contributors ha~ been calculated ll'otn the table• pp. 90 md 1  02. 
II)  Average  pen;~  ion.~ Toil! I l'e11'!ion Expehditur~  I Tatlll Number of  Pensions. Per capita GOP~  ODP (a• indicated ih the Report) 1  Pdpulation (a•. indicat~d in BIJROSTAT, 1995). 
7)  Low growth scenario.  '  . 
Table II.13b 
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18.6 
220 
100 
16.5 
190 
150 
109 
17.6·· 
210 
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? SPAIN  III 
. Herce and Pirez-Diaz, 1995 
Old-Age Dependency Ratio<t) % 
Number of  Pensions (1995='100) 
Number of  Contributors (1995=100) 
Dependency Ratio<2l % 
Average yearly Pension (1995=100) 
Per Capita GDP (1995=100) 
Average Pension I Per Capita GDp(3l% 
Expenditure I GDP % 
lrontrihn1ion• to Pension Schemes I GDP % 
of  different em pl. scenarios on Exp. I GDP %: 
Employment growth = 1. 7 % p.a. 
Employment growth= 0.5 % p.a. 
of  reforms on Expenditure I GDP %: 
a) Lower accmal rates<4l 
b) Longer reference contribution period<5l 
c) Higher retirement age (  + 3 years) 
Higher discount rate for early retirement pensions<6l 
Price indexation - 0.5% per year 
1)  Nwnber of  People aged 65 and over I Number of  People aged between 15 and 64. See Table 2.1. 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Ol 
0  -0.29 
0  +0.21 
0  -0.23  -0.29  -0.31  -0.36 
0  -0.1  -0.21  -0.3  -0.39 
0  -0.25  -0.46  -0.58  -0.69 
-0.06  -0.09  -0.12  -0.15 
-0.241  -0.51  -0.8  -1.11  -1.42 
2)  Nwnber of  Pensions I Number of  Contributors. As calculated from Table 2. 3. 
3)  Average pension~  Total Pension Expenditure I Total Number ofPeru~ions. (See Tables 2.3 and 2.4). Per capita GDP ~  GDP (as calculated from Table 2.4) I Population (as indicated in Table 2.1). 
From the year 2005 real GDP is assumed to grow at a yearly mte of2.5% (with employment and productivity respectively growing at I% p.a. and 1.5% p.a.). 
4)  From (4%*15 yeat1!+2%*20 years)~ 100% to (3.3%*15 years+l.6%*25 years)~ 90%. 
5) From last 8 years to last 15 years in 2001  and last 25 years in 2010. 
6)  From 8% to I 0% per year. 
-0.4 
-0.46 
-0.77 
-0.16 
~1.74 
\ . 
Table ll.13c 
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ll.14 SWEDEN 
The  Swedish  pension  system  has  two  main  components:  the  national  basic  pension 
sche~e, providing  a  univers~l  . flat-rate  p~nsion,  and  th~  co~ulsory .  Supplement~ 
pens10n schemes (ATP), prov1dmg an earmng-related pens10n.  Both schemes provide 
old-age,  disability,  and  survivors'  pensions.  Pension  credits  earned  and  pensions  are 
expressed in terms of "base amounts" which are increased in line with inflation.245  The 
standard retirement age is 65. 
In 1990 the ratio of public expenditure for old-age. and  survivors to GDP was 11.9 per 
cent, compared with a EC average of9.2 per cent and an average of7.5 per cent for the 
non-EC OECD countries.246 The relatively high level of expenditure was related to the 
age  structure  of the  Swedish  population:  in  1990  17.8  per  cent  was  65  or  older 
compared to an  OECD  average of 13.5  per cent.247  The share of old  people on total 
population was stable during the eighties and is expected to rise only after the year 2010, 
when the generation born in the forties will retire. 
During the eighties a growing awareness of  the need to adapt the pension system to new 
demographic and economic conditions led to the setting up of a public commission on 
pensions. The work of  the commission resulted in the reform of  survivors' pensions: from 
1990 ATP widows'.pensions have been gradually phased out; they have been replaced by 
an "adjustment pension" paid for a year after the death of  the partner. 
In 1990 the Ministry of  Finance carried out some pension expenditure projections on the 
basis of three different scenarios (Table II.14,  point 1)?48  Within the "basic  scenario", 
where a 2 per cent yearly growth in productivity and real wages is assumed, the share of 
pension expenditure to GDP falls from the initial  11  per cent in  1990 to  10 per cent in 
2000  and  1  0. 9  in  2025.  Considering  the  new  measures  and  the  same  economic 
assumptions ("main scenario"), the situation is a little bit worse. The most worrying case 
would  be  that  of a  "low  growth  scenario"  (with  a  1  per  cent  yearly  growth  in 
productivity and real wages), where.the share would remain constant until2000 and then 
rise to 14.9 per cent by the year 2025. 
Two years later the Ministry ofFinance updated its projections in the new Medium-Term 
Survey of the Swedish Economy. It estimated that total old-age pension expenditure in 
244 
245 
246 
247 
248 
For a description of the Swedish pension system see OECD  (199lb) and Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs (1994  ). 
In 1994 the "base amount" was SEK 3-5,200 (per cent of Swedish per capita GDP). 
See OECD (1994a  ). The data concerning the two groups of  countries are not fully comparable. 
See OECD (1994b  ). 
See OECD (199lb). 
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. real terms would increase by 25  per cent in the period 1990-2005 and by  112 per cent 
over the period up to 2025.  Up to the year 2005 the increase in ·expenditure would be 
mostly due to rising average real benefits; thereafter the number of pensioners was also 
expected to rise considerably. 
The need for reform stems from financial, distributive and efficiency reasons: 
a)  The maturing of ATP  schemes is reducing the financial  soundness of the system. 
In the past few  years this tendency has  been  conipound~d by  the effects of low 
economic  growth  on contributions.  249  Despite  several  increases  in  contribution 
rates,  between 1983  and  1992 the ratio  of ATP's  assets to pension expenditure 
. 250 
gradually declined from 6.8 to 5.1. 
· b)  The relation between contributions and expected pension is "vague and· unclear". It 
raises problems of horizontal equity,  as  people having paid similar contributions 
during their working lives  can receive very different  amounts  of pension.  As to 
vertical equity, while the basic pension scheme is progressive in terms of life-time 
income, the supplementary pension is regressive.Z5  · 
c)  The weak link between contributions and benefits may also  have negative effects 
on labour supply, since "the present pension contributions are ... to be regarded as 
a t~  to a large degree".  252  .  · 
A special working group on pensions was set up in  1991  with the ·aim. of outlining. a 
radical reform ofthe pension system. The proposals of  the working group were endorsed 
by the Riksdag in June  1994.  The reform will come into effect in stages, starting from · 
·January 1 1997. It aims at making the system more able to tolerate demographic changes. 
and  fluctuations  in  economic growth,  more transparent in. its  distributive  effects,  less 
distortive in its effects on individuals' choices. 
The guidelines of  the reform are the following: 
a)  The present two-tier old-age system is to be gradually replaced by a single system 
providing two joint benefits:  a PAYG pension and a funded r:ension,  respectively 
financed by a 16.5 and a 2 per cent contributions on earnings.2  3 
b)  Both benefits will be strictly related to the individual's lifetime contributions to the 
pension ·system.  Contributions for the P  A  YG benefits will be updated  each year 
249 
250 
251 
252 
253 
According to Ministry of  Health and Social Affairs (1994, p. 31 ), "In the recent years, the share of  aggregate 
wages accounted  for  by  pensions has  dramatically  increased from  24.5  to.  30  per cent.  Unemployment 
accounts for a large part of  this increase." 
See National Social Insurance Board (1994  ). 
See OECD (1994b  ). 
Ministry of  Health and Social Affairs (1994, p. 12). 
A more radical shift towards funding was discarded mainly because it would have forced one generation to 
pay twice over (see Konberg 1994  ).  · 100 
with a wage index; contributions for the funded pension will be invested into a fund 
chosen by the individual. 
c)  There is  no general retirement age.  Individuals will be allowed to retire from 61 
years of  age onwards. The pension will be based on actuarial principles. 
d)  Two built-in mechanisms will. adjust pension expenditure to changes in expected 
life  (through  the  formula  determining  the  amount  to  be  paid  to  each  new 
pensioner) and to the economic cycle (through the indexation of pensions). As to 
the latter  aspect,  the present  price  index  will  be  substituted  with the  so-.called 
"economic adjustment index".  Pensions will  be adjusted to price changes with a 
reduction or an addition of a number of percentage units related to the difference 
between the actual growth of  real wages and a certain norm value. 
e)  A minimum pension will be guaranteed. 
The  effects  of the  reform  on ·swedish pension  expenditure  have  been  examined  in 
Swedish Parliament (1994). Before the reform, the ratio of old-age pension expenditure 
to taxable income (presently  19.8  per cent) was expected to remain  ~table up to 2005 
and then to rise gradually for the follow_ing  20  years (Table 11.14,  point 3) reaching a 
peak  at  about  24.5  per cent.  The  reform  measures  conct;?rning  pension  benefits  are 
expected to redu~e th.e ratio by aboutJ5point in  th~ year 2015, by 2.5. poi.nt in the .Year 
2025 and by 3 pomts m the year 2050.  About one fifth of  the reductiOn m the ratiO of 
pension expenditure to taxable !nco  me can be attributed to the change in indexation. The 
reform is also expected to increase the amount of  taxable income: this should reduce the 
ratio of  old-age expenditure to taxable income by about 3. percentage points. 
In the main macroeconomic scenario  considered in Swedish Parliament (1994),  taking 
the  effects  on  taxable· income  into  account,  after  the  reform  the  ratio  of old-age 
expenditure to taxable income should increase from  17 per cent in 1995 to ·  19.7 in 2015 
and then decline to 16.7 in 2050. In the Low Growth and the High Growth scenarios, in 
20 15 the ratio would respectively reach 20.3 and 17.7 percentage points). 
In November 1994 a package of new consolidation measures was taken by the incoming 
Government.  It was  supplemented  by  further  measures  in  the  Draft  Budget  Bill  for 
1995/96. Limits are envisaged for early retirement pensions and pension indexation will 
be restricted.  As reported in  OECD  (1995e), these measures would  reduce  Swedish 
public spendings by 16.5 billion 1994 SKr. 
254  In  Table  ll.14,  point  3,  compare  the  line  "Before  the  Reform"  with  the  line  "After  the reform  (with 
unreformed Taxable Income and economic adjustment index)". In order to outline the effects of  the changes 
in the indexation mechanism,  compare the latter line with ·the  line  "After the reform  (with unreformed 
Taxable Income and price indexation)". 
... SWEDEN 
1.  Ministry of Finance(l>, 1990 
Pension Expenditure I GDP % 
' ~  .  ,  . 
Basic Scenario (Expenditure trend, no new measuresP) 
Main Scenario ("most likely" scenario  pl. 
Low Growth ScenarioC4l 
2.  Ministry of FinancecS>, 1992 
,old-Age Dependency Ratioc6>  % 
Old-Age Pension Expenditure in real terms (1990=100) 
Percentage of  real pension expenditure growth in the 
lnrevious 5 years due to: 
Change in the number of  pensioners 
Change in the averag~ pension in real terms 
3.  Swedish ParliamentC7l, 1994 
Old-age Pension Expenditure I Taxable fucome % 
Before the Reform<8l 
After the Reform<8) (with unreformed Taxable fucome and 
price indexation) 
After the reformC8l  (with unreformed Taxable fucome and· 
"economic adjustment index") 
After the Reform(&) (with new Taxable income and "econ. 
adj ind")  Main Scenario<&) 
Low Growth ScenarioC9l 
High Growth Scenario(lo) 
Total Public Pension Expenditure I Taxable fucome 
After the Reform<&) (with unreformed Taxable fucome) 
After the Reform(S) (with new Taxable fucome) 
4.  Eurostat, 1995 
Old-Age Dependency RatioC6l % 
11 
11 
11 
31 
109 
15 
85 
19.8 
19.8 
27 
1)  It includes the National Basic Pension Scheme and the National Supplementary Scheme for employees .. 
2)  "The Medium-Tet111 Survey of  the Swedish Economy".  As quoted in OECD (1991). 
3)  2% yearly growth in productivity and real wages.  · 
4)  1% yearly growth in productivity and real wages. 
5)  ''The Medium-Tet111 Survey of  the Swedish Economy". 
6)  Number of people aged over 64 years/ Number of  people between 14 and 64. 
7)  ''Pension Refonn". 
!l)  1  .S% yearly growth in prodlliltivity and real wages. 
9)  1% yearly growth in pi'Oifuctivity and real wages. 
10)  3% yearly growth in prOductivity and real wa~•· 
I 
10.1 
11.1 
115 
-27 
127 
20.6 
29.5 
125 
11 
89 
17.9 
15.9 
29 
25.1 
26.5 
151 
48 
52 
21 
21 
28 
178 
56 
23.8 
23.1 
22. 
25 
31 
36.1 
1 
22.9 
22.6 
19.4 
20 
17.5 
29 
24.7 
33 
. 
• .. 
11.3 
14.9 
212 
32 
68 
24.5 
22.4 
22.1 
19 
19.4 
17.2 
30.8 
23.8 
'  .  . 
Table ll.14 
24.6 
21.9 
21.8 
18.7 
19.4 
17.6 
30.1 
22.9 
22.3 
19. 
19.1 
16.4 
17 
15.7 
27.7 
20.7 
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· D.15 UNITED KINGDOM 
The British old-age pension system is based on two main tiers:255 
a)  A contributory tier which, when a certain number of contributions have been paid, 
provides  a  basic  flat  rate  pension  and  an  additional  earnings-related  pension 
(SERPS)256  to  men over 65  and  women  over 60  who  have  retired  or can be 
considered as having retired from work. 
b)  A non-contributory tier, providing· a retirement pension for people aged 80 or over 
who do not receive a National Insurance retirement pension or whose pension is 
less  than  a  prescribed  amount,  and  an  income-related  Supplementary  Pension 
payable to people over pensionable age.  · 
Furthermore, there are several occupational pension schemes set up by employers: they 
are  operated  separately under  trust  law.  The  Goveriunent  imposes  certain  rules  and 
requirements on such schemes,  particularly  on those under which  employees ·may  be 
contracted out of  the earnings-related pension scheme. 
According to Secretary of State for  Social Security (1985), the main cause of pension 
expenditure growth in the United Kingdom has  been the increase in the real value of 
benefits:  "since 1949 the basic National Insurance pension has increased to two  and ·a 
·  half times its original value in real terms and, although ~he period of  greatest growth was  . 
during the 1960s, real groWth has  continued,  the basic pension increasing from 20 per .  · 
cent of  average take-home pay after the war to 33 per cent (single person) or 50 per cent 
(married couple) in 1985. In the overall position (considering all the pensioner's jncome) 
pensioners have, on average, 70 per cent of  the total personal· disposable income of  non-
pensioners, compared with only 40 per cent in 1951."257 Higher spending on pensions is 
also due to the large increase in the numbers of  retirement rensions (they have more than 
doubled from 4.1  million in 1949 to 9.3 million in 1984)?5  · 
In 1993 'total social expenditure for old-age, survivors and disability benefits represented 
14.2 per cent of GDP (Eurostat,  1995- see Annex A),  as against 10.7 per cent in 1980_ 
and 11.9in 1985. 
In  1984259  the  Government  Actuary's  Department  projected  an  increase  in  the 
dependency ratio from 44 per cent in 1984 to 45  per cent in 2005 and to 56 .per cent in 
255 
256 
257 
258 
259 
The main features of the UK pension system are examined in Department of Social Security (1993), in 
OECD (1994g) and in Dilnot et al. (1994). 
Under certain conditions insured individuals can contract out of SERPS. 
Secretary of  State for Social Security (1985a, p.3). 
Secretary of  State for Social Security (1985b, p.28). 
The Beveridge Report in 1942 presented long-term (30 years) estimates of social ex{>enditure in the UK. A 
comparison of  these estimates and the actual outcomes is carried out in Dilnot et a!.  ( 1984  ). 
.  .  . .. 
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2025  (Table 11.15a,  point  1).260  Under the assumption of wage indexation of flat-rate 
pensions, the benefit ratio was also projected to increase due to the maturing of SERPS. 
This would involve a rise of  the equilibrium contribution rate concerning benefits payable 
to people over minimum pensionable age261  from 12.5 per cent in 1984 to 14.3  per cent 
in 2005 and to 19.9 per cent in 2025. Under the assumption of price indexation offlat-
rate pensions, the benefit ratio was projected to decline.  In this case the effects of the 
maturing ofSERPS were offset by the continuos decline in the value of  basic pensions as 
against· average wage. The equilibrium contribution rate would decline to 11.9 per cent. 
in 2005 and then reach 14.7 per cent in 2025. 
New projections were carried out by  the Government Actuary in  1986 (Table II.15a, 
point  2):  The  estimates  concerning  the ECR were not directly  comparable  with the 
previous ones, because they also took  the benefits to those under pensionable age into 
account. Under the assumption of  price indexation of  basic pensions, the ECR (14.5 per 
cent in 1993) was expected to decline to 14.3 per cent by the year 2003, and then to rise 
to  15.4  by  the year 2013  and  to  18.5  by the year  2033.  Thereafter the ECR would 
decline to 15.0 per cent by the year 2053. Under the assumption of  wage indexation, the 
ECR was projected to rise continuously up to the year 2033, reaching 27.3  percentage 
points. 
The  1986  ·Social  Security  Bill  introduced  several  measures  aimed  at  avoiding  the 
increases in contribution rates which might otherwise have become necessary, everr with 
price indexation ofbenefits. The main changes were the following: 
a)  The ultimate target for additional pension was reduced from 25 per cent to 20 per 
cent  of relevant  earnings,  the  reduction  being  phased  in from  the  yeai  2000 
onwards. 
b)  Instead of being based on the average of the best 20 years revalued earnings, the 
additional·pension is to be based on revalued earnings averaged over working life. 
c)  From April2000, additional pensions paid to widows or widowers will be one half 
instead of  the whole of  the pension which would have beep payable to the deceased 
contributor. 
d)  Arrangements for contracting out of  SERP S were. also extended. 
The  reform  was  expected  to  substantially  reduce  the  projected  values  of the  ECR 
According to the Government Actuary's 1986 projections (Table 11.15a, point 2), under 
·the assumption of price  indexation of flat-rate  pensions,  the  contribution rate would 
decline from 14.6 per cent in 1993 to 14.3 per cent in 2013; it would reach 14.5 in 2033 
and thereafter decline to  10.8  in  2053.  Under the assumption of wage indexation, the 
260 
261 
These  estimates  were  carried  out  under  the  assumptions  of an  annual  increase  in  real  earnings  of 
approximately 1.5 per cent, and a rate of  unemployment of  6 per cent. Population projections were based on 
1981 data.  .  . 
The equilibrium contribution rate for  benefits paid to pensioners over pensionable age was estimated in 
12.5 per cent. The gap between this rate and the actual (Class I) standard contribution rate of 17.65 per cent 
was largely due to the benefit paid to pensioners below pensionable age. 103 
reform was expected to  reduce the ECR by 4  percentage points  from  the  year  2030 
onwards. 
In 1990 the Government Actuary carried out some new projections to establish the rates 
of  contribution likely to be required up to the year 2050 to meet the cost of  the benefits 
provided for under the National Insurance Scheme. The population over pensionable age 
was expected to remain broadly  constant  over the  period  up to 2000~ thereafter,  the 
number of the elderly was expected  to increase gradually up  to 40  per cent in  2030 
(Table II.15a, point 3).  The working age population was expected to remain relatively 
stable?62 As a result a significant deterioration in the dependency ratio was projected. 
Over the period 1990-2000, the ratio of  the numbe; of  basic retirement pensi~ners to the 
number ofcontributors was expected to decrease from 48  to 47  p~r cent.  Thereafter it 
would gradually increase, reaching 64  per cent by  the year 2030.  Pension  e~enditure 
would also be boosted by the gradual build-up of earnings-related pensions? 3  On the 
basis of pension upratings in line with prices, ·the increasing cost of the earnings-related 
pensions would be  offset by  the gradual decline in the flat-rate  pension in relation to 
earnings.  The total  proportion of basic  and  additional  pensions  at  award  to  average 
earnings was expected to decline from 1995 onwards, reaching 30 per cent for men and 
35 for women in 2010 and  respectively  19  and  26  per cent in 2050.  The  equilibrium 
contribution rate would be rather stable up to 2030 and would decline afterwards. 
With pensions indexed to earnings,  there would be no  offset to the factors leading to 
higher contribution rates (the proportion of the total pension to pre-retirement earnings  · · 
would  in  this  case  increase  for  l:Soth  men  and  women)  and  the  required  rates  of 
contribution would rise steadily from 19 per cent in 1990 to over 21  per cent by the year 
2010 and26 per cent by the year 2030. 
New  long-term  projections  of pension  expenditure  were  presented  in  Government 
Actuary (1994 and 1995).264 The latter document is the Third Quinquennial Review265 of 
the long-term prospects of  the British pension system. The documents point to two main 
factors  liable  to  produce  a  significant  increase  in  the  contribution  rates  required  to 
262 
263 
264 
265 
This projection is based on the assumption that the total fertility rate reaches 2.0 in the long-term. 
Earnings are assumed to grow at a rate 1. 5 per cent higher than prices. Unemployment is assumed stable at 
a rate of  5 per cent. 
The Reports by the Government Actuary stresses the unavoidable uncertainty of long term projections. The 
main points of  uncertainty are the following:  fertility and mortality rates, unemployment rates, the rate of 
growth in real earnings, the number of  workers contracting out of SERPS. 
The purpose of the quinquennial Reviews is "to establish the rates of C<intribution likely to be required in 
future  years  to  meet the  cost  of the  benefits  provided  for  under the National  Insurance  Scheme".  ln 
calculating the projected rates for the future, no allowance has been made for the possible payment of any 
Treasury grant into the National Insurance Fund.' (The Social Security Act 1993 introduced the "Treasury 
grant" to enable the payment into the National Insurance Fund ·of money provided by Parliament. The grant 
is subject to a maximum of 17 per. cent of  benefit expenditure in future years.) ... 
104 
. finance  expenditure: the relationship between numbers of contributors and numbers of 
pensioners and the relationship between average eaniings levels and benefit rates. 
Due to the increasing numbers of  people over pensionable age and to the stable and then 
decreasing numbers of people of working age,  the  depe~dency ratio projected on the 
basis of  updated demographic assumptions increases from 48.5 per cent in 2000 to 60 
per cent in 2020 and  to 76.7  per cent in 2040.  In forty  years  the ratio  is  therefore 
projected to increase by 58.1  per cent (over the same period the demographic old-age 
dependency ratio increases by 66.6 per cent).266  ·  ·  . 
As to the transfer ratio, under the assumption of  price indexation ofbenefits, the pension 
at award (for men and women on average earnings) as a percentage of earnings before 
retirement would decrease from 33 and 36 per cent in 1995, respectively for men and 
women, to 28 and 31  per cent in 2020 and to 22 and 27 per cent by the year 2040. These 
projections  are  broadly  consistent  with  those  of the  Second  Quinquennial  Review 
.  (1990).  267 
As a result,  the contribution rate would fluctuate over a ·narrow range (around  18  per 
cent)  until  2020,  as  the growing  cost of SERPS  and  the  increase  in  the number of 
pensioners is broadly offset by the continuos fall in the level of  flat-rate benefits relative 
to earnings. It  would then reach a peak in the year 2030. It  would later decline following 
the improvement in the old-age dependency ratio and the continuous decline in the level 
of  both pensions. The 2030 peak was expected .to be nearly 2 percentage points higher 
than current contribution rate;  it was also  about  1. 5 per cent higher than the estimate · 
carried out in 1990. 
New changes in pension rules were introduced with the  1995.Pension~ Act.268 · 
a)  Female  state pensionable age will increase from  60 to 65.  The increase will  be 
phased  in  between  2010  and  2020.  It will  affect  basic  and  earnings-related 
pensions. 
b)  The calculation of  the earnings factors used to derive SERPS entitlements is to be 
amended from April 2000 onwards: the lower earnings limit in each financial year 
will be deducted from the relevant earnings before revaluation to retirement age 
(instead Qf deducting it from the revalued earnings factor). 269 
c)  Contributors  will  no  longer  accrue  any  SERPS  entitlement  in.  respect  of 
contracted-out earnings from 1997. 
266 
267 
268 
269 
It was assumed that the total period fertility rate would rise gradually.from the actual 1.8 children per 
woman to I.  9 by the end of  the century and remain at that level thereafter. 
Both the basic pension and the earnings-related pension (from the year 2000) would decline as a percentage· 
of earnings before retirement. These projections were carried out on the a8sumption of a  growth in real 
earnings of 1.5 per cent a year. 
The reforms are described in Government Actuary's (l994). 
Since revalued earnings are greater than earnings before revaluation, this measure will decrease the pension 
amount.  ·  ·  · 105 
The effects of the 1995. Reform are analysed  in Government Actuary (1994 and 1995). 
The change in female retirement age is expected to increase the number of contributors 
to the pension scheme (by 0.8  millions in 2020 and  2030  and by  0.6 - 0.7 millions .in 
2040 and 2050) and to reduce the number of pensioners (by 0  .1. millions in 2010, 1.1  in 
2020, 2.2 in 2030, 1.7 in 2040 and 1.9 in 2050270). The improvement in the ratio of  basic 
pensioners to contributors is  quite substantial: while under existing legislation the ratio 
was projected to rise from 48 per cent in the year 2000 to 60 per cent in 2020 and 77 per 
cent in 2040, after the introduction ofthe new rules it is projected to reach 50 per cent in 
2020 and 67 per cent in 2040 (Table 11.15b, point 4).271 
The average amoun~  paid to basic -pensioners will increase, as females are likely to retire 
with longer contributory records.  Therefore, in the year 2020, in spite of a 23  per cent 
reduction in the  number· of basic  pensioners,  the  reform is  expected  to reduce basic 
pension expenditure by about 10 per cent. 
The changes introduced in SERPS  rules will reduce the ratio of the ·average earnings-
related  pension  to  average  earnings  and  strengthen  the  effects  of. the  increase  in 
retirement  age.  Altogether,  the  reform  is  expected  to  re(iuce  SERPS  expenditure  by 
about 25 per cent in 2020 and by more than 45 per cent in 2040. · 
Under the assumption of price indexation of pensions, the contribution rate will decline 
from  18.2  per cent in  1995  to  16.8  per cent in 2020  and  14  per  cent  in  2050.  The 
increase  in  the  old-age  dependency -ratio  will  be fully _offset  by  the. reduction in the 
eligibility  and  transfer ratios.  The  1. 5 per cent yearly gap  between earnings  aJ:ld  basic 
pension dynamics will reduce the ratio of  the latter to avera~e male earnings from 16 per 
cent in 1995 to 11  per cent in 2020 and 7 per cent in 2050.2  2  .  · 
With pensions indexed to earnings, the reform is also expected to reduce the equilibrium 
contribution rate by nearly 3 percentage points from 2030 onwards. The required rates of 
contribution would rise steadily from  18.25  per cent to 22.2 per cent in 2020 and 25.3 
per cent in 2050. 
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These estimates refer to basic pensions. 
Because of  the increase in female retirement age, the old-age dependency ratio would increase: from 30.1 
per cent in 1994 to 41.5 per cent in 2050, as against 49.4 per cent under previous legislation. 
The latest Department of Social Security (1995) projections estimate that between 1994 and the year 2000 
old-age  pension  expenditure  will  increase  in real  terms  by  12  per cent (Table  ll.15b, point  5).  These 
projections  are  based  on  the  same  demographic  assumptions  referred  to  in  Government  Actuary's 
Department (1990), on the assumption of GDP real growth of 2 per cent per year and on unemployment 
remaining at around 2.4 million throughout the period. yj 
UNITED KINGDOM "I 
1.  Government Actuary's Department<2><3>,  1984 
Old-age dependency ratio<4l% 
Dependency Ratio<5l % 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate% (for benefits 
payable to people over minimum pension age) 
Price indexation of flat-rate pensi<>ns 
Wage indexation of flat-rate pensions 
2. Government Actuary's Department<Z><6l, 1986 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate % 
Before the 1986 Refonn 
Price indexation of basic pensions 
Wage indexation of basic pensions 
After the 1986 Refonn<7) 
Price indexation of basic pensions 
Wage indexation of basic pensions 
3.  Government Actuary's Department<2J(ll), 1990 
Men's Transfer Ratio<9l % 
Price indexation of  basic pensions 
Wage indexation of  basic pensions 
Women's Transfer Ratio<9l% 
·  Price indexation of basic pensions 
Wage indexation ofbasic pensions 
Old-Age Dependency Ratio<4l % 
Dependency Ratio<10l o/o 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate<lll % 
Price indexation of flat-rate pensions 
Wage indexation of flat-rate pensions 
30 
44 
12.5 
12.5 
14.5 
15.8 
14.6 
15.9 
28 
28 
35 
35 
30 
48 
19.1 
19.1 
30 
45 
11.9 
13.3 
47 
18.1 
19.2 
14.3 
17 
14.1 
17 
35 
37 
40 
43 
30 
47 
17.8 
19.9 
29 
45 
11.9 
14.3 
15.4 
20 
14.3 
18.9 
30 
34 
35 
40 
31 
50 
17.4 
21.3 
32 
50 
13.3 
17 
,, 
• 
16.8 
23.4 
14.4 
20.9 
28 
34 
33 
, 40 
35 
'55 
17.8 
23.5 
,• . 
37 
56 
14.7 
19.9 
18.5 
27.3 
14.5 
23.2 
25 
33 
30 
39 
42 
64 
18.4 
26.4 
Table ll.15a 
16.5 
25.3 
12.2 
21 
221 
32 
28 
39 
42 
63 
16.4 
25.8 
I)  National Insurance includes the universal basic pension scheme and the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS). Pensions contracted out of  SERPS are not considered. 
2)  Data refer to budgeting years. The year Considered in. the headlines is the ftrst of the two calendar years jointly covered by each budgetary year. All projections carried out by the Government Actuary are based on a 1.5% yearly real earnings gro\\th. 
3)  "Population and Pension Costs".  · 
4)  Number of  men aged 65 and over+ Number of  women aged 60 and over /Number of  men between 16 and 64 +Number of  women between 16 and 59. 
5)  Number of  Pensioners f Number of contributors. 
6)  "Government Actuary's Report on Social Security Billl986". Data attributed in this table to years  1990, 2000, 2010, 2020, 20:10, 2040 and 2050 actually refer to years 1993-94, 2003-04, 20 IJ!-14, 2023-24, 2033-34, 2043-44 and 2053-54. 
7)  Based on the assumption that 0.5 million additional workers will ultimately contract out.  · 
8)  ":--Ia tiona! Insurance Fund Long-Term Financial Estimates". 
9)  Pensions at award for men/women on average earnings as a percentage of  earnings before retirement on the assumption of  a growth in real earnings of 1. 5% a year. 
I  0)  NU!11ber of  basic retirement pensioners f Number of  llOtltributors. Calculated from Tables 10 and  12 of the Report. 
11)  The rates shown are th~ main Class 1 joint employeefempluyer contributions for National Insurance (i.e. el!icluding NHS contributions). 
15 
24,2 
10.8 
20 
19 
32 
26 
39 
, 38 
59 
14.1 
24.5 
' 
~ UNITED KINGDOM  II 
4.  Government Actuary's Department<2l, 1994<3> 
and 1995<4> 
a)  Before the 1994 Reform 
Men's Transfer Ratio(5J  % 
Price indexation of basic pensions 
(percentage of basic pension) 
Wage indexation of  basic pensions 
(percentage of basic pension) 
Women's Transfer Ratio(5J% 
Price indexation of basic pensions 
(percentage of basic pension) 
Wage indexation of basic pensions 
(percentage ofbasic pension) 
Old-Age Dependency Ratio(6l % 
Dependency Ratio(?) % 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate(8J o/o 
Price indexation of  flat-rate pensions 
Wage indexation of flat-rate pensions 
b) After the 1994 Reform 
Old-Age Dependency Ratio(9J % 
Dependency Ratio(?) % 
Equilibrium Contribution Rate(SJ % 
Price indexation offl!lt-rate pensions 
Wage indexation of flat-rate pensions 
5. Department of Social Security<2>,  1995 
Old-age Pension Expenditure in real terms 
33 
(15) 
33 
(15) 
36 
(21) 
37 
(21) 
30.1 
18.25 
18.25 
I 
24.4 
100 
34  30 
(14)  (12) 
35  33 
(15)  (15) 
37  33 
(20)  (17) 
39  37 
(21)  (21) 
29.9  32.3 
48.5  52.1 
17.6  17.6 
18.8  20.9 
24.3  25.3 
48  51 
17.7  17.4 
19.0  20.9 
-
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l) National Insurance includes the universal basic pension scheme ·and the State Eatnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS). Pensions contracted out of  SERPS are not considered. 
Table B15b 
28  25  22  19 
(10)  (9)  (8)  (7) 
32  32  31  31 
(15)  (15)  (15)  (15) 
31  29  27  25 
(15)  (13)  (11)  (9) 
37  36  36  36 
(2l)  (21)  (21)  (21) 
37.7  46.9  49.8  49.4 
60  73.2  76.7  75.7 
18.7  20  18.7  16.8 
24.2  28.1  28.7  28.2 
30.2  37.6  42.1  40.7 
50  61  67  65 
16.8  17.2  15.8  14 
22.2  25.4  25.9  25.3 
2} Data refer to budgeting years. nie year considered in the headlines is the first of  the two calendar years jointly covered by each budgetary year.  All projections canied out by the Government Actuary are based on a 1.5% yearly real earnings growth. 
3)  "Pensions Bil11994. Report by the Government Actuary on the Financial Provisions of  the Bill on the National Insurance Fund." 
4)  "National Insurance Fund Long Tenn Financial Estimates" (Report.by the Government Actuary on the Third Quinquennial Review under Section 137 of  the Social Securiy Act 1975). 
5)  Petisions at award for men/women on average earnings as a percentage of  earnings before retirement on the assumption of  a growth in real earnings of  1:5% a year. 
6)  Nwnber of  men aged 65 and over+ Number of  women aged 60 and over I Number of  men between 16 and 64 +Number of  women between 16 and  ~9. Data attributed to the year 1994 actually refers to the year 1992. 
7)  Nwnber of  basic retirement pensioners I Number of  contn"butors. For the 1990 projection, data are calculated from Appendix D and E of the 1994 Report. 
8)  The rates sh,own are the main Class 1 joint employee/employer contributions for National Insurance (i.e. excluding NHS contributions). 
9)  Number of  people aged 65 and over I Number of  people between 16 and 64. Calculated from Table Cl (Appendix C). 
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ANNEX  A 
DATA ON PENSION EXPENDITURE IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION MEMBER STATES 
The data on social protection expenditure in the EU Member States are drawn up by 
Eurostat according to the European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics 
(ESSPROS). 
Benefits in cash and in kind to households are classified in 11  categories according to 
their  different  functions  (or  social  risk):  sickness;  invalidity/disability;  occupational 
accidents  and  disease;  old-age;  survivors;  maternity;  family;  placement/vocational 
guidance/resettlement;  unemployment;  housing;  miscellaneous.  Benefits  are  also 
classified by group of schemes (basic,  supplementary, means-tested}and by types (e.g., 
pensions, lump-sum payments).  ·  · 
Public pension expenditure is included in the old-age,  survivors and invalidity/disability 
categories. 
a)  "Old-age is defined as the state of having reached a certain minimum age, beyond 
which, as a rule, one's main occupation may cease" (Eurostat, 1992a, p.  9). 
b)  "A survivor's benefit is a benefit granted on the basis of  a derived right, i.e.  a right 
originally acquired by another person whose death is  a condition· for granting the 
benefit" (Eurostat, 1993, p.  9). 
c)  "Invalidity/disability (physical or mental) is the inability to engage in any activity 
to a minimum prescribed extent, or to lead a normal life" (Eurostat, 1992b, p.  9). 
In most countries public pensions represent most of the expenditure included in  these 
categories, that  also include: public cash benefits that are not pensions, public benefits in 
· kind, pensions and other benefits paid by private institutions. 120 
Eurostat's  statistics  concerning  total  social  expenditure  for  old-age,  survivors  and 
disability functions are ·available up to the year 1993.273 More detailed statistics, allowing 
the identification of public pension expenditure. are presently available only up to  1988 
for old-age pensions and up to 1990 for survivors and disability pensions.274 
A1 - Social expenditure for old-age, survivors and invalidity/disability in 1980-1993 
Table  AI  reports  the  GDP  ratio  of social  expenditure  for  old-age,  survivors  and 
invalidity/disability  in the period  1980-1993.  The weighted  ratio  for  the  12  Member 
States increased from  12.2 per cent in 1980  to 13.4 in  1983, Thereafter,  it remained 
rather stable up to 1990, then increased, reaching 14.7 per cent in.1993. 
Between 1980 and  1993  the expenditure ratio  expanded in every country:  the lowest 
increases were recorded in Ireland (0.2 per cent) and Germany (0.3 per cent); the highest 
in Gr.eece (4.8 per cent) and Italy (5.9 per cent). Most countries with higher than average 
expenditure  ratios  in  1980  recorded  r~latively low  increases  in the  following  years. 
Countries with lower than  average  ratios  usually  recorded  ~gh increases.  The  main 
exception to this convergence trend were represented by Ireland and the Netherlands. 
The increase  in  expenditure  is  mostly  due  to  the  old-age· function  (Table  A2):  the 
weighed average for the 12 EU countries increased from 8. 0 per  cent in 1980 to .1 0.1 per 
cent in 1993. Survivors' expenditure remained basically stable (from 2.1  per cent in 1980 
to 2.2 in 1993 -Table A3). Invalidity/disability expenditure increased  in most countries: 
the weighted average expanded from 2.1  per c~nt in 1980 to. 2. 5 in 1993  (Table A4). In 
the United Kingdom its GDP ratio  increased by 1.3 points, in Greece by 0.6 points. 
A2. Estimates of 1995 ratio of  total public pension expenditure to GDP. 
The following  estimates of the ratio  of public pension expenditure to GDP  have been 
used in Section 6: 
Austria: 10.8 per cent. As indicated by the Federal Ministry.ofLabour and Social ~airs 
in October 1995. This  estimate does not include pension expenditure for public sector 
employees. 
Belgium: 10.5 per cent. It is the ratio reported for 1.991 in Englert et al.  (1994). 
Denmark: 9.3 per cent. As indicated by the Ministry of  Finance in September 1995. 
Finland: ·13.4 per cent. As indicated by the Government Institute for Economic Research 
in September 1995. 
273  The data concerning social expenditure and GDP in 1993  are reported in Eurostat (1995). In the case of 
Finland the data actually refer to 1992.  · 
274  See Eurostat (1992a, 1992b, 1993). 1980  1981  1982 
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UK  10.7  11.6  11.6 
EUR 12  12.2  12.8  13.2 
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Old-age Social Expertditure I GDP  . 
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Sun-ivors' Social Expenditure /GDP 
1980  1981  1982  1983  .1984  1985  1986  1987 
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1 
2 
1.3 
2A 
3.7 
1.7 
1 
0.2 
2 
1990 
2.3 
2.5 
2.3 
1.8 
1.6 
3.6 
1.6 
1.3 
1.6 
3.1 
7 
1.9 
2.5 
2.2 
Table A3 
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I 
I 
• .....  I 
1991  1992  1993! 
! 
2.9  2.6  2.8 
0  0  0 
2.9  3  3 
1.6  1.6  1.6 
2  2.1  2.2 
1.2  1.3 
2  2  2.1 
1.3  1.3  1.3 
2.5  2.7  2.7 
4.3  4.2  4.4 
1.7  1.7  1.7 
1.1  1.2  1.3 
0.3  0.3  0.3 
2  2.1  2.2 
Table A4 
! 
1991  1992  1993• 
2.3  2  2.41 
2.6  2.6  2.71 
2.4  2.4  2.61 
1.6  1.5  1.5 
1.6  1.7  1.8 
4.2  4.7 
1.6  1.6  1.7 
1.3  1.4  1.4 
1.5  1.6  1.7 
3.1  3.2  3.3 
7,1  7.2  7.2 
1.9  1.9  2 
2.9  2.9  3.1 
2.3  2.3  2.5 
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France:  8.7  per cent.  In General Planning Committee (1995,  p.  94) the  1993  pension 
expenditure of the main schemes (Regime  general,  Fonctionnaires  civils,  CNRACL, 
SNCF, ARRCO, AGIRC, Exploitants agricoles) is reported as FF 618,9 billion. 
Germany:  12.0 per cent. In Federal Ministry ofLabour and Social Affairs (1994, p.  36), 
the share of pension expenditure to GDP in  1993  (West+East) is estimated at 12.0 per 
cent of GDP (General  System= 10.1  per cent;  Special  Systems  for Farmers and  the 
Professions= 0.3; Civil Service Pensions= 1.6 per cent). 
Greece:  11.9 per cent.  Pensions (primary and supplementary) of IKA,  OGA,  and other 
institutions  (excluding  Civil  Servants'  pensions)  represents  9.5  per  cent  of GDP  (as 
estimated by the Ministry of  Public Health, Welfare and Social Insurance); Civil Servants' 
pensions represent 2.4 per cent ofGDP (as estimated in the Budget ofthe Goverrurient). 
Ireland:  3.9  per cent.  As  indicated  by  the National Pensions Board  in  January  1996, 
estimated total expenditure in 1995  on pension benefits (as categorised in table 7 of the 
National Pensions Board Final Report) was £1.494 billion. Provisional out-turn for GDP 
in 1995 (consistent with Budget 1996) was £38.3 billion. 
Italy:  15.1  per cent. It is the 1994 ratio of  total public expenditure for old-age, survivors 
and  disability  pensions  to GDP.  Source:  Ministry  of Budget and  Economic Planning 
(1995). 
Luxembourg:  10.2  per  cent.  In  Ministry  of Social  Security  (1995),  1994  penswn 
expenditure  by  contributory  schemes  is  reported  as  LFR  44.7  billion; · penswn 
expenditure by non-contributory schemes is reported as LFR 14.1 billion.  . 
The Netherlands:  14.4 per cent.  In.  1993  total. social expenditure on old-age,  survivors 
and disability represented  19.1  per cent of GDP (Eurostat,  1995).  The share of public 
pensions  on  total  social  expenditure  has  been  computed  assuming  that  it  remained 
constant on ·the  1988-1990 level.  The following  data has been considered:  a)  In  1988 
public pensions represented 84 of  total social expenditure for old-age (Eurostat, 1992a); 
b) in  1990  public  pensions  represented  80  per  cent  of total  social  expenditure  for 
survivors (Eurostat,  1993); c) in the same year public pensions represented 63  per cent 
oftotal social expenditure for disability.· 
Portugal: 6.4 per cent. In Centre fo.r Financial Economics Research (1995) total pension 
expenditure in 1995 is estimates as 1018 billion ESC. 
Spain:  9.1  per cent.  In Ministry  of Labour  and  Sociat  Security  (1995,  p.  38)  1995 
pension expenditure is reported as PTA 6220 billion (9.06 per cent ofGDP). 
Sweden:  12.3  per cent.  Public  pension  expenditur~ in  1995  is  estimated in  Swedish 
Parliament  (1994,  p.  81,  Table  4.7)  in  198.2  billion  SK.  In European  Commission 
(1995b), Swedish 1995 GDP is estimated in 1616 billion SK. 
United Kingdom:  6.5  per cent.  As  indicated by  the Department of Social  Security  in 
October 1995, total expenditure on basic and earnings relat'ed pension, widow's pension 
and income support to pensioners is expected to amount to 34.7 billion£ (5.0 per cent of 
GDP,  assuming GDP growth of 3.25  % from  1994 to  1995).  In  1988  expenditure on 
old-age  and  survivors  pensions  for  civil  servants  amounted  to  1.5  per  cent  of GDP 
(Eurostat, 1992a, 1993). ANNEX  B 
PENSION EXPENDITURE DYNAMICS: CHARTS ON DEMOGRAPHIC 
AND NON-DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS 
Bl.  Austria 
B2.  Belgium 
B3.  Denmark 
B4.  Finland 
B5.  France 
B6.  Germany 
B7.  Greece 
BS.  Ireland 
B9.  Italy 
BlO.  Luxembourg 
Bll.  The Netherlands 
B12.  Portugal 
B13.  Spain 
B14.  Sweden. 
B15.  United Kingdom 
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